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Conscience, ethics and politics: beyond beautiful souls. 
 





This thesis examines the conceptual and practical difficulties posed by the use of conscience. 
In order to address those difficulties, it looks at the figure of the beautiful soul in romantic 
literature as an important resource with which to re-assess the problem of conscience. To 
show how this thesis stages a conversation between three thinkers: Charles Taylor, Gillian 
Rose and Rowan Williams. I offer a critical survey of efforts to respond to the difficulties 
that conscience presents, before examining Taylor’s work on moral inarticulacy and 
secularity, so as to contextualize the problem of conscience and show why people are 
pressured to rely on conscience as a moral principle despite the problem. Then I introduce 
the beautiful soul as a compelling depiction of what it feels like to organize your life by 
following your conscience.  I focus first on the story of the beautiful soul in Goethe’s Wilhelm 
Meister’s Apprenticeship, in order to build up a picture of the key movements in the beautiful 
soul’s understanding of conscience as an expression of individuality and to see why 
cultivating a beautiful soul might be a modern temptation. Then I consider the story of the 
beautiful soul in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which interrogates individuality as a justified 
norm and indicates how we might avoid the temptation to cultivate a beautiful soul. Next 
I examine Gillian Rose’s claim that Hannah Arendt succumbed to that temptation. I argue 
that Rose’s claim has its basis in Arendt’s struggle to rework the concept of conscience after 
the trial of Eichmann.  I return to Taylor’s proposal that we take a theological approach in 
this secular age and set out the distinctive features of conscience, drawing up the insights of 
Rowan Williams.  This thesis argues that the beautiful soul issues two important warnings 
about conscience. With regards to efforts to theorize conscience, the beautiful soul offers a 
salient reminder that conscience is formal and that its formalism always has the potential 
to undermine its purported morality.  With regards to the use of conscience in practice, the 
beautiful soul warns of serious pitfalls associated with responding to ethical and political 
issues as if they were personal matters that could be addressed by curating your life 
according to conscience. It is still possible to make public appeal to your conscience and 
avoid the fate of the beautiful soul, but only if we heed these two warnings. That means we 
must not assume conscience to be a self-explanatory moral principle, and we must resist 
treating it as a single, weighty decision for or against institutional life without considering 
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The beautiful soul is a literary figure that gained widespread popularity in the eighteenth 
century through poems, plays, novels, autobiographical works and philosophical 
reflections.  The beautiful soul is known by her intense feelings, her moral purity and her 
refusal of limits, which defines the scope of her involvement in the institutions that make up 
social and political life.  Above all, the beautiful soul is a creature of conscience.  This soul 
longs for a way of being in the modern world that does not contribute to its ills and 
endeavors to find a way of living that brings her actions into alignment with her beliefs.  So, 
the beautiful soul focuses on what she personally, individually, can do to manage her moral 
responsibilities, thereby enacting many of the struggles of living in accord with one’s 
conscience.  Following the struggles of the beautiful soul is meant to be formative and 
instructive, both for her as she writes about the difficulties she faces and for those who read 
her record of it.  The figure of the beautiful soul therefore offers herself up self-consciously, 
as a resource for thinking about the meaning, function and significance of conscience.   
 
Three scholars of Hegel–Charles Taylor, the late Gillian Rose and Rowan Williams–have 
looked at facets of the beautiful soul tradition and at the ethical and political discourses that 
frame the problem of conscience.  Putting their work side by side offers tantalizing 
suggestions about what we might learn about conscience from the beautiful soul; however, 
this has not yet been done. In fact, the literature on the history of conscience has taken 
almost no notice of figure of the beautiful soul or her cautionary tale. The aim of this thesis 
is to stage a conversation between these three thinkers so that the problem of conscience 
can be re-assessed in light of the beautiful soul.  
 
I offer a critical survey of recent efforts to provide a history of conscience and to give new 
definition to conscience, characterizing the ways scholars have sought to respond to the 
difficulties posed by conscience and demonstrating why those efforts fall short. Moreover, 
these efforts do not adequately contend with two aspects of conscience that need to be held 
in tension: its normativity and its formalism (chapter I). Conscience is normative in that it 
sets a standard for making judgments about what behavior is good or permissible for a 
person. And conscience is formal, or empty, because it does not contain, in and of itself, 
anything about standard it sets.  The problem of conscience, with which current approaches 
to conscience do not adequately contend, is that the formalism of conscience has the 
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potential to undermine the morality of conscience. To put it another way, claims of 
conscience refer to a particular experience of moral obligation, but because of their 
formalism, claims of conscience are not comprised of anything that could confirm the 
obligation is in fact moral. A new approach to the problem of conscience is needed. 
 
I then turn to Charles Taylor’s account of moral inarticulacy and of secularism. Going over 
Taylor’s work in these areas allows me to situate the problem of conscience within the 
unresolved debates of modernity (chapter II). Extrapolating from Taylor’s work, I show 
why people are pressured to rely on conscience as a moral principle despite the difficulties 
it poses and the need for a new approach (chapter II).   
 
The figure of the beautiful soul offers important warnings about undertaking this.  So before 
delineating the form that a new approach to conscience should take, I turn to the figure of 
the beautiful soul and its depiction of conscience. My aim in examining the morality tales 
in which the beautiful soul figures is to bring into full view the possibilities and pitfalls of 
conceptualizing conscience and of making claims of conscience in public discourse. I focus 
first on the story of the beautiful soul narrated by Goethe, which portrays what generating 
ethical ideals and moral practices out of nothing but one’s own mind or will entails (chapter 
III). My reading of Goethe’s narration aims to build up a picture of the key movements in 
the beautiful soul’s understanding of conscience and of the key moments in her attempts to 
live by conscience alone.  I proceed in some detail in order to provide a counterbalance to 
the abstraction of later representations of the beautiful soul.   
 
After establishing how the conscience of the beautiful soul is figured in my reading of 
Goethe, I turn to the phenomenology of the beautiful soul narrated by Hegel. Of particular 
importance is the way in which Hegel has the beautiful soul interrogate individual 
conscience as a justified norm (chapter IV). My reading of Hegel examines how the project 
of cultivating a beautiful soul offers a way of framing a particular matter as a moral issue 
when one is unable or unwilling to engage with it as a political issue. My reading also 
clarifies why Hegel believed that project to be futile and self-defeating. 
 
In opening up these cautionary tales about the conscience of the beautiful soul, I seek to 
uncover why cultivating a beautiful soul is seen as a perennial modern temptation.  To that 
end, I provide a critical assessment of Hannah Arendt’s efforts to rework the concept of 
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conscience, before turning to consider Gillian Rose’s indictment of Arendt as having a 
beautiful soul (chapter V). Here again the figure of the beautiful soul stands as a warning 
about the dangers of treating conscience as a private matter that can be separated from 
politics and ethics. It also stands as a warning about assuming conscience to be a single, 
weighty decision without giving due consideration to the practices, dispositions and virtues 
that shape what decisions come before conscience.  
 
For a new approach to the problem of conscience, I return to Charles Taylor’s claim that 
we need to consider moral motivations with sources that transcend the human sphere. 
Allowing for strong moral motivations gives us a starting place for developing a more 
theologically informed understanding of conscience. To show how this understanding of 
conscience might begin to take shape, I draw upon the theological perspective of Rowan 
Williams to set out the key features of conscience that need to be developed (chapter VI).  
In conclusion I argue that in this historical moment when the temptation to cultivate a 
beautiful soul is evident, and men and women are increasingly falling back on conscience 
as a privileged source of moral authority, public appeals of conscience will continue to be 
problematic. Nevertheless, continuing to develop the concept of conscience along the lines 





















Conscience and its complexities:  




 The history of conscience in the Western ethical tradition… is a moving, tortuous 
record of decline and fall which forces upon us in our time the frankest possible facing 
of a sharp alternative: either “do the conscience over” or “do the conscience in!” 
Ethical theory must either dispose of the conscience altogether or completely 
transform the interpretation of its ethical nature, function and significance.1  
 
The problem of conscience–where it comes from, to what exactly it refers, how it justifies 
moral behavior, what authority it has and whether it even exists–has been debated for 
centuries. Conscience seems to be intrinsically problematic. It is problematic in the sense of 
arising in the context of moral dilemmas and difficulties and in the sense of calling into 
question settled norms and customs. It is also problematic in the sense of posing problems 
in both common speech and in moral, theological and political discourse.  
At its most basic, conscience is the experience of being bound by a moral obligation.  
However, the nature of that experience, that is, the moral assessment at the center of a 
claim of conscience does not have a fixed structure that has existed always and everywhere. 
The concept of conscience as an ethical reality has been in currency for more than two 
thousand years, and in that time, it has been used to describe many different experiences. 
Consequently, there has never been one simple, settled understanding of conscience across 
history. In fact, the concept of conscience has shown remarkable proficiency in adapting to 
new circumstances and bearing new meanings.  
Paul Lehmann described conscience as having a “tortuous” history, and his words are often 
repeated in the literature when analyses of the concept of conscience reveal an ambiguous, 
complicated and contested term. This chapter shows what often happens when scholars 
delve into the history of conscience in an effort to manage the problem of the conscience. I 
begin by assessing efforts to situate conscience in its semantic context, showing why they 
 
1 Paul Louis Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (London: SCM Press, 1963), 327. 
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are unsatisfactory. Then I evaluate other approaches that extend beyond the semantics of 
conscience but do not extend far enough.  My contention is that these approaches fail to 
provide sufficient resources to adequately analyze the ambiguities that have posed problems 
for conscience over the course of its history. Furthermore, these efforts to manage the 
ambiguity of conscience obscure two aspects of conscience which need to be held in tension: 
its formalism and its morality. This chapter concludes by assessing projects which attempt 
to do conscience over in light of other related, concepts, showing why those attempts do 
not address the problem head on. 
 
Exclusively attending to the language of conscience  
 
A common approach for handling the changes that conscience has undergone historically 
is to examine what has happened to the terminology of conscience. Tracing the history of 
the terms for conscience reveals a good number of the concept’s tortuous paths. There have 
been many terms for conscience including conscientia, syneidêsis and synderesis. Moreover, that 
list of terms continues to expand, as different aspects of conscience are renamed, in an effort 
to clear up misunderstanding and reinterpret conscience to serve ethical theory, political 
life and the church as it enters new situations. 
 
The hope of those who approach conscience this way is that by unpicking some of the 
semantic knots we can come to a fuller understanding of what conscience has meant in the 
past and should mean now. But unpicking the threads in the semantic knots will not 
necessarily produce an unambiguous concept free of conceptual tangles with which to work 
going forward. In fact, the language of conscience has been particularly resistant to such 
attempts at unpicking. Historians of conscience who try to study it lexically are often left to 
cherry pick among the various terms those which seem most ripe for reappraisal. 
 
To take just one example of the contradictions in contemporary understanding of 
conscience that trouble scholars, we could turn to the Second Vatican Council documents, 
and in particular to Gaudium et Spes. 2  These documents articulate different views of 
 
2 Catholic Church, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium Et Spes (Washington: United 
States Catholic Conference, 1965). 
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conscience, some of which conflict, especially when compared with other official teachings.3 
On one hand, conscience is a synonym for personal responsibility and a subjective standard 
for action, which might give individuals authority to dissent from the teaching of the 
magisterium. This is a personalist reading of the documents. 4  On the other hand, 
conscience is a source of objective norms imposed on individuals who passively receive the 
moral law discovered in the depths of their souls. This is an ecclesialist reading of the 
documents.5 Frustration with the contradictory uses of the concept of conscience in Second 
Vatican documents and the hope of finding a clear meaning for conscience with authority 
for Roman Catholic moral life has inspired many historical investigations into the terms 
used for conscience in earlier periods.  
 
Those historical studies show that scholastic debate about conscience revolved principally 
around two words: conscientia and synderesis. Synderesis is a strange term that appears to have 
entered the discussion by means of an enigmatic passage in Jerome’s commentary on the 
prophecy of Ezekiel. In Ezekiel’s vision, four living creatures come out of a fiery cloud, each 
having the face of a human, a lion, an ox and an eagle. In the key passage of Jerome’s 
commentary, he mentions several interpretations of Ezekiel’s vision of the four living 
creatures, which read the faces as representing the structure of the human soul, before 
offering this explanation of them: 
 
 These writers interpret the vision in terms of Plato’s theory of the three elements of 
the soul. There are Reason, Spirit, and Desire; to these correspond respectively the 
man, the lion, and the ox. Now, above these three was the eagle; so in the soul, they 
say, above the other three elements and beyond them is a fourth, which the Greeks 
call synderesis. This is that spark of conscience which was not quenched even in the 
heart of Cain, when he was driven out of paradise. This it is that makes us, too, feel 
our sinfulness when we are overcome by evil Desire or unbridled Spirit, or deceived 
by sham Reason. It is natural to identify synderesis with the eagle, since it is distinct 
from the other three elements and corrects them when they err. This is that spirit 
which, as we read in Scripture, “intercedes for us with groans beyond all utterance.” 
 
3 The 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor (paragraphs 54-64) and the Catechesis (I.6) shows the same tension with 
respect to the primacy given to the law and the consideration given to the subject, the tension that can be 
seen in all the official documents that deal with conscience. 
4 For a presentation of the personalist view see Charles E. Curran, Conscience (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2004); 
Linda Hogan, Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 2000).  
5 The ecclesial view is that the moral truth is primarily to be attained by conformity of one’s conscience to 
the definitions put forth by the hierarchical teaching office. For a sample of writings that present the 
ecclesial view, see Karl Rahner, Nature and Grace: And Other Essays (London: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 84-111; 
Livio Melina, “Moral Conscience and Communio: Toward a Response to the Challenge of Ethical 
Pluralism,” Communio 20, no. Winter (1992); John M. Haas, Crisis of Conscience (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 1996). 
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“Who else can know a man’s thoughts, except the man’s own spirit that is within 
him?” This is that spirit which Paul prayed might be kept unimpaired with soul and 
body. And yet in some men we see this conscience overthrown and displaced; they 
have no sense of guilt or shame for their sins; as it is written, “Little the godless man 
recks of it, when he falls into sin’s mire.” They deserve the rebuke, “Still never a 
blush on thy harlot’s brow.”6 
 
Jerome’s reading of Ezekiel raised a number of interpretative problems.7 It was unclear 
what medieval commentators should do with the terms conscientia and synderesis. Synderesis 
looked like the Greek word syneidesis, which is the standard correlate in Greek Patristic 
literature for the Latin conscientia, but the use of conscientia and synderesis in the passage seemed 
to imply a distinction between these terms. Jerome’s text refers to synderesis as a spark from 
conscience’s flame, which implies that they are different aspects of the same thing. 
However, the text also implies that they are different things, in that synderesis is something 
that could not be extinguished (“even in the heart of Cain”), whereas conscience could be 
extinguished (in, for instance, Israel who “falls into sin’s mire” but feels no shame.) To 
complicate matters further, the text presents synderesis as something which exists “above and 
beyond” the other parts of the soul and is distinct from them. Sydneresis corrects anger, 
appetite and reason, moreover it is likened to a spirit that knows our thoughts and guides 
our reasoning. So is synderesis a part of the soul along with reason, spirit and desire, which 
would suggest it is a faculty akin to the faculties of reason, irascible appetite and 
concupiscible appetite? Or is it better understood as a guiding spirit or oracle? The 
confusion forced the Scholastics into a myriad of subtle reflections about the relation of this 
new term to conscience which ultimately developed into two treatises: one on synderesis, 
understood as the spark which illuminates conscience and cannot be extinguished, and the 
other on conscientia, understood as the fire itself, which might err by attaching itself to an 
object inferior to reason. In this way, the terms became rooted in the tradition.8  
 
6 This is Eric D’Arcy’s translation. Eric D'Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1961), 16-7. 
7 In addition to the problems raised by the terminology, interpretation s muddied by what one scholar 
called “a blunder of remarkable proportions.” Douglas Kries sheds light on this problem, which comes 
down to the fact that Jerome was not describing his own interpretation of conscience but Origin’s - a fact 
which was overlooked by Scholastic commentators. So in a curious twist of fate, “Jerome, a great and 
sometimes vehement critic of Origen, passes on to the medieval period an account of his adversary’s theory 
of conscience under the authority of his own illustrious name.” Douglas Kries, “Origen, Plato, and 
Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome’s Ezekiel Commentary,” Traditio 57 (2002): 83. 
8 For a detailed discussion of the development of these two treatises, see Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Philippe Delhaye and Charles Underhill Quinn, 
The Christian Conscience (New York: Desclee, 1968); Michael G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late 
Scholasticism and the Young Luther, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1977); Robert 
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Thomas Aquinas tried to clarify these treatises by treating synderesis as the habitus of the first 
principles of practical reason, where habitus is understood to be like an innate ability or 
disposition that enables one to grasp the basic truths of morality, and conscientia is an act of 
applying the first principles of practical reasoning to specific situations.9 Synderesis became 
the unerring source of all judgments of conscience, which was indelibly inscribed within the 
human person, and conscientia became the application of synderesis in appraising acts we have 
carried out or will carry out. Synderesis was not extinguished by sin and could not err, 
whereas conscientia could be mistaken in its reasoning, presenting something that is 
objectively good as bad or the reverse.10 Aquinas’ association of synderesis with the grasp of 
the principles of natural law and conscience with the application of those principles to one’s 
conduct clarified some of the ambiguities in the tradition. It also created interest in the 
binding nature of conscience, the problem of an erroneous conscience and of scrupulosity, 
the relation of conscience to the virtues and the relation of conscience to freedom that would 
fuel discussion and debate for centuries.11 As the tradition of reflection on conscientia and 
synderesis grew, increasingly nuanced distinctions were drawn between the terms. 
Contemporary scholars assessing the tradition now conclude that for the Scholastics “the 
word [synderesis] means just what they made it up to mean.”12 Throwing all the emphasis 
on the language of conscience seems designed to deflect attention from the dynamics of 
power that surround whose claims of conscience are heard. 
 
While the technical term synderesis does not feature in early modern Protestant discourse 
about conscience, the idea of innate moral knowledge did not vanish. Mika Ojakangas 
traces the idea through Stoic metaphors about seeds or biblical metaphors such as light and 
 
J. Smith, Conscience and Catholicism: The Nature and Function of Conscience in Contemporary Roman Catholic Moral 
Theology (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998). 
9 Timothy Suttor, Summa Theologiae Man: Ia. 75-83, vol. 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
ST I.79.12-13. 
10 Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Veritate (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952).q. 16-17; Thomas Gilby, 
Summa Theologiae: Volume 18, Principles of Morality: 1a2ae. 18-21 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).ST I.19.5-
6. 
11 For excellent examinations of Aquinas’ treatment of conscience that detail the mis-readings that are 
generated when historians focus on the terminology of conscience without examining the wider context of 
those terms, see Herbert McCabe, “Aquinas and Good Sense,” New Blackfriars 67, no. 798 (1986); Servais 
Pinckaers, “Conscience and the Christian Tradition,” in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral 
Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005); “Conscience and the Virtue of 
Prudence,” in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven 
Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005); John R. Lamont, “Conscience, 
Freedom, Rights: Idols of the Enlightenment” The Thomist 73 (2009). 
12 Gilby, Summa Theologiae: Volume 18, Principles of Morality: 1a2ae. 18-21, 180 Appendix 15; Smith, Conscience 
and Catholicism: The Nature and Function of Conscience in Contemporary Roman Catholic Moral Theology, 19. 
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candle in the writings of Calvin, William Perkins, Cambridge Platonists, John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant.13 The candle metaphor, which is thought to originate in Proverbs 20.27 
(“the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord”), is particularly interesting for historians and 
genealogists to chase through commentaries on that passage. There “the candle of the 
Lord” metaphor becomes identified with synderesis, the inextinguishable spark which 
illuminates conscience and allows for innate perception of the difference between good and 
evil and other self-evident moral principles. Through identification with the candle of the 
Lord in man, synderesis is reinstated in the English Renaissance, through sermons and essays 
where its light illuminates right reason and moral truths.14  
 
So where does this leave those tracing the filiation of terms, who are searching for clarity 
and precision in the language of conscience that might inform its current usage? Is synderesis 
the missing term that ought to be reintroduced in discussions of modern conscience for the 
sake of more precision and clarity? Perhaps so, but even those who wish to intentionally re-
introduce synderesis into current debates concede that the word synderesis likely found its 
way into the tradition by accident. The glossae of Jerome’s text, which introduced synderesis 
and which became the standard Medieval locus for discussions about conscience, is 
generally ascribed to a transcription mistake. It is thought that a scribe attempting to copy 
the word syneidesis accidently put down synderesis instead, resulting in this “massive error.”15 
Those who try to make the best of the situation reason that although the introduction of 
synderesis was a mistake, it was a happy accident, and that continuing to differentiate 
between conscientia and synderesis can be productive to the degree that those labels help to 
distinguish between various meanings of conscience.16 Whether one assesses the language 
of conscience as an extraordinary blunder or a boon to scholars who want to draw 
increasingly fine distinctions, tracing the terminology of conscience in order to pinpoint 
original meanings which might clear up current contradictions is a tortuous journey. It 
entails chasing a white rabbit through a labyrinth of false starts and dead ends. 
 
 
13 Mika Ojakangas, The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethical Experience (London“ Bloomsbury, 
2013), 104-10. 
14 Ibid. See also Robert A. Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 52, no. 4 (1991). 
15 Timothy E. O'Connell, “An Understanding of Conscience ” in Conscience: Readings in Moral Theology ed. 
Charles E. Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 25. 
16 Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, 11. 
  
10 
Another problem with this approach is that a survey of the terminology of conscience alone 
does not tell a clear story of the development of the concept of conscience, as not every use 
of the word conscience refers to the ethical reality. Some of the terms for conscience signify 
conscious awareness in general and not any particular ethical awareness. For instance, we 
have seen conscience that comes from the Greek συνείδησις (suneidesis) and the Latin 
conscientia, which are compounds of the word “to know,” oida and scio, and the prefix “with,” 
sun- and cum-. In both the Greek and the Latin, conscience means “the state or act of 
knowing with” or “shared knowledge” conveying that conscience is the discernment of 
one’s own wrongdoing or absence of wrongdoing. That knowledge may be shared with 
another in the sense of the context of relationship with others or that knowledge maybe 
shared with one’s self, as a reflexive apprehension of one’s own moral guilt or innocence.17 
However, the prefix might also work merely to intensify oida and scio, such that the 
compound word (suneidesis or conscientia) refers not to shared moral knowledge but to the 
state or act of knowing well, or simply to knowledge, intellectual awareness, mind or 
consciousness of (this or that).18  It is only the context of the word that gives a clue as to 
whether or not the term is being used in an ethical sense or not. This has led to the creation 
of new terms to help indicate whether conscience refers to moral conscience or not. John 
Locke coined the term “consciousness” so as to distinguish between moral and non-moral 
conscience in English, Christian Wolff introduced the term Bewusstsein (consciousness) to 
make the distinction in German, and Leibniz tried to do the same in French by rendering 




17 This ambiguity over the prefix con- and over the moral and non-moral senses of conscience continues to 
muddy the literature on the history of conscience, where confusion persists over how to interpret the con- of 
conscience etymologically. What is at stake is whether conscience is a knowledge of one’s own fault shared 
with another, be that God or another person, and thus a concept that originally had a social dimension and 
reflected shared values, or whether conscience is an unshared opinion about one’s own fault, and therefore 
an individualistic construct in origin. The former view of conscience as “moral knowledge shared with others” 
is more commonly held to be the standard interpretation, see for instance Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and 
the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between Person and State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther, 24-25. Paul Strohm, Conscience: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8, 10, 118. Michael Walzer, “Conscientious 
Objection,”  in Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1970).  
18 Lewis covers a number of pitfalls in interpreting references to conscience in his study of the term and its 
various shades of meaning. C.S. Lewis, Studies in Words (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 181-
213. 
19 Ojakangas, The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethical Experience, 30. 
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There is a further complication. Even if one takes into account all the terms used for 
conscience, one still needs to contend with the fact that there have been significant moments 
in the history of conscience when its meaning has been conveyed without recourse to the 
language of conscience. To offer just one example, the word for conscience does not appear 
in the Hebrew Bible. Those who have gone looking for it end up end up searching for other 
words which carry some of the meaning of conscience and might be said to function 
analogously. One such term is the Hebrew word for “heart” (lêb). Heart was treated as the 
seat of moral life, as the site where God’s commandments are interiorized, as the site where 
the memory of our acts is preserved, and as the site where contrition is felt for the wrongs 
we have committed.20 It is therefore read as conveying some of the meaning of conscience. 
Another term that is treated as sharing in some of the work of conscience in the Hebrew 
Bible is the word hokmâh, translated as wisdom (sapientia) or prudence (prudentia) in the 
Vulgate. Wisdom and prudence are seen to play a role in moral judgment in that they refer 
to the knowledge of God’s will, as well as the discernment of the moral order and of what 
will please God. 21  Subsequently, these terms became entwined with the concept of 
conscience. 
 
A history of terms for conscience therefore needs to contend not only with an unwieldy and 
ever-expanding number of terms. It also needs to contend with the fact that the language 
of conscience does not always refer to the ethical decision-making and that furthermore the 
ethical decision making to which conscience does refer has been conveyed in different 
periods by use of other terminology that might be said to function in a similar manner. So, 
while lexical studies reveal some of the steps (and missteps) that have been taken, even the 
most comprehensive word search simply cannot tell the full story. 
 
Downplaying conscience’s conceptual framework 
 
Examining the changing terminology, even if sensitive to the complexities above, is not a 
 
20 In the Old Testament the heart is not just figured as a place but also as a text or tablet. The reflections of 
conscience are inscriptions made by God the scribe upon the tablet of the heart. They constitute both an 
inner scripture containing the Law (a kind of internalized phylactery) and a book in which personal and 
collective sin and guilt are recorded to provide a moral account. St Paul and scholastic writers take up this 
heart-based terminology for conscience in Hebrew Scriptures and extend it to describe the moral record of 
the life of each individual. For more on conscience and the trope of the tablet of the heart, see Eric Jager’s 
fascinating study. Erice Jager, The Book of the Heart (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
21 For a treatment of terms which function as analogues of conscience in the Christian tradition, see Delhaye 
and Quinn, The Christian Conscience, 51-68. 
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viable strategy for untangling the notion of conscience as it has evolved over time, because 
the meaning and the function of the terminology in any particular period depends not only 
upon the concept’s semantic frameworks but also upon its conceptual framework. A 
conceptual framework forms the context in which the language of conscience was deployed. 
And the conceptual framework of conscience has not remained static.  
 
Over its long history, the notion of conscience has developed conceptually within a number 
of moral thought worlds. Determining the specific meaning of the experience ascribed to 
conscience in any particular historical period requires mapping the wider moral context 
that frames it.22  For instance, our understanding of conscience is bound up with our 
conception of the nature of moral knowledge and the nature of human freedom, as well 
with our conception of the common good and the nature of selfhood. As those conceptions 
have shifted, conscience also has shifted thereby performing different functions within 
different moral visions.23 And those changes have not been superficial.24 For that reason, 
conscience needs to be examined against its intellectual backdrop and not in isolation from 
other concepts that are determinative of its meaning.  
 
In the fourth century, John Chrysostom described conscience as a court with an inner 
judge. Chrysostom said: 
 
There is no judge, no judge at all among men, as sleepless as our conscience. 
External judges are corrupted by money, influenced by flattery, and induced by fear 
to give false judgments; and many other factors spoil their upright decision. But the 
court of conscience cannot yield to any of these influences. Whether you give bribes, 
or flatter, or threaten, or do anything else, this court will bring forth a just judgment 
against your sinful intentions. He who commits sin himself condemns himself even 
if no one else accuses him. He does this not once only, or twice, but often, and 
continues through his whole life. Even if a long time passes, the conscience never 
forgets what has happened, but even during the commission of the sin, and before 
 
22 This is a point that Paul Lehmann made when he described conscience as “a concept in search of a 
context.” Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 344.  
23 As Christopher Steck reminds us, “the moral agent is embedded in a framework that shapes her moral 
reasoning, affectively and intellectually. Moral reasoning is always reasoning within (that is, within a moral 
framework, a religious worldview, and/or a set of ideological commitments.” See Christopher Steck, “Re-
Embedding Moral Agency,”  Journal of Religious Ethics 41, no. 2 (2013): 332-3. However, this point is frequently 
overlooked, especially when conscience is treated as an isolated phenomenon that could serve as the basis of 
common moral experience or a universalist anthropology.  
24  Here I dispute Ojakangas’ thesis that there has been radical continuity in the Western tradition of 
conscience. Ojakangas, The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethical Experience. 
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and after it is committed, the conscience stands against us as a vehement accuser.25 
 
Likewise, in the eighteenth century, Kant described conscience as consciousness of an 
internal court in man. Kant wrote:  
 
Every human being has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, and, 
in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this 
authority watching over the law in him is not something that he himself (voluntarily) 
makes, but something incorporated in his being. It follows him like a shadow when 
he plans to escape. He can indeed stun himself or put himself to sleep by pleasures 
and distractions, but he cannot help coming to himself or waking up from time to 
time; and when he does, he hears at once its fearful voice. He can at most, in 
extreme depravity, bring himself to heed it no longer, but he still cannot help 
hearing it.26 
 
Kant and Chrysostom deploy the same metaphors, likening the thought process of 
conscience to an inner court with an inner judge whose verdicts one cannot escape from; 
however, Kant’s use of conscience cannot simply be aligned with Chrysostom’s use of it. 
Their conceptions of conscience are conditioned by very different understandings of “the 
judgment” involved, of “the law” being upheld and of the human agent. Nevertheless, these 
conceptual differences downplayed by theorists looking to establish that conscience has 
referred to the same core experience over time. So while their approaches extend beyond 
studying how conscience’s semantic context has changed, insufficient attention is given to 
conscience’s changing conceptual context. 
 
Overlooking the social practices that make sense of conscience 
          
Understanding the shifts in meaning that the notion of conscience has undergone does not 
only require studying conscience in light of the terms that contextualize it semantically and 
conceptually. It also requires an examination of the religious and political ideals and 
practices that undergird claims of conscience and to which they, in turn, lend support. For 
the very idea of conscience has at times been central to the unfolding of political events, in 
that views about conscience were expounded as part of a struggle in political and 
ecclesiastical politics, where views about conscience have shaped debates about freedom of 
 
25 John Chrysostom, On Wealth and Poverty, trans. Catharine P. Roth (Yonkers: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 
1984), 88. 
26 Immanuel Kant, Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 189. 6:438. 
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religion and the toleration or persecution of heretics and about the practice of making 
penitence for bad conscience–to take two examples from very different historical moments. 
Indeed, making a claim of conscience can be understood as a social practice in and of itself, 
one that has changed in step with the political and religious changes of modernity.27  
 
The genealogical heirs to Nietzsche such as Foucault have underlined this point with their 
warnings about the distorting effects of blindness towards the dominant actual uses of moral 
concepts. Likewise, the work of some Thomistic Aristotelians such as Alasdair MacIntyre 
has also drawn attention to the social, political and cultural order in which forms of practical 
reasoning are embodied and institutionalized. They have stressed that trying to study moral 
concepts, such as conscience, detached from the political and social contexts in which they 
are put to work, inevitably distorts our understanding of those concepts.28  
 
Protests over military responses to conflict, the politics of gender and the culture wars have 
generated new social practices that have re-configured the concept of conscience 
considerably. A good example of such invocations of conscience can be seen in the lead up 
to the Church of England’s debate over the ordination of women in 1992 with an eye to 
practices that framed its use. A high ecclesiology, stressing the unbroken apostolic 
succession of priests and the obedience due to bishops, was a cornerstone of the self-
understanding of the traditionalist wing of the church, that is, until the mind of the church 
no longer reflected traditionalist views. 
 
Contrary to what many assume, the debate about the ordination of women had been going 
on in the Church of England since the 1860s, sparked by efforts to revive the order of 
deaconesses.29 Proposals to supervise, regulate and support the ministry of sisterhoods and 
deaconess institutes were debated for decades, and clarity was sought to ensure that the 
order conferred on deaconesses would not be understood as analogous to that conferred on 
deacons at ordination. In 1924 the upper house of both the Convocation of Canterbury 
and the Convocation of York agreed on the service for ordaining deacons; however, the 
 
27 This was a development Hegel sought to trace in his account of the development of conscience. See Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).  
28 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, “Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Social Practice: What Holds Them Apart?” 
in The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 109-10. 
29 The first deaconess, Elizabeth Catherine Ferard, received a Licence from the Bishop of London in 1862. 
For a detailed analysis of the historical documentation of the debates, see Jacqueline Field-Bibb, Women 
Towards Priesthood: Ministerial Politics and Feminist Praxis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 69. 
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Lambeth Conference of 1930 re-affirmed that the order of deaconess was “for women the 
one and only Order of the ministry.”30 When a group of clerical and lay members of the 
church wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury stating that they could not see any objection 
in principle to the ordination of women to the priesthood, a commission was set up to 
“examine any theological or other relevant principles which have governed or ought to 
govern the Church in the development of the Ministry of Women.”31  The Report it 
produced stated that “the Commission as a whole would not give their positive assent to 
the view that a woman is inherently incapable of receiving the grace of Order, and 
consequently of admission to any of the three Orders.” 32  While finding no sufficient 
theological ground for the exclusion of women the Commission determined that the time 
was not right based on “the practical difficulties which would ensue from such an 
innovation, and the breach which would be caused with the traditions of Christendom in 
past ages, and the present maintenance of that tradition by other Christian Communions 
which have retained the three historic Orders of the ministry.”33   
 
Dissatisfaction with that Report’s conclusion grew over the years. As the ordination of 
women became a practical legislative possibility, organized opposition to the ordination of 
women grew as well. That opposition was spearheaded by Reform, a pressure group of 
evangelical traditionalists, and “Cost of Conscience,” a group of Anglo-catholic 
traditionalists now known as Forward in Faith, who worked to ensure that the general mind 
of the church remained resistant to women’s ordination. When in the 1980s it became 
conceivable that the church might change its mind on the matter, traditionalists ceased 
defending canonical obedience and the authority of the church.  
 
In 1987 a standing committee of Synod was asked to draft legislation for traditionalists. The 
report they presented, The Ordination of Women to the Priesthood: The Scope of the Legislation, did 
not outline a one-clause measure for conscience but instead offered a raft of special 
measures.  Those measures offered special provisions that would exclude the ordination of 
women priests to the episcopate, permit bishops to refuse to ordain and license candidates 
 
30 Ibid., 78. 
31  Archbishops’ Commission on the Ministry of Women, The Ministry of Women: Report of the Archbishops’ 
Commission (London: Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1935), 1. 
32 Ibid., 29. 
33 Ibid. For a summary of the cases put forward in support and in opposition to the ordination of women to 
the priesthood, see Field-Bibb, Women Towards Priesthood: Ministerial Politics and Feminist Praxis, 89-95. 
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solely on the basis of gender and provide alternative oversight for traditionalists who 
disagreed with their bishops through the creation of non-geographical dioceses.34  It was 
not until 1992 that a measure to permit the ordination of women in the Church of England 
came to a vote at General Synod and passed. The Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod, which 
was passed shortly thereafter, created two so-called “integrities” in the Church of England, 
with the special provisions for opponents of women priests who had not accepted that 
general mind of the Church had changed.  
 
A more recent concept that can help us think about what was going on with the 
traditionalist’s appeal to conscience is cultural appropriation.35  Cultural appropriation 
involves the unacknowledged adoption of the customs, practices, ideas or status of one 
people or society by members of another more dominant people or society. In this case 
traditionalists in the Church of England appropriated cultural understandings of minority 
rights for themselves. So when “the general mind” of the Church changed in 1992 and 
resolved to include those who had been, up until then, excluded from ordination, 
traditionalists no longer held the dominant, majority position for the first time in history 
and recast themselves as the oppressed minority to make their case for special provisions on 
the grounds of conscience.  
 
Traditionalists successfully argued that they would only be able to stay within the Church 
of England if they were assured women priests could not be ordained bishops, guaranteed 
that parishes could still bar women from exercising ordained ministry there and given 
alternative oversight from bishops who would not be involved in the ordination of women. 
In other words traditionalists took some women’s experience of being excluded from 
ordained ministry and argued that the ordination of women would have the result of 
excluding them [the patriarchy] from exercising their ordained ministry within the Church 
of England, unless these provisions were put in place.36 On the grounds of conscience they 
 
34 Field-Bibb, Women Towards Priesthood: Ministerial Politics and Feminist Praxis, 168-9. 
35 Cultural appropriation is controversial social practice that has only begun to receive explicit theorization 
in recent years. Richard A. Rogers, “From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and 
Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation,” Communication Theory 16, no. 4 (2006). 
36 Despite the enormous ground conceded to traditionalists in The Ordination of Women to the Priesthood: The Scope 
of the Legislation, the Revd D.N. Gibbs insisted that it “looks as if it will be taken away from men who have 
committed their lives to the Lord, and who have been accepted by the Church for priesthood.” Field-Bibb, 
Women Towards Priesthood: Ministerial Politics and Feminist Praxis, 170. 
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argued that it would violate their integrity to have to recognize the ministry of those they 
had historically denied.  
 
Traditionalists secured these exceptions and a special position within the Church of 
England by casting themselves as the oppressed minority, once there were legislative 
possibilities for ordaining women. By arguing that traditionalists now deserved the status 
and protection that might be afforded to a minority group–understood up to that point as 
a group that historically had been denied privilege, power, dignity or access–and that the 
conscience of a traditionalist would be violated without the protection afforded by special 
measures, they changed the meaning of minority rights so that it could be appropriated 
much more widely.37 Traditionalists showed it could be appropriated by any group that felt 
it was being denied privilege, power, dignity or access in order to win concessions on the 
grounds of conscience.  
 
Traditionalists were asserting, in effect, that claims of conscience function in a new way for 
them. A claim of conscience had been understood as a first-person claim. In other words, 
it is a claim about what I believe I can or cannot do in a particular set of circumstances 
without violating my integrity or sense of right and wrong. But the claims traditionalists 
were making–and continue to make–purportedly on the basis of conscience are claims 
about what other people can or cannot do lest their actions violate traditionalists’ integrity 
and sense of right and wrong. The assertion of traditionalists is that the voice of conscience 
they hear dictates to them how other people must act. This is conscience in the third person, 
and it represents a clean break from traditional conceptions about how claims of conscience 
function. 
There has been an interesting development in the United States with important parallels, 
concerning the lobbying efforts of Roman Catholic bishops to restrict access to 
contraceptives. During the Obama administration, Roman Catholic bishops demanded 
complete exemption to the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act, so that 
employer health plans would not be required to offer preventative reproductive health 
coverage. Roman Catholic bishops fought for exemption on the ground of freedom of 
 
37 I am grateful to Rachel S. Neaum for the discussion we had about this. “Rachel S. Neaum to Women and 




conscience, with the aim of restricting access to Catholic and non-Catholic women alike, 
whether or not they were morally opposed to the use of contraception.38 Moreover, they 
demanded that exemptions from the law would apply not only to religious employers such 
as Catholic parishes and dioceses, but to also to all Catholic non-profits (including the 
church’s schools, universities, hospitals and social service organizations) and for-profits 
(such as Hobby Lobby, a chain store selling arts and crafts supplies run by evangelical 
Christians), and to both their Catholic and non-Catholic employees. The assertion of the 
Catholic bishops and their evangelical counterparts was that it would be a violation of their 
freedom of conscience for others to obtain access to reproductive health care coverage; the 
only way to uphold their freedom of conscience was for the moral law, as they interpreted 
it, to be made the civil law for everyone else.  
There is not space here to adequately explore the path this has taken through the courts or 
the parallels between their arguments and those made by traditionalists in the Church of 
England, but attentiveness to practices of cultural appropriation can shine a light on the 
dynamics of power involved when claims of conscience of these sorts are made. For this 
reason, historical studies that aim to trace the changes that the concept of conscience has 
undergone need to explore how the social practices which frame those terms are 
undergoing change as well.  
This overview of the twists and turns that conscience has taken over its tortuous history has 
highlighted a few of the major semantic, conceptual and social changes that have 
configured conscience. Attentiveness to these changes in the context of the concept of 
conscience–changes to the terminology, changes in the conceptual field but also the changes 
to social practices–can help makes sense of the various uses to which conscience has been 
put at different points. 
Conscience can mean anything 
Attempts to get a handle on what conscience has and has not meant over time and attempts 
to re-work conscience so that it is less ambiguous are motivated by concern that a claim of 
conscience could mean anything.  At its most basic, conscience is an experience of 
normativity as such, which gives rise to a sense of obligation in us. While conscience 
 
38 Leslie C. Griffin, “The Catholic Bishops vs. The Contraceptive Mandate,” Religions 6 (2015).  
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designates an experience of normativity, it says nothing about the nature or content of the 
claim the being made on us. To put it another way, the concept of conscience is formal. 
Because it is formal, or empty, it can have any content. So, in theory, conscience could tell 
me anything, and, in practice, it could be used to justify anything.  My conscience might 
tell me that I must always tell the truth, or it could tell that I must lie in this instance. This 
means that conscience can be harnessed for any purpose, even a pernicious one. 
 
The real problem of conscience that none of those approaches I have outlined can 
adequately contend with is that the formalism of conscience has the potential to undermine 
the morality of conscience. To put it another way, claims of conscience refer to a particular 
experience of normativity which obligates us, but claims of conscience do not contain, in 
and of themselves, anything that could confirm the experience is in fact moral. Conscience 
simply says, “I must” or “I cannot.” It does not specify why. 
 
While there is nothing in conscience to ensure it is reserved exclusively for good purposes, 
conscience can be given normative content in other ways. I have tried to show that the 
content of conscience is not provided in full by its linguistic context or even by its conceptual 
context, but also requires some account of its social and political function. What I want to 
propose at this stage is that efforts to reduce the ambiguity of conscience, and to reserve the 
idea of it only for good purposes, however those are conceived, represent a failure to fully 
appreciate its formalism. Later chapters will go on explore to what extent the normative 
content of conscience can be supplied by individual preferences and whether it is better 
supplied by traditions, practices, and the institutions of social and political life. But first, it 
is instructive to see what can happen when the concept of conscience is “done over.” 
 
 “Doing conscience over” until conscience is doing it all 
 
There is evidence that persons and self-consciousness exist in all cultures, that innate 
emotional programs are everywhere the same. These aspects of human nature 
predispose the human being to moral decision making always and everywhere. 
…Evidence from many sources reveals that questions of conscience appear in all 
places and times that have been recorded; an inner sense of right and wrong comes 
with the birth of the self and self-consciousness.39 
 
 
39 Sidney C. Callahan, In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making (San Francisco: Harper 
San Francisco, 1991), 177. 
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Scholars who are trying to develop a new understanding of conscience by “doing conscience 
over” have taken on board Lehmann’s warning that conscience is a “concept in search of 
a context.” Many have tried to establish the co-ordinates of conscience’s context by 
correlating conscience to other concepts that may clarify its proper meaning, function and 
significance.  This produces studies that aim to reduce the ambiguity of conscience by 
drawing out the connections between conscience and responsibility, 40  conscience and 
integrity,41 conscience and obedience,42 conscience and transcendence,43 conscience and 
self-transcendence,44 conscience and other virtues,45 conscience and prayer46–to take the 
titles of a few such projects.   
 
What these projects have in common is that they seek to qualify the acting subject and the 
field of action in order to build up a picture of the full context in which conscience can be 
understood. While connecting conscience to less ambiguous concepts such as responsibility, 
integrity or obedience, can go some way towards specifying how conscience could be 
understood in a secular context, and connecting conscience to concepts such as 
transcendence and prayer might go some way in specifying how conscience should be 
understood in theological context, neither go far enough. Conscience cannot be adequately 
explained in light of another, related concept.  
 
The underlying problem is that in the absence of an adequate account of the good or of 
human nature all of these concepts retain some ambiguity no matter how they are 
configured together. Without  an adequate account of the good or of human nature, the 
concept of conscience tends to aggregate more meanings and functions to itself. As a 
consequence, conscience gets tasked with supplying more of the conceptual basis for moral 
action. When the concept of conscience is put to work shoring up our account of responsible 
moral action, it is more likely to be viewed as a universal. Having served various roles in 
Platonic, Stoic and Christian thought, conscience lends itself to being abstracted; therefore, 
 
40 Eric Mount, Conscience and Responsibility (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969). 
41 Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, Integrity and Conscience: Nomos Xl (New York: NYU Press, 1998). 
42 William Stringfellow, Conscience and Obedience (Wipf & Stock I, 2004). 
43 Donald E. Miller, The Wing-Footed Wanderer: Conscience and Transcendence (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1977). 
44 Walter E. Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence (Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1981). 
45 Douglas C. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2008). 
46 Dennis J. Billy and James Keating, Conscience and Prayer: The Spirit of Catholic Moral Theology (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2001). 
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efforts to do conscience over that fail to situate it firmly within a particular moral frame are 
prone to produce situations where conscience is lifted out of context. 
 
This is most clearly evident once the concept of conscience is treated as providing the core 
of conscious subjectivity. It is then held as key to universal moral experience. The search 
for a non-context dependent moral imperative has led many to pick up the concept of 
conscience in this way. Sidney Callahan, for example, holds that conscience really only has 
one meaning–something like the personal capacity to judge for ourselves what is right and 
what is wrong–and one function–in that the capacity to distinguish good and evil for 
ourselves is meant to offer principled resistance in the form of the courageous lone 
individual, who is willing to stand up to those in power and authority, because they believe 
this is right. While that view of conscience will be dismissed by many as the kind of gross 
oversimplification that comes from being held in thrall to a certain narrative of modernity, 
Callahan is not alone in wanting to assert that there is consensus among all people, religious 
and secular, that the self-conscious person exists and that all moral decisions can be oriented 
to doing good and avoiding evil.47  
 
The view of conscience as a moral phenomenon that occurs “in all places and times” has 
contributed to the development of naturalistic and subjective idealistic accounts of 
conscience. The supposition that everyone possesses a conscience, and that conscience gives 
every human being dignity and rights, has also inspired the hope that conscience can supply 
the foundation of ethics by serving as the basis for common moral experience.  Talking 
about conscience permits discussion about the dignity of the moral subject without having 
to come to any prior agreement about the nature of God or the structures of cosmos and 
society ordained by God. In those discussions, the concept of conscience is typically aligned 
with universal moral reasoning, so that conscience is seen to be consistent with Kantian 
moral theory and capable of extending it.48 Once conscience supplies the core of conscience 
subjectivity and provides universal moral experience, it can be enlisted to serve in any 
context. Conscience may even be given an existence above cultural, historical and linguistic 
contexts. 
 
47 Callahan, In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making, 32. Others who share the view that 
conscience supplies the basis for a universal anthropology include: John C. Staten, Conscience and the Reality of 
God (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988); Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence. 
48 D'Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom; Thomas E. Hill, “Four Conceptions of Conscience,” in Integrity and 
Conscience, ed. Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 
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To see how conscience could attain this kind of existence, it can be instructive to consider 
how conscience entered into the language of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. It is easily the most interesting and under-studied twist in the linguistic 
history of conscience. The preamble to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) explains that “disregard and contempt for human rights have 
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.” The 
Declaration then asserts that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience.” (Article 1.) It then attempts to 
secure freedom of conscience as an enforceable right, stating that “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” (Article 18.)   
 
Reflecting on the making of the Universal Declaration and the discursive struggle over 
crafting universal human rights, Lydia Liu explains that there were many debates on 
conscience. Liu draws attention to the figure of P. C. Chang, a Chinese ambassador who 
rose to prominence in the UN and became one of the principal architects of the UDHR in 
1946–48. Chang was the Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Commission, which was tasked 
with the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Chang was responsible 
for freeing the idea of human rights from associations with Western Christian notions of 
natural rights and Enlightenment notions of autonomous individuality so that it might 
universalized. He did so by revising the meaning of human in human rights.  
 
Chang argued that it was not sufficient to say that humans were simply endowed with 
reason and that something else ought to be included. He suggested that Article One include 
another concept, a second essential human attribute. Liu relays how Chang tried to prevail 
on the Committee to adopt a Confucian concept: ren.49  The Chinese character pronounced 
ren is a literal translation of a concept from Confucian moral philosophy which Chang 
glossed as “two-men-mindedness.”  Liu suggests the character in Mandarin pronounced ren 
is better translated as “plural human,” something akin to consciousness of one’s 
responsibilities to other people; however, there was no equivalent in either English or 
French, the working languages of the UN, that would help Chang’s colleagues understand 
what he was going after. In the end the members of the drafting committee accepted 
Chang’s proposal to add a second essential attribute but decided that concept of conscience 
 
49 Lydia H. Liu, “Shadows of Universalism: The Untold Story of Human Rights around 1948,” Critical Inquiry 
40, no. 4 (2014): 411-13. 
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would stand in for ren. Thus Article 1 read that humans are “endowed with reason and 
conscience.”  
 
When the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, 
it existed in multiple languages and was soon translated into 375 different languages. Each 
translation had the effect of exporting the concept of conscience, with its own particular 
genealogical tradition, into a new linguistic and philosophical context. However, the 
process of translation revealed the concept of conscience to be less universal than assumed, 
since few non-European languages had equivalent terms to the word conscience. 
Multilingual reiterations of the UDHR were tasked with re-working the concept of 
conscience linguistically so that it could take a place within other intellectual traditions.  
Adding a further twist to the story of conscience’s universalization, Liu observed that in the 
Chinese version of the UDHR conscience was not translated as ren.50 Instead the word 
liangxin was substituted. Liangxin is related to ren in Confucian moral philosophy and 
describes a moral disposition of being open to the humanity of others. Liu asserts that the 
conflation of liangxin and conscience “was an attempt to forge what she calls a ‘master sign,’ 
powerfully semiotic and freed from its specifically Christian associations.” 51  So after 
conscience was pried from its original conceptual and political contexts to act as a universal, 
standing in the place of ren to articulate what was essentially human, it was inserted back 
into new intellectual traditions via translation, before being re-configured by liangxin that it 
might exist above culture and outside of time. As a master sign conscience is free to assume 
any context, language or tradition.  
So far we have seen how efforts to “do conscience over” by situating it in a context, namely 
a context that attempts to fix the co-ordinates of conscience by configuring it to another 
notion, freights conscience with the burden of conveying what it might mean to act with 
responsibility, integrity, obedience, responsibility and authority (returning again to the titles 
of those recent efforts to do conscience over). Conscience, so configured, must maintain our 
deepest convictions, signal our self-awareness and sense of individuality, secure our dignity 
and shore up what it means to be a human being. The literature on conscience certainly 
 
50 It is not known whether Chang was involved in that particular translation. Ibid., 413. 
51 Strohm, Conscience: A Very Short Introduction, 85. 
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This chapter showed what happens when scholars delve into the history of conscience in 
an effort to manage the problem of the conscience. It began by assessing efforts to situate 
conscience in its semantic context, showing why they fail to tell the whole story. It also 
evaluated other approaches that extend beyond the semantics of conscience but do not 
extend far enough.  I argued that these approaches fail to provide sufficient resources to 
adequately analyze the ambiguities that have posed problems for conscience over the course 
of its history. Moreover, they prevent us recognizing the inherent problem of conscience: 
the fact that its formalism undermines its purported normativity. Lastly, I pointed to efforts 
to rework conscience that did not address this problem head on. Those efforts showed that 
when we fail to appreciate that conscience can mean anything, in the absence of a rich 
account of its particular social, political, metaphysical and linguistic context, conscience can 











In the last chapter, I asserted that the concept of conscience is formal and argued that 
because of its formalism, conscience could, in theory, tell me anything and could, in 
practice, be used to justify anything.  This has created considerable skepticism about 
conscience–whether that be about its existence, its normativity, its universality, its 
objectivity, its infallibility or its capacity to liberate. It has also created genuine frustration 
for theorists trying to manage the problem of conscience, a frustration encapsulated in the 
dilemma of whether and how to “do the concept over.”52   
 
In everyday speech talk of conscience can be particularly hard to negotiate.  Especially 
when we say, “Conscience made me do it”, or “I must do X because my conscience tells 
me,” and leave it at that, as if no other explanation is required.  These sorts of claims present 
conscience as if they were sufficient warrant to be able to do what we please without 
interference.  In fact, such claims beg for elaboration. Nevertheless, it is often a struggle to 
spell out our reasoning. This chapter examines why that is the case.  
 
It begins by looking at phenomenological aspects of conscience that lend credence to the 
view that we may invoke conscience as a free-standing assertion about what is morally right 
for us. I argue that these aspects of conscience deflect attention from the work of recognizing 
what motivates our moral judgments and from the responsibility we have to articulate those 
motivations so that others can engage with them.  
 
 
52 These frustrations can be heard in Bernard Wand’s rehearsal of the meanings conscience has borne: “It 
has been said of conscience that it is fallible (Broad), that it is infallible (Butler); that its ultimate basis is 
emotional (Mill), that its ultimate source is rational (Rashdall); that it is the voice of God (Hartmann), or the 
voice of custom (Paulsen); that it is merely advisory (Nowell-Smith), that it is a command internally imposed 
(Mayo); that it is conscious (Butler), that it is unconscious (Freud); that it is a faculty (Butler), that it is not (any 
contemporary moral philosopher); that it is the disposition to have certain beliefs, emotions, and conations 
which, when operative, issue in conscientious actions (Broad), and that it is conscientious action (Ryle).” 
Bernard Wand, “The Content and Function of Conscience,” The Journal of Philosophy 58, no. 24 (1961): 771. 
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From there this chapter turns to consider the work of Charles Taylor. Taylor has written 
extensively about the ways we tend to think, reason, argue and question ourselves about 
morality.  He is particularly interested in why we find it difficult to intuit the ideals that 
have a hold on us and to talk about them. Taylor attributes this moral inarticulacy to certain 
features of modern moral theories and to the development of self-defining subjectivity. 
Going over Taylor’s work on moral frameworks and agency allows me to situate the 
problem of conscience within the unresolved debates of modernity and to frame modern 
conscience as an exemplary instance of self-defining subjectivity. Doing that will help us 
come to grips with the philosophical roots of our modern conceptions of conscience. It will 
also help us understand the role conscience now plays in easing the tension between 
universal ethical imperatives and the individual’s own particular experience of the world. 
 
Another one of Taylor’s agendas is to show that moral articulation is qualitatively different 
from what it was for our pre-modern predecessors, because we face a fundamentally 
different existential predicament as a result of secularization.  For Taylor, a critical 
examination of secularism requires that we take a closer look at the structural realities that 
make up secularism (such as the protection of freedom of conscience) and at the moral aims 
that motivate secularism (universal benevolence for instance). Exploring his work on 
secularization’s structural realities and moral sources will allow me to show the pressures 
on modern conscience in new light: not just as a political necessity for managing our 
conflicts but also as an experiential imperative in a secular age.  It will also show where to 
begin in formulating a new approach to conscience, which will be the focus of chapter VI. 
 
Invoking conscience to deflect attention from our inarticulacy  
 
Even though we feel strongly about abortion, divorce, dishonesty, and so on, we are 
not sure why we feel as we do. And the less sure we are of the reasons for our beliefs, 
the more dogmatically we hold to them as our only still point in a morally chaotic 
world. Ironically, our dogmatism only masks our more profound doubt, for 
although we hold certain moral convictions adamantly, we secretly suspect that we 
believe what we do because we have been conditioned. We hold certain beliefs as if 
they are unconditioned yet are impressed with the knowledge that all beliefs are the 
result of the environment, and thus at least potentially arbitrary. That very 
acknowledgement seems then to reduce all moral disagreements to subjective 
opinions about which there can be no argument. This lurking suspicion that we 
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really have no firm grounds for our beliefs makes us all the more unwilling to expose 
what we think to critical scrutiny.53 
 
The lurking suspicion that we really have no firm grounds for our beliefs plays into the ways 
claims of conscience are made. This is most evident when conscience is invoked in ways 
that suggest conscience itself has informed our judgment, rather than moral reasons, which 
we would need to spell out.  It is also evident when we insist that our conscience must 
obeyed because of its absolute authority or because that is required based on my identity as 
a certain kind of person. Neither way of framing a decision of conscience supplies an 
explanation of how we reached that decision of conscience.  Nevertheless, they resonant 
with several phenomenological aspects of conscience that are worth unpacking. 
 
When struggling to articulate our reasons for judging a particular action to be morally right 
(or wrong) according to our conscience, we sometimes speak as if it were conscience itself 
that informed our judgment, as if conscience itself were the reason. This is understandable 
and gets at two phenomenological aspects of conscience. The first aspect is that decisions 
of conscience are often experienced as the arrival of a conclusion rather than the movement 
of thought. The second aspect is that decisions of conscience are sometimes experienced as 
an uncanny voice coming from a source outside or beyond oneself. This is reflected in the 
tendency to describe conscience as a sort of latent internal moral repository that issues 
directives when activated. It is also reflected in the tendency to treat conscience as an agent 
that mandates the right course of moral action such as an oracle, a Socratic daemon or a 
Jiminy Cricket.  
 
These two phenomenological aspects of conscience can lend credence to the intuition that 
conscience is actual rather than formal. We say: “conscience made me do it,” as if 
conscience itself led us to judge a particular act to be morally right (or wrong). Treating the 
experience of conscience as a reason for our judgments obscures the fact that our decisions 
of conscience are responses to moral convictions. When following conscience is put forward 
as the motivation for our decision, our decision becomes inscrutable. For this reason, 
modern conscience is likened to a black box in which no one can see into or describe the 
contents of.54  
 
53 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1983), 3. 
54 Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between Person and State, 20. 
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Those who maintain that it is conscience itself that informed their judgment sometimes take 
another tack when pressed. Rather than explain the moral convictions that led them to 
make that judgment, they insist that conscience itself directed them and that obedience to 
it motivated them.  So, they treat the need to follow conscience, its absolute authority, as if 
that itself were a sufficient reason. This gets at another phenomenological aspect of 
conscience, which is that conscience is bound up with the experience of moral obligation. 
Nevertheless, framing a decision of conscience simply in terms of the obligation to follow 
conscience does not supply an explanation of how we reached that decision.  It merely 
asserts the binding nature of conscience.  These kinds of claims of conscience close down 
conversation by hiding behind the authority of conscience and some sense of obedience to 
that authority. 
 
Another way to deflect attention from the difficulties we experience in trying to articulate 
what we mean when we make a claim of conscience is to explain that I must do what my 
conscience tells me because, if I do not, my sense of personal integrity would be violated. 
While decisions of conscience, as a decision about what I must or must not do, are 
inherently self-reflective, they are not merely self-reflective. Decisions of conscience are 
judgments about the meaning and value of the action I believe I am obligated to take made 
in light of the norms that obligate me; they are not simply judgments about the demands of 
own integrity and identity. When I cannot voice the meaning and value of the actions in 
terms of norms and fall back on the claim to be following my identity or what is required 
to maintain my integrity, I am treating my individuality as a self-sufficient reason for my 
decision of conscience. Explaining our decisions in this way portrays modern conscience’s 
claims as endlessly self-referential. 
 
We may wish for our claims of conscience to be received by others as demands that must 
be accommodated so as not to violate our conscience, because we do not want to examine 
our own reasons and motivations. Perhaps we harbor a suspicion that our reasons in some 
way exceed reason and cannot be put into words. Alternatively, we may know what reasons 
motivate us but would rather those reason not come up for debate. So, we shield them from 
scrutiny by framing our decision as a matter of obedience to conscience, in the hope that 
our claim will be received as a non-negotiable demand. Or we talk about the certainty we 
feel about our decision in the hope that we will be justified based on the strength of our 
conviction and not on the basis of those reasons.  In all of these instances, claims of 
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conscience are articulated as a warrant for our actions rather than offered alongside the 
reasons that might provide some justification for our actions. 
 
Describing a moral decision simply as a decision of conscience, without explaining the basis 
of my conviction or the reasons that led to my judgment, is insufficient. If claims of 
conscience are going to be accessible to others, those claims  need to be framed not as free-
standing assertions about what is morally right but as judgments that we only could have 
made against a particular normative background. That does not mean that we must strip 
our desires, intuitions, emotions and basic cares and personal commitments out of the 
equation when describing decisions of conscience. The reasons given need not be limited 
to those goods that can be reasoned and debated nor do they need to have a basis solely in 
general moral duties. Conscience is more than those sorts of reason. It also concerns what 
those reasons mean to me or it would be unclear what calling such a decision “conscience” 
adds.55  
 
While my reasons do not have to be abstracted from my particular motives and interests, 
there is a responsibility to articulate those reasons in such a way that others can recognize 
them and evaluate them. Some accountability is necessary because claims of conscience are 
a source of conflict. They are a source of conflict for the subject, who is thrown into a crisis 
about what to do when his actions seem to be governed by conflicting norms or norms that 
cannot be fully justified, and also for those who have to judge to what extent this claim of 
conscience should override other considerations and whether it can be accommodated. So, 
there is a burden on the person who claims to be following conscience to supply some 
content to that claim in order for others to see that that is in fact what that person is doing, 
as the meaning of the claim cannot be taken as given.  
 
The conflicts and controversy surrounding decisions of conscience should force those 
implicit reasons to the fore, even if our preference is to leave the moral sources behind our 
claims unspoken and to use the authority or individuality of conscience as a smokescreen 
for our decision-making process.  Unless we articulate the moral claims, which conscience 
discerns and to which it responds, we will not be able to make sense of some of our moral 
responses or be able to explain them to others.  
 
55 Vischer makes this point: Ibid., 68, 91. 
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The ethics of inarticulacy  
Charles Taylor has paid close attention to the signs of moral inarticulacy and can help make 
sense of what is happening when we appeal to conscience. He attributes moral inarticulacy 
to certain features of modern moral theories and to the development of self-defining 
subjectivity. Taylor describes moral articulation as the ability to intuit the ideals that have 
a hold on us and talk about them. He understands those ideals to be visions of the good. 
These visions of the good are sources of identity in that the ability to live according to these 
ideals shapes our moral self-worth. Taylor explains that “performance to these standards 
has become part of what we understand as a decent, civilized human life. We live up to 
them to the extent that we do because we would be somewhat ashamed of ourselves if we 
didn’t. They have become part of our self-image, our sense of our own worth.”56 For that 




A normative framework provides the frame or horizon within which I can get my bearing 
and try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable or what ought to be done. 
Frameworks incorporate a set of qualitative distinctions about what is important to me and 
what is not, based on higher ends that make an absolute claim (against merely relative ones). 
These qualitative distinctions are perceptions of the good, where “good” designates 
anything considered, valuable, worthy or admirable. A good could be “some action, or 
motive, or style of life, which is seen as qualitatively superior.”57  
 
The idea of the Good or the “constitutive good” is what makes particular actions, motives 
or aspirations good. Taylor terms these constitutive goods “moral sources,” because of the 
way they empower us to do and be good.58 A moral source has the capacity to shape the 
will; it provides the motivation to live up to the demands we place on ourselves and the 
ideals to which we aspire. 59  So, for instance, the ideals of freedom, altruism, and 
universalism are among the central moral sources of modern culture; they are the 
 
56 Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity?, ed. James L. Heft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 18. 
57 Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 92. 
58 Ibid., 92-3. 
59 Ibid., 693. 
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“hypergoods” which are distinctive to it. These hyper goods are higher order goods with 
unique importance that provide the standpoint by which other, ordinary goods are 
judged.60 They shape our view of the value of all other goods and provide the definition of 
what is “moral” in our culture.  
 
With a normative framework, qualitative distinctions about the good represent the 
standards by which we determine what is desirable, admirable, pure and by which we judge 
our desires, inclinations and decisions.61 Qualitative distinctions give the reasons for our 
moral and ethical beliefs, where reasons are understood to be justifications based on our 
perceptions or intuitions of the good.62 In other words, qualitative distinctions help us 
answer questions about how we should live. We come to know our beliefs by taking our 
moral intuitions seriously and by trying to put them into words that would justify them to 
others. Taylor explains that “we should treat our deepest moral instincts, our ineradicable 
sense that human life is to be respected, as our mode of access to the world in which 
ontological claims are discernible and can be rationally argued about and sifted.”63 
Our moral intuitions come into view and attain the power to motivate us, as we begin to 
articulate them; however, there is not one way only to put these intuitions into words. As 
other commentators have noted, Taylor’s treatment of moral articulacy assumes a plurality 
of accounts: “all of which are better or worse at correctly articulating a particular vision of 
the good, but it also assumes that even the worse account can say something, however 
inchoately, about the sources that animate it.” 64  The articulation that more correctly 
expresses, illuminates, formulates, or makes sense of an intuited moral sources should be 
talked about as the best account.  That account is the best not only because it identifies the 
good most correctly and clearly but also because it allows us to say why it moves us. 
As moral articulacy means having the capacity to be explicit about our moral sources, moral 
inarticulacy is worrying in that it can cause us to lose contact with the good however it is 
conceived.65 Without moral articulation, we cannot state the moral point of our actions or 
 
60 Ibid., 63. 
61 Ibid., 19, 20. 
62 Ibid., 54. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 Carlos D. Colorado, “Transcendent Sources and the Dispossession of the Self,” in Aspiring to Fullness in a 
Secular Age: Essays on Religion and Theology in the Work of Charles Taylor, ed. Carlos D. Colorado and Justin D. 
Klassen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 81. 
65 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 97.  
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make clear what is important or valuable or commands our allegiance. The inability to 
disclose the presuppositions that inform our judgments on any particular subject of moral 
controversy has been identified as one the predicaments that characterizes modern, post-
Enlightenment, moral cultures.66 Taylor’s agenda is to show that the process of articulation 
is qualitatively different for moderns in their quest for meaning than it was for our pre-
modern predecessors, because we face a fundamentally different existential predicament.  
 
How modern moral theories foster inarticulacy 
 
Taylor attributes contemporary moral inarticulacy to several features of modern moral 
theories found in almost all contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. These new 
features of moral thought give rise to reductive accounts, which inhibit the discussions we 
should be having about the nature and sources of the values which underlie our moral 
ideals. In broad brush strokes, Taylor’s argument is that whether by side-lining or actually 
suppressing moral sources, modern moral theories leave us inarticulate when it comes to 
describing the contours of the good life. Taylor identifies three features of modern moral 
theories that contribute to inarticulacy. 
 
First, modern moral theories inhibit moral articulacy by focusing on determining the 
principles of action and invoke various procedures to ascertain the right action.67  They 
share a procedural conception of reason, in which good thinking involves maximizing 
calculation or universalization, rather than a substantive one. Taylor explains, “I call a 
notion of reason substantive where we judge the rationality of agents or their thoughts and 
feelings in substantive terms. This means that the criterion for rationality is that one gets it 
right. ...By contrast, a procedural notion of reason breaks this connection. The rationality 
of an agent or his thought is judged by how he thinks, not in the first instance by whether 
the outcome is substantively correct. Good thinking is defined procedurally.”68 Taylor 
holds that the way Kantians and utilitarians invoke procedures pushes aside questions about 
the substantively correct ends, which would define a good life, and precludes them from 
saying anything coherent about the goods we value or their claim on us.  
 
 
66 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, “The Recovery of Moral Agency?,” in The Best Christian Writing 2000, ed. John 
Wilson (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2000). 
67 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 87. 
68 Ibid., 85-6. 
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Second, modern moral philosophers inhibit moral articulacy by basing their theories on a 
limited set of “basis reasons” rather than on qualitative distinctions. On Taylor’s account, 
utilitarians and Kantians organize everything around one basic reason, in the first instance 
on the principle of maximizing utility and in the second instance on the categorical 
imperative.69 Articulating a basic reason to explain the point of your rules is not the same 
as articulating qualitative distinctions. Taylor asserts that “it is one thing to say that I ought 
to refrain from manipulating your emotions or threatening you, because that is what 
respecting your rights as a human being requires. It is quite another to set out just what 
makes human beings worthy of commanding our respect, and to describe the higher mode 
of life and feeling which is involved in recognizing this.”70  Taylor holds that the way 
modern moral theorists suppress the existence of qualitative distinctions limits the range of 
moral questions we can answer (why, for instance, humans are worthy of respect and 
concern, or what makes a life worth living) and prevents us from being explicit about the 
moral sources that underlie our beliefs.71 Modern theorists do not just suppress qualitative 
distinctions, some deny their reality altogether or cast them as projections.72 Here Taylor 
has in mind “all those who are influenced by a naturalist-inspired metaphysical picture, say, 
of humans as objects of science, or as part of a disenchanted universe, to adopt a basically 
non-realist position about the strongly valued goods.”73 
 
 
69 Ibid., 76. 
70 Ibid., 77. 
71 Will Kymlicka counters that while it is true that naturalism suppresses qualitative distinctions, it is not true 
of utilitarianism, as it affirms that benevolence has the status of a higher good even if utilitarians have not 
given much attention to the question of why people are worthy of equal concern. (167, 171). Kymlicka holds 
that while modern moral theorists do respond to qualitative distinctions differently it is not because they reject 
them but because they do not see their task to articulate the good. On his view, “their belief is simply that the 
ways of life which are worthy of our allegiance are suitably protected by principles of right which provide 
people with the resources, rights, and social conditions under which they can make their informed judgments 
about the good on an on-going basis.” (169) So, for Kymlicka, the task of moral philosophers is not to evaluate 
the good or to draw distinctions to clarify what it is good to be–a task better left to artists, ministers, theologians 
and psychologists–but to clarify our moral obligations so as “to impress on people the importance of respecting 
other people’s good.” (170). The real disagreement between Taylor and Kymlicka concerns whether we do 
or do not need strong moral sources that can motivate people to live up to the standards of universal justice, 
especially in instances where upholding the legitimate claims of others’ conflicts with ordinary goods. For 
instance, impartial morality will at times require us to voluntarily relinquish our unjust advantages, which 
may include the goods of community friendship and traditional identity, and that we sacrifice our attachment 
to those ordinary goods in order to respect other people’s good. Kymlicka thinks we do not need strong moral 
sources to motivate voluntary compliance, for “in an unjust world, morality may be as much about what 
individuals can rightly take by force as it is about what individuals can voluntarily sacrifice.” (178) Will 
Kymlicka, “The Ethics of Inarticulacy,” Inquiry 34, no. 2 (1991). 
72 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 80. 
73 Ibid., 58-9.  
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Finally, modern moral theories inhibit moral articulacy by giving priority to the right over 
the good. Earlier moral theories held that “the reverse is the case, that in a sense, the good 
is always primary to the right. Not in the sense that it offers a more basic reason in the sense 
of our earlier discussion, but in that the good is what, in its articulation, gives the point of 
the rules which define the right.”74 Taylor believes it is a problem that modern moral 
philosophers segregate all but the most abstract considerations of the good, and he argues 
that they have abandoned their task in focusing on what it is right to do rather than on what 
it is good to be. 
 
Having expunged questions about substantively correct ends, side-lined qualitative 
distinctions and shifted the focus to what is right to do rather than on what it is good to be, 
modern moral theories are left with “no way of capturing the background understanding 
surrounding any conviction that we ought to act in this or that way–the understanding of 
the strong good involved.”75 Taylor holds that as long as the moral sources that motivate 
us are treated as irrelevant to the discussion, we will struggle to make our moral decision 
intelligible to ourselves and to others. We can no longer say what is good or valuable about 
the moral code we cleave to or the moral consideration we want to give priority to, or why 
our moral considerations ought to be given higher priority in deliberation. There is very 
little we say about our moral decisions. They are simply “choices.”   
 
What underpins modern moral standards  
 
Inarticulacy presents a further problem, because while we feel bound to certain moral 
standards in modern culture there is no consensus about what would motivate us to live up 
to them. The liberal virtues are the standards (or hypergoods) most characteristic of life in 
the modern moral order, where we “feel particularly strongly the demand for universal 
justice and beneficence, and are particularly sensitive to the claims of equality, feel the 
demands to freedom and self-rule as axiomatically justified, and put a very high priority on 
the avoidance of death and suffering.”76  The difficulty we face is that there are profound 
rifts about what actually underpins these standards. If pressed some might give a theological 
response when questioned about their moral standards, saying that humans are in the image 
 
74 Ibid., 89.  
75 Ibid., 87.  
76 Ibid., 495. 
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of God and speak of being motivated by the love of God. While others will speak of being 
motivated by a conviction about human dignity and worth, or of being energized by a 
feeling of indignation about oppression, injustice and suffering.77  
 
To help us make sense of our responses, Taylor sketches three sets of anthropological views 
in Sources of the Self. These are views that modern people draw upon in the attempt to 
articulate their views about what motivates their aspirations to meet their moral standards. 
These sets of views act as sources of constitutive goods and sources with which to understand 
the self.  The first is a theistic view, which provides a theological grounding for moral 
motivations, moral standards and the sense of self. 78  The latter two categories are 
quintessentially modern for breaking with older views which defined subjectivity in relation 
to an ideal order beyond and building upon the idea of defining subjectivity in relation to 
itself. Taylor terms this new subjectivity “self-defining.”  
 
From it we can trace the second category of moral sources, the naturalistic view, which 
holds that our nature and our moral standards are best understood in scientific, 
instrumentalist, atomistic terms without any recourse to final causes. Self-definition, on this 
view, “is bound up with a sense of control over the world–at first intellectual then 
technological.”79 Taylor explains that full self-definition “requires that we free ourselves 
from the projections of meanings onto things, that we be able to draw back from the world, 
and concentration purely on our own processes of observation and thought about things. 
The old model now looks like a dream of self-dispersal; self-presence is now to be aware of 
what we are and what we are doing in abstraction from the world we observe and judge.”80  
 
The third category, or expressivist view, is thought of as the alternative modern outlook. 
This expressivism fueled a moral vision that was widespread among Romantic writers and 
also among Romanticism’s successors: emotivism, projectivism and other forms of liberal-
individualist empiricism. On this view, we can only know our unique nature and our own 
moral standards by giving verbal or artistic expression to that which exists within us. 
Expression has the effect of realizing our life’s purpose and clarifying who we are - which 
we come to recognize as authentic. So “man as conscious being achieves his highest point 
 
77 A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 698. 
78 Sources of the Self, 495. 




when he cognizes his own life as an adequate, a true expression of what he potentially is–
just as an artist or writer reaches his goal in recognizing his work as a fully adequate 
expression of what he wanted to say.”81  
 
Self-defining subjectivity has a number of compelling features. Taylor believes these 
features play the crucial role in secularization, a thesis he expands on in A Secular Age. 
Nevertheless, the definition that Enlightenment naturalism gave to self-defining subjectivity 
was felt to come at too high a cost for proponents of expressivism, who viewed it not as 
exhilarating self-possession and self-affirmation but as inner-division and self-alienation. 
Where Enlightenment thinkers created separate categories that divided “soul from body, 
reason from feeling, reason from imagination, thought from senses, desire from 
calculation.”82 Romantics strove to overcome divisions which jeopardized their aspiration 
to wholeness. They sought a feeling of harmony with self, unity with others and communion 
with nature. And they sought it in their inner depths, where a new source of morality could 
be found and brought out through the power of expressive self-articulation. 
 
In short, modern culture discovered two new domains to explore in seeking sources of 
constitutive goods and sources with which to understand the self. These sources could be 
found in the exaltation of our own powers and in the exaltation of nature. Enlightenment 
humanism and Romantic expressivism conceive of and access these domains differently, 
using either the power of disengaged rational control or the power of the creative 
imagination which gives expression to our inner nature. This generates tension, because 
the modern subject is defined by both the instrumental stance and the creative imagination, 
and the former can cause us to disengage from the latter.83  
 
The moral and spiritual ramifications of these Enlightenment and Romantic developments 
are still being worked out and, as Taylor seeks to show, the disagreement about what 
underpins our moral standards is far from settled: 
 
The battle between these spiritual outlooks, which starts in the eighteenth century, is 
still going on today. This in spite of the fact that the Romantic doctrines about the 
current of life, or the All of nature, have just about totally disappeared. Just as 
 
81 Ibid., 17. 
82 Taylor, Hegel, 23. 
83 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 390. 
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Enlightenment humanism is no longer extant in its Deist form, but survives in 
naturalism, so the idea of nature as a source no longer refers to a God or cosmic spirit 
in the world, but the demand remains very much alive that we be open to or in tune 
with nature in ourselves and outside. The loss of belief in a spirit in nature has itself, 
of course, been the occasion of crisis and doubt, but the understanding of nature as a 
source still survives, although what underlies it is very uncertain and problematic.84 
 
Taylor identifies both the theistic and atheistic outlooks as “spiritual” with the aim of 
reframing what it means to be religious in the modern secular world. Taylor is interested in 
how people might be re-attuned to God in a secular age without simply returning to the 
pre-modern. One of his aims in A Secular Age is to challenge the central tenet of the 
secularization thesis, which holds that religion entered into irreversible decline with the 
advent of modernity and that secularity is now the only defensible option. Taylor wants to 
explore the religious possibilities in a secular age, because he does not think that modern 
moral sources are capable of satisfying our needs as moral and political selves in the modern 
world.  Ultimately, he wants to open up a conversation about whether agape could ground 
an ethics of benevolence and about whether Trinitarianism could provide a foundation for 
a pluralist politics. Before turning to his wide-ranging treatment of secularization, I want to 
give some indication of what these developments mean for modern conscience. For Taylor’s 
treatment of self-defining agency offers important insights into the pressures on modern 
conceptions conscience.  
 
Conscience in the modern moral order 
 
Self-defining agency and modern conscience 
 
Taylor’s treatment of modern moral sources is suggestive in that it allows us to view modern 
conscience as an exemplary instance of self-defining subjectivity. This in turn helps us come 
to grips with the philosophical roots of our modern conceptions of conscience. It helps us 
to recognize our commitment to the Romantic ideals that we now associate with following 
conscience (ideals such as authenticity, individualism and creative expression) and with 
being true to conscience.85 Modern conscience is thus treated as part of what it means to 
be human and seen as representing the integrity of the human.  
 
 
84 Ibid., 384. 
85 Ibid., 79. 
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It also shows why assertions of conscience are so often marked by moral inarticulacy and 
an inability or unwillingness to provide some justification for our decisions.  The modern 
moral order is characterized by an ongoing commitment to certain standards for the 
justification of moral judgments, formulated during the Enlightenment which hold that we 
should be able to justify our moral judgments by appealing to universal principles that could 
not reasonably be rejected by any rational agent. That commitment is combined with an 
awareness that different conclusions have been reached about what those principles should 
be–principles for maximizing utility or for following the categorical imperative–so there are 
no fully justified norms. Moral articulacy stems from the realization that we ought to be 
able to offer reasons for our decisions and that there are no reasons that will fully justify 
those decisions.  
 
What is more, the Enlightenment vision admits no place for my own particular motivation 
reasons, which the Romantic vision elevated: the interests or projects that shape my 
determination that this is what I must or mustn’t do in these particular circumstances in 
order to be true to who I am and who I am becoming. Conscience, as first-person reasoning 
about what I should do based on who I am and my circumstances, insists that my own 
particular interests be treated as morally relevant and related to the good of others. For that 
reason, conscience appears to ease the tension between the universal ethical imperative and 
the subject’s own experience of the world, or as one commentator identifies as “the tension 
between the extremes of disengaged reason–which has made the ‘universality’ of our 
commitments thinkable–and Romantic expressivism–which affirms the significance of 
every individual’s uncategorizable quotidian experience.”86 Modern conscience’s position 
within the unresolved debates of modernity gives some hint as to why conscience gets 
saddled with carrying the unrealized hope for a universal ethic notwithstanding the 
persistence of the three families of moral theories. 
 
Secularism and modern conscience  
 
Taylor is concerned about what is needed for a world in which societies must learn to live 
with moral and religious diversity. He is pushing for a more critical examination of the role 
 
86 Justin D. Klassen, “The Affirmation of Existential Life in Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age,” in Aspiring to 
Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion and Theology in the Work of Charles Taylor, ed. Carlos D. Colorado and 
Justin D. Klassen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 16. 
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secularism plays in democratic societies where citizens espouse a plurality of conceptions 
about the world and the good–based on religious, spiritual as well as secular core beliefs–
arguing that religious conceptions of the world and the good should not be placed in a class 
apart from the other conceptions but rather given equal respect. A critical examination of 
secularism requires that we take a closer look at both the moral aims that motivate 
secularism and the structural realities that make up secularism. Taylor’s only sustained 
treatment of conscience is to be found in a slim volume titled Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience, where he and Jocelyn Maclure look at the latter.  
 
Taylor and Maclure identify important tensions and contradictions in the structural 
realities of secularism, which are masked by the ways social scientists tend to describe liberal 
political systems. One of those tensions can be seen when the place of religion in the public 
sphere is debated. Secularism, as a political mode of governance, is based on (1) respect for 
the moral equality of individuals, and (2) protection of freedom of conscience and freedom 
of religion.87 These two constitutive principles do not always sit together neatly. They can 
be interpreted in different ways raising a number of questions: 
 
Do moral equality and freedom of conscience justify, in certain cases, that 
accommodation measures or exemptions be granted to certain people so that they 
may practice their religions? Do such accommodations constitute preferential 
treatment incompatible with an adequate understanding of social justice? And if 
religious beliefs do sometimes justify practices of accommodation, what about 
nonreligious beliefs? How, in other words, is equal treatment of religious and 
nonreligious people to be assured? Must “conscious convictions,” whether religious 
or secular, be treated like the other personal preferences, or must a special moral and 
legal statues be attributed to these convictions?88 
 
 
This conflict can be seen in the attempt to reconcile respect for freedom of conscience with 
respect for the moral equality that the liberal state must demonstrate. So, for example: 
 
 A Muslim teacher who wears a headscarf in class may be viewed as compromising 
the neutrality of the public schools, which would be a derogation of the norm 
requiring that public institutions treat all citizens equally. Conversely, preventing the 
teacher from wearing a headscarf… enhances the appearance of neutrality of the 
institution of learning but restricts the teacher’s freedom of conscience and religion; 
or, it undermines the principle of equal opportunity by closing the door to a career 
 
87 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), 4. 
88 Ibid. 4 
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by means of which she might have made her contribution to society.89  
 
European countries have settled this question in different ways. Taylor and Maclure believe 
that looking at how liberal democracies reconcile these two aims (respect for moral equality 
and respect for freedom of conscience) better enables us to draw out the differences that 
exist between political systems than we could by using the typologies of social scientists, 
which are based on how the state relates to the church (whether through “establishment” 
or “separation”). While those typologies contain elements of truth about the principles of 
the modern Western state as a political and legal system, they fail to describe the 
contradictions of secularism, where, for instance, separating Church and State and 
relegating religion to the private sphere is compatible with a majority of people still 
professing belief in God and practicing their religion. Focusing on the how secularism’s two 
aims are reconciled allows Taylor and Maclure to compare different regimes. They 
distinguish between republican models of secularism that favor the growth of a common 
civic identity and force religious affiliations back into the private sphere and liberal-
pluralism models that try to find the optimal balance between respect for moral equality 
and respect for freedom of conscience.90   
 
Examining modern political arrangements based on how respect for moral equality and 
respect for freedom of conscience are reconciled has an additional advantage. It does not 
only foreground conflicts between secularisms’ principal aims, it also foregrounds the ends 
that secularism is trying to realize. That end might be to banish religion from “public” 
spaces or to help us manage the ethical and political conflicts that come with the moral and 
religious diversity of contemporary societies. Their argument is that if liberal secular 
democracies are to be truly liberal and pluralist, they will evidence neutrality towards 
religious, spiritual, or secular conceptions of the good. Efforts to banish religion from public 
spaces are a means (though misguided) not an end and divert us from secularism’s proper 
end, which is to help manage our ethical and political conflicts. Taylor and Maclure 
propose that liberal democracies need to pursue policies that are politically secular (which 
affirm their independence from religion using positive law) but do not promote social 
secularization (the erosion of the influence of religion in social practices and in the conduct 
of individual lives).91  
 
89 Ibid., 24, 25. 
90 Ibid., 34. 
91 Ibid., 16. 
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Sources of the Self and A Secular Age also focus on secularism, but in those two books Taylor is 
more concerned with moral sources of contemporary societies than with their institutional 
arrangements. Although Taylor says very little about conscience in Sources of the Self or A 
Secular Age, his approach to secularization in both can help us see the pressures on modern 
conscience in a new light. Taylor’s treatment of secularization in both works offers a 
different kind of story about the shifts that led to secularization, a story which permits us to 
see conscience not just as a political necessity for managing our conflicts but also as an 
experiential imperative in a secular age. To understand conscience in this new light, we first 
need to give some more attention to Taylor’s characterization of the modern moral order 
and how it came to be. 
 
Moral sources and religious possibility in a secular age  
 
The immanent frame 
 
Taylor identifies the highest good in the modern moral order as immanent human 
flourishing.92 For this reason, he describes the moral framework of the modern moral order 
as the “immanent frame.” The immanent frame is meant to capture the context of secular 
modernity, a context best understood as one in which a naïve acknowledgement of the 
transcendent is no longer possible.93 The immanent frame is “a this-worldly order that we 
have come to imagine together, whether or not we take this to be the final word on 
reality.”94 It holds whether we believe that the transcendent is the fulfilment of the greatest 
good or an obstacle to it, “a threat, a dangerous temptation, a distraction” or as “answering 
to our deepest craving, need.”95 So the immanent frame is something that we all share in 
the modern West–regardless of what we believe.  
 
The immanent frame is, therefore, best understood as the unconscious or unformulated 
construct of our whole situation, the pre-theoretical background upon which particular 
 
92 Taylor, A Secular Age, 632. 
93 Taylor’s language of immanence and fullness are controversial. In responding to his critics, Taylor says he 
regrets having used the terms as so many have read his distinction between immanence and transcendence 
as watertight. For attempts to clarify his meaning, see Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, “‘Long Live the 
Weeds and the Wilderness Yet’: Reflections on a Secular Age,” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (2010): 350. Paul D. 
Janz, “Transcendence, ‘Spin’, and the Jamesian Open Space,” in Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age, ed. Justin 
D. Klassen and Carlos D. Colorado (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 47-50. 
94 Charles Taylor, “Challenging Issues About the Secular Age,” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (2010): 412. 
95 A Secular Age, 548.  
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features of our world show up for us.96 And that is because the immanent frame is not a set 
of beliefs (either the belief in transcendence or the denial of it) but rather the context in 
which we develop our beliefs and from which all our moral and religious questioning now 
proceeds. 97  The immanent frame is characterized by a particular understanding of 
ourselves: buffered, disengaged, living in a disenchanted world.  
 
Exclusive humanism  
 
A characteristic of the immanent order is that it can be envisaged without reference to God; 
however, the immanent frame does not rule out all conceptions of God as active in history 
and in human experience.98 In fact, how you orient yourself in the context of the immanent 
frame and what form of life you pursue in it depends on your take on things. Taylor 
describes two different stances we might take. Some inhabit this context as an open space 
out of a recognition that is possible to have a different take on things. In this open space 
they can feel the tug of alternatives and the force of each opposing position, without 
concluding that atheism, reductive naturalism or materialism necessarily follow.99 The 
option of taking this stance is available to all of us whether or not we believe in some 
transcendent source or power.100 Yet there are others who inhabit this context as a closed 
space, in which they cannot imagine things being otherwise. Taylor explains that if we 
perceive our take on transcendence–whatever that may be–to be just the way things are, 
our view is closed. Although the immanent frame does not compel either an open or a 
closed view, in certain milieux closure is hegemonic. Exclusive humanism is Taylor’s term 
for treating the immanent frame as closed.  
 
The problem with exclusive humanism is that it does not just envision life without reference 
 
96 Ibid., 171.  
97 Ibid., 549. This means that even those believers who defend the supernatural now live within the paradigm 
of the immanent frame. This paradigm is, after all, one that makes a distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural, a distinction earlier ages would have resisted. Ibid., 542, 48. 
98 For a different account of various fundamental orientations between transcendence and immanence, and 
an assessment of their potential to produce and sustain a political subjectivity capable of criticism and change, 
see Geoffrey Holsclaw, Transcending Subjects: Augustine, Hegel and Theology, Challenges in Contemporary 
Theology (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2016). 
99 Taylor describes this posture as standing in the Jamesian open space, a reference to William James’s 
description of an existentially “open space where you can feel the winds pulling you, now to belief, now to 
unbelief.” Taylor, A Secular Age, 549. 
100 In particular, Taylor has in mind those “who want to respect as much as they can the ‘scientific’ shape of 
the immanent order, as they have been led to see it; or who fear the effect of religious ‘fanaticism’; but who 
still cannot help believing that there is something more than the merely immanent.” Ibid., 548. 
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to God, it treats open readings of human agency, culture and history as intellectually 
indefensible instances of wishful thinking or immaturity that are unworthy of serious 
consideration. Taylor counters that both open and closed views actually require a “leap of 
faith,” by which he means that we are pushed or rather drawn to embrace one or the other 
position. Our sense of how things are is anticipatory and leaps ahead of the reasons we 
could offer for having taken either stance.101 In making the case for transcendence, Taylor 
wants to release secular humanists from the false certainty of closure, as if closure were a 
self-evident truth rather than a way of spinning things.  
 
Mainstream secularization theory  
 
Mainstream secularization theory tends to tell the story of secularization as one in which 
we substituted one set of beliefs for another–in this case, new rational or scientific ones 
supplanted the old religious beliefs that once dominated–as if to be secular was to deny the 
existence of God or to affirm the triumph of science over religion. Taylor takes pains to 
show that this is a misunderstanding. While the process of modernization did instigate a 
change in us, it was not just a change in what we might believe but rather a change in our 
whole way of being in the world and of experiencing it.  The difference between our secular 
age and earlier ages is not located in the catalogue of beliefs available to us but rather in 
the conditions of belief, that is, in the “default assumptions about what is believable,” as 
one commentator put it.102  
Part of the problem is that mainstream secularization theory recounts the development of 
secularization by telling how one set of theories came to be replaced by another (how 
Biblical cosmology was displaced by evolutionary theory, for instance). This relies upon a 
narration of loss or of “subtraction” where modernity and secularity are described as 
emerging once people “lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, 
confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge... [releasing certain] underlying 
features of human nature which were there all along but had been impeded by what is now 
set aside.”103 Taylor maintains that the secular is not the remainder left over once belief in 
God has been eliminated from the equation, as subtraction stories suggest. Rather the 
 
101 Ibid., 550-1. 
102 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2014), 19. 
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secular is the sum view of the world we now have after the addition of new ways of 
imagining meaning and significance that do not depend on transcendence.  
Taylor explains that subtraction stories are subtractive not only in the sense that they 
presume that the development of modernity involved cutting ourselves free from fanciful, 
ignorant, and superstitious beliefs. They are also subtractive in the sense of oversimplifying 
the story, typically by prioritizing one factor as the major force in secularization (whether 
that is the rise of modern science or the development of the modern stat). These sorts of  
reductions misconstrue religious beliefs and practices to fit the constraints of the interpretive 
frame, which is why subtraction narratives cannot account for the full panoply of religious 
beliefs now available to us in the secular age. Finally, mainstream secularization theory’s 
narrative of subtraction is distortive because it obscures the central role Christianity has 
played in the creation of a humanist alternative to faith. Taylor believes he can give a more 
convincing account of our secular age, one that puts modernization in its proper frame, 
that is as a “historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms 
(science, technology, industrial production urbanization), of new ways of living 
(individualism, secularization, instrumental rationality), and of new forms of malaise 
(alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution).”104  
Taylor’s story of secularization 
 
Taylor contends that if we want to understand what it means to be secular, we need to trace 
the transformations wrought by Western modernity with an eye to the development of the 
immanent frame. For it is the immanent frame that permits us to see how the context of 
belief and the conditions of belief have actually changed over the last five hundred years. It 
also allows us to see how those changes have in turn re-shaped what kind of experiences of 
the human condition and of the world are now possible for us. This involves telling the story 
of secularization in a way that highlights the changes that have taken place in our 
perception at a pre-theoretical level, including the perception that believing in God is no 
longer easy, as opposed to the perception that belief in God was something that could be 
taken for granted and simply a part of what it means to be human. Taylor believes that only 
by seeing how the whole frame came into place can we appreciate the great cultural 
 
104 Taylor’s conception of modernity is spelled out in the companion volume that Taylor wrote in tandem 
with A Secular Age. See Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 1.  
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transformation that Western modernity has generated, including new understandings of the 
self, society, time, space and agency.105 By narrating these transformations he hopes to 
break open closed readings of the immanent frame.  
 
Mainstream secularization theory holds that advances in education and science 
marginalized religious ideas in public life leading to a decline in belief; however, it is not 
the case that religion has simply become less credible in a disenchanted world. Taylor’s 
thesis is that the obstacles to belief are not epistemic; they are moral. He argues that only 
new and powerful ethical ideas, put forward by exclusive humanism, could have countered 
the force of traditional religious ideas in people’s lives and caused them to drift towards 
unbelief.106 These new ethical ideas include commitments to altruism, benevolence and 
justice, and they offer the most significant sources of moral motivation. They also lead to a 
distinctive and powerful vision of agency characterized by autonomy, sovereignty and 
dignity. As Taylor puts it, “forging your identity through self-definition is accompanied by 
a sense of exhilaration and power.”107 Exclusive humanism was embraced because it gives 
us a vision of ourselves as distanced, free and controlling. It is this vision which gave 
immanence its compelling frame so that it becomes “the near-unsurpassable horizon of our 
thinking, acting, and judging, indeed, of our ‘age.’”108  
 
Reform and the shift from agape to altruism 
 
Taylor’s thesis is that the shift to secularity can be attributed to a tension felt within Latin 
Christendom and efforts to resolve that tension. This tension, internal to Christian thought 
and inherent within it, is between directing life to meet daily needs, so as to foster some 
degree of human flourishing in this world and directing life to the Good that transcends this 
world and lies beyond ordinary human flourishing. It is a tension that stems from the 
demand for the total transformation of one’s life (which means being ready to renounce 
everything and follow God, even to the cross) and the ongoing demands to meet the 
immediate concerns of ordinary life and the obligations of work, family, and friends.109  
 
105 These include, for instance, new perceptions of ourselves “as autonomous subjects, as beings who can revel 
in choice, as citizens among others in a sovereign people, as potentially in control of history.” A Secular Age, 
573. 
106 Ibid., 567. 
107 Hegel, 9. 
108 Hent de Vries, “The Deep Conditions of Secularity,” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (2010): 391. 
109 Taylor, A Secular Age, 80-81. 
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In earlier ages, there were sanctioned ways of easing the tension that builds up from the 
pressure of attending to the everyday and attending to the transcendent. The example that 
Taylor turns to most often is of Carnival, a period in which the ordinary order of things 
was inverted or the world was turned upside down. As Taylor explains, “boys wore the 
mitre, or fools were made kings for a day; what was ordinarily revered was mocked, people 
permitted themselves a form of license, not just sexually but also in close-to-violent acts, 
and the like.”110 The festival of Carnival and other rituals of reversal permitted people to 
let off steam through jesting, mockery and mayhem.  
 
The tension was also accommodated through a two-tiered division of labor (one of the 
distinctions Carnival turned on its head). There were those with special vocations, namely 
monks and nuns, who aspired to perfection and who devoted themselves to it on behalf of 
the wider society. And there were the laity who did not live up to the demands of perfection 
but who helped sustain those on the path of perfection and were carried along by them in 
turn. This two-tier system, initially intended to show forth the complementarity of all lives 
in God’s service, took on a hierarchical cast in which those with monastic, clerical, or 
renunciative vocations were set above ordinary lay vocations as the functions of their 
vocations were accorded more dignity. Although the division between those with special 
vocations and those with ordinary ones could be obscured by a degree of mutual service 
where the clergy prayed for the laity and the laity defended and labored for the clergy–a 
system of “hierarchical complimentarity”–those particular functions were not esteemed to 
have the same worth. The end result was a distinction between first- and second-class 
Christians, that is, between elite Christians who tried to fulfil the gospels and ordinary 
Christians who were not expected to meet those higher moral demands.111  
 
The impulse to close the gap between elite and ordinary piety, which had hitherto separated 
various forms of life, Taylor terms “Reform.” Reform is a desire for the renewal of social 
life, rooted in the promise that “God is sanctifying us everywhere.”112 Taylor calls it “a drive 
to make over the whole of society to higher standards.”113 Taylor sees the Reformation, 
with its thoroughgoing rejection of the monastic life and its vision of a monastic discipline 
 
110 Ibid., 45-6. 
111 Taylor, A Secular Age, 66, 81. 
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for everyone, as but one phase of the agenda of reform. Reform actually covers a number 
of movements and initiatives spanning three centuries, including the various phases of the 
Reformation and counter-Reformation. Movements of reform include both efforts to raise 
the bar so that more can be expected as all can live lives wholly dedicated to God whatever 
their station in life, and it includes strategies to lower the bar, so that less is going to be 
expected as the aspiration to transcend the world is obscured by the aim of flourishing here 
and now in this life. What these various movements shared was an impulse to make over 
the whole church and society, so that all Christians would be totally dedicated. As Taylor 
puts it, “reform demanded that everyone be a real, 100 percent Christian.”114   
 
Taylor traces how the impulse towards reform carried on beyond the Reformation and 
Counter-reformation, in 18th-century Deism with its emphasis on benevolence, and into 
the 19th-century with the emergence of exclusive secular humanism. The path to exclusive 
humanism is one that involves “zig-zags” and frequently doubles back on itself as Taylor’s 
theme expands.115 It is a long story the way Taylor tells it, full of ironies, contingencies, and 
unintended consequences; however, throughout the story Reform is identified as the motor 
that propelled the shifts leading to disenchantment, allowed the modern moral order to 
seep into our social imaginary, and made exclusive humanism a real possibility for large 
number of people.  
 
It is possible to offer only the briefest account of what Taylor terms the “long march” to 
modernity that prepared the ground for exclusive humanism. To show how he sees the 
impact of Reform, we might start with the “taming of the nobility” to pick up just one strand 
in the story. The taming of the nobility refers to the transformation in the self-understanding 
of the nobility and gentry after the War of the Roses, as they came to see themselves no 
longer as semi-independent warriors but as courtiers who advised and served royal power. 
This represented a shift from feudal nobility to a nobility of servants to the Crown and 
“brought with it new models of sociability, new ideals, and new notions of the training 
required to fulfil their role.”116 For instance this ideal of courtesy imposed norms of polish 
and refinement and prioritized humanistic training in persuasive and courteous 
conversation in place of training in ritualized combat such as jousting.  
 
114 Ibid., 774. 
115 Ibid., 95. 
116 Modern Social Imaginaries, 34. 
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The Renaissance interest in courtesy can be seen in a larger context where it merges with 
the notion of civility in the nascent modern state. The taming of the nobility is related here 
to the need to cultivate industrious, disciplined, reliable people for the sake of establishing 
a new social order. For this reason,  
 
[W]e need to understand the notion of civility not just in the context of the taming 
of the nobility, but in relation to the much more widespread and ambitious attempt 
to make over all classes of society through new forms of discipline economic, 
military, religious, moral–which are a striking feature of European society from at 
least the seventeenth century. This transformation was powered both by the 
aspiration to a more complete religious reform, both Protestant and Catholic, and 
by the ambitions of states to achieve more military power and hence, as a necessary 
condition, a more productive economy.117  
 
This is the agenda of reform at work. Taylor explains, “we can say that while late medieval 
elites, clerical of course, but with a growing lay component, were developing ideals of more 
intense devotion and were coming to demand church reform, members of the same elites–
sometimes others, sometimes the same people–were developing/recovering the ideal of 
civility, with its demands for a more ordered, less violent social existence.” 118  These 
complex religious and political agendas of reform propelled a number of changes that 
reflected a growing inability among elites to tolerate what came to be seen as violent, 
uncontrolled or disordered in popular culture. Taylor has in mind programs such as the 
enactment of the poor laws in the fifteenth century, aimed to distinguish between those who 
are capable of work and those who have no recourse but to charity, which put the former 
to work at very low pay and gave the latter relief or confinement; the suppression of 
Carnival for violating the ideal of civility and the place of the sacred by city governments 
and church authorities; and the imposition of personal methods of self-control and 
discipline meant to spread civility from the ruling strata to broader sections of society.119 
Programs such as these amounted to a progressive imposition of order. They also brought 
in their wake “a new self-understanding of our social existence, one that gave 
unprecedented primacy to the individual.”120  
 
 
117 Ibid., 39. 
118 Ibid., 41. 
119 Taylor is thinking of methods of spiritual discipline such as the spiritual exercises of Ignatius of Loyola as 
well as the cognitive exercises of Descartes, but also of the new modes of training of armies in the sixteenth 
century that Foucault described, the principles of which were later applied to schools, hospitals and then 
factories. 
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The shift from understanding ourselves as deeply embedded in society to understanding 
ourselves as individuals first is particularly significant for Taylor’s story.121 He holds that 
“this was not just a revolution in our neutral view of ourselves, but involved a profound 
change in our moral world, as is always the case with identity shifts.”122 That change in our 
moral world inaugurated a modern understanding moral order. What began to emerge in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Taylor argues, is a new moral order 
derived from the modern natural law theories of Grotius and Locke.123  
 
Taylor sees the idea of this order going through many redactions but identifies four features 
that stand out as constants. First, political society starts with individuals and exists for their 
sake. In the modern ideal of moral order the individual agent precedes society, in contrast 
with the pre-modern understanding that a person “can be a proper moral agent only when 
embedded in a larger social whole, whose very nature is to exhibit a hierarchical 
complimentarity.”124 Second, the goal of political institutions is to secure for individuals the 
“conditions of existence as free agents,” which are the benefits of life and the means to 
life.125 Third, political society is ordered so as to secure individual freedom, which finds 
expression in term of rights. Individuals are understood as autonomous and as free to shape 
their own lives as well as the social order founded on their consent. Fourth, these rights, 




121 Taylor goes to some length to distinguish between various forms of individualism, including the kind of 
individual stance that has to do with taking responsibility upon oneself and for oneself; the individualism 
that entails self-examination, self-development and authentic living; and the individualism in which each 
pursues his own good in his own way bound only by voluntarily assumed obligations to any common good. 
While Taylor is wary of this later atomistic or instrumental individualism because it fosters the delusion of 
Reform that supposes we can attain mastery of ourselves and of the world, he is in fact cautiously 
sympathetic to the instrumentalisms of responsibility, self-examination, self-development and authenticity. 
They can enable people to live in ways that are open to transcendent moral sources. A Secular Age, 541. See 
also The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). As he will argue Christianity is 
itself individualist in the sense that it understands the human relationship with God, with the transcendent, 
to be a personal relationship, one that should bring into being a community of persons in relation to God, 
which exists not merely for mutual benefit but for the sake of love. A Secular Age, 282. For an insightful 
account of Taylor’s treatment of authentic individuality and genuine community, see Jennifer A. Herdt, 
“The Authentic Individual in the Network of Agape,” in Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion 
and Theology in the Work of Charles Taylor, ed. Carlos Colorado and Justin Klassen (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2014). 
122 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 65. 
123 This part of Taylor’s story is very sketchy. The transformations wrought by modern natural law theorists 
in their efforts to provide a nonsectarian account of Christianity which might secure peace after the wars of 
religion are better detailed elsewhere. See, for instance: Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A 
History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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the central moral concern becomes the imposition of a disciplined order on personal 
and social life, ensuring high standards of self-control and good behavior in the 
individual, and peace, order and prosperity in society.... The highest goals of human 
beings seem, even in the sphere of religion, to aim at purely human goods. When, 
on top of this, there begins to be serious progress towards these goals, the idea can 
gain currency that these ends are within the scope of unaided human powers.126 
 
Exclusive humanism arose alongside an alternative set of moral sources for the modern 
moral order’s ethic of freedom and mutual benefit.127 If the modern ethic of freedom and 
mutual benefit gave us the confidence that we can actually shape and re-order our lives 
using discipline and disengaged reasoning, then this alternative set of moral sources 
provided the motivation to universalize this project by carrying it out for benefit of all. This 
alternative set of moral sources included benevolence, human sympathy and altruism. 
Taylor argues that exclusive humanism became a conceivable option once the moral goals–
“self-control and good behavior in the individual, and peace, order and prosperity in 
society”–were brought down into the human realm. At this point people could see 
themselves as having the moral ability to meet their goals without calling for God’s aid.  
 
Taylor identifies the order of mutual benefit, with its impulse to universal altruism, as a 
secularization of the Christian call to love the neighbor (such that the neighbor includes the 
stranger, the alien, even one’s enemy). So what exclusive humanism defines as moral 
fullness and devotes itself to–benevolence–is in fact an analogue for the spirituality of agape. 
Together the combination of new ethical ideas planted by Christianity about how we are 
to live together in society and new ethical sources to motivate us to act for the universal 
human good eventually created the conditions for this secular age. Taylor’s argument is 
that secularism is in fact dependent upon Christianity, and “it would probably not have 
been possible to make the transition to exclusive humanism on any other basis.”128  
 
The malaise of immanence  
We live in a condition where we cannot help but be aware that there are a number 
of different construals, views which intelligent, reasonably undeluded people, of 
good will, can and do disagree on.... [W]e are aware today that one can live the 
spiritual life differently; that power, fullness, exile, etc., can take different shapes.…  
[We have moved] from a condition where, in Christendom, people lived naïvely 
 
126 A Secular Age, 260-61. 
127 Ibid., 259. 
128 Taylor, A Secular Age, 247. 
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within a theistic construal, to one in which we all shunt between two stances, in 
which everyone’s construal shows up as such; and in which moreover, unbelief has 
become for many the major default option.129  
 
Taylor has re-narrated the story of secularization in order to trace how people came to see 
themselves as capable of mustering the will to act for universal human good on an 
unprecedented scale without God’s help. Either through enlightenment, discipline and 
rational self-control, as the Enlightenment view suggested, or through tapping inner 
resources of sympathy, as the Romantic view proposed, or indeed through a combination 
of the two.130 Reform is his name for the processes which made this self-image a conceivable 
option.  On his account, living in a secular age means living a cultural and political situation 
in which, as Fergus Kerr put it, “belief in a divinely-created world with divinely-instituted 
moral law has gone, or is going, and in which we thus seem to be left with nothing but our 
own minds and wills to generate ethical ideals and moral practices.”131 Yet there is a certain 
malaise, a vague sense that something may have been lost with the “eclipse of 
transcendence.”132  
 
Taylor describes our discomfort with exclusive humanism in terms of the experience of 
cross-pressures, fragilization and optionality. Cross pressures are part of what Taylor calls 
the “malaise of immanence,” a feeling of flatness that has to do with a nagging sense of loss 
of meaning that is sometimes accompanied by a nostalgia for enchantment.133 They issue 
from “the draw of narratives of closed immanence on one side, and the sense of their 
inadequacy on the other.”134 Indeed, they are cross pressures because many of those who 
recoil from the materialist atheist position also reject orthodox religion. So people feel 
pushed from both sides.  
 
Taylor contends that cross pressures define contemporary culture as a whole.135 Even those 
who are firmly entrenched in their positions cannot help but be aware that many people do 
not share their views, an awareness which can cause consternation even righteous 
indignation. Taylor sees these cross pressures generating two conditions. Cross pressures 
 
129 Taylor, A Secular Age, 11, 14. 
130 Ibid., 257. 
131 Fergus Kerr, “How Much Can a Philosopher Do?,” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (2010): 327. 
132 Taylor, A Secular Age, 307. 
133 Ibid., 309. 
134 Ibid., 303, 595. 
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may spur a return to transcendent outlooks and traditional forms of faith, but they may also 
propel people to create new positions from which to pursue meaning and fullness in the 
absence of transcendence. There has been an explosion of options that are being devised 
to find meaning within the immanent order in response to the intensity of the cross pressures 
acting on the buffered self. Taylor has in mind not only the new options generated by Freud 
and Nietzsche, but also those generated by Goethe and D.H. Lawrence.136 More recent 
options include the search for spiritual wholeness that is tied to the pursuit of self-
development and wellbeing, such as the “power of positive thinking” propounded by 
Norman Vincent Peale in the 1950s and the proliferation of New Age modes of practice 
that blend spirituality and therapy.137  He also identifies a new kind of spiritual quest 
characterized by assembling one’s own personal outlook through meditation, special forms 
of prayer, participation in study groups, taking a pilgrimage to Taize or attending a 
gathering such as World Youth Day.138 As a result of these new quests “we are now living 
in a spiritual super-nova, a kind of galloping pluralism on the spiritual plane.”139 Taylor 
portrays the contemporary scene in this way: 
 
It is marked by an unheard-of pluralism of outlooks, religious, non-religious and 
anti-religious, in which the number of possible positions seems to be increasing 
without end. It is marked in consequence by a great deal of mutual fragilization, 
and hence movement between different outlooks. It naturally depends on one’s 
milieu, but it is harder and harder to find a niche where either belief or unbelief go 
without saying.... Religious belief now exists in a field of choices which include 
various forms of demurral and rejection; Christian faith exists in a field where there 
is also a wide range of other spiritual options.140 
 
The “fragilization” of all beliefs (religious and anti-religious) is the second condition 
generated by cross pressures. Fragilization is Taylor’s term for the sense that my religious 
commitments have been put in question and are felt to be fragile. Fragilization comes about 
through contact with others who do not share my faith but who embody plausible 
alternative ways of life. It raises the question “why my way, and not hers?”141 And it has to 
do with the fact that people today have a heightened sense of awareness about the existence 
of alternatives to their own position on belief, whatever that position may be. Taylor sees 
 
136 Ibid., 313. 
137 Ibid., 509. 
138 Ibid., 514, 17. 
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evidence of fragilization in the hesitancy many people feel about making a religious 
commitment and in the increased movement between various religious identities and 
communities.142  
In certain passages, Taylor seems to suggest that the mere existence of multiple religious 
and nonreligious possibilities generates fragilization but in others he suggests that hardcore 
believers and unbelievers, whether they align themselves with the New Atheists or with 
religious fundamentalist groups, are less likely to experience it. So fragilization, like cross 
pressures, may be limited to those who come to stand in the open space of the immanent 
frame where one “can actually feel some of the force of each opposing position.” 143 It is 
difficult to draw conclusions about the scope of fragilization from Taylor’s account of it as 
some of the passages contradict others.144 However widespread it may be, the phenomenon 
itself comes down to the way individual believers now experience their own faith with some 
sense of contingency and relativity. 
Taylor’s identification of cross pressures and fragilization does more than simply point to 
the fact of religious pluralism. Pluralism (in the sense of people with different faiths living in 
the same city) existed in pre-modern contexts and in other places in the world without 
having the same fragilizing effects. What is new is the sense that the alternative embodied 
by another could be conceivable for me. Ruth Abbey explains that “what matters is not just 
that a dizzying array of religious and nonreligious options exists, but also that… the 
existence of alternative religious and nonreligious options makes it hard for people in 
modern Western societies to take it for granted that their own position is unquestionably 
correct.”145 Cross pressures and fragilization try to capture the sense today that the myriad 
of other positions I come across can raise questions in my mind about unassailability of my 
own position. Taylor’s analysis of the impact of unbelief and of the multiplicity of faiths on 
 
142 Ibid., 598. 
143 Ibid., 549.  
144 Ruth Abbey has tried to bring more clarity to Taylor’s complicated thesis about cross pressures and 
fragilization by canvassing his claims about how widespread they really are in contemporary religious 
experience and whether they actually prevent people from holding onto their beliefs with as much tenacity or 
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experiences of people who have undergone these “religious realignments” and that without them it is hard to 
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way. See Ruth Abbey, “Theorizing Secularity 3,” in Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion and 
Theology in the Work of Charles Taylor, ed. Carlos D. Colorado and Justin D. Klassen (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2014). 
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the experience of believing today is related to the fact that religious belief has become 
optional. Cross pressures and the fragilization effect stem from this sense of optionality.146 
 
Going back to Taylor’s analysis of the new consequences of pluralism on society, it becomes 
clear that conditions in society have shortened the distances between us so that there is 
more contact and exchange with those who have taken different moral and religious 
positions. Taylor says that as we become more and more like each other, we come to realize 
that there are other positions we could take and that the one we happen to take is an option. 
This is how he depicts the plurality of contemporary secular society and the sense of 
optionality: 
 
Of course, our society is different from earlier ones in which virtually everybody 
believed in or experienced the same shape of spirituality. But it is also different from 
other societies, such as India has been for centuries, and the Ottoman Empire was, 
to take two examples, in which everyone was aware of many spiritual positions being 
lived in one’s society. But this could be so without one’s feeling that some other 
position was a real existential option for one.... But for many people today, members 
of their own family live some other position; moreover, there have been shifts within 
the family, and new changes are always taking place. Moreover, everyone is aware 
that this isn’t a rare fact about my family alone but is very widespread.... This is 
what it is to see one’s stance as in this sense an option.... It has nothing to do with 
my being ready or even vaguely tempted to exercise an option to change.147  
 
 
When Taylor says that belief is now an option, he means that it we can no longer regard 
either religion or its alternatives as providing all of society with normative foundations. The 
fragilization that accompanies this realization is not so much a faltering in faith–my faith 
may still be robust–as it is an unsettling awareness that my faith can be viewed as merely 
one plausible option among others. 148  One reviewer offered this description of how 
believers experience optionality: “religious convictions themselves have been inwardly 
‘destabilized.’ Even if we regard our faith as firm, we know that it is considered implausible, 
even irrational, by rival perspectives that we know to be credible.”149 But Taylor would be 
 
146 We have Hent de Vries to thank for coining the term optionality. See de Vries, “The Deep Conditions of 
Secularity. ” De Vries’ treatment of the optional nature of faith is too perplexing to restate here unfortunately, 
and Taylor himself has dismissed it as a misreading: Charles Taylor, “Challenging Issues About the Secular 
Age,” Ibid.: 416. 
147 Italics his. A Secular Age, 415-6. 
148 The optional nature of religious belief can give people the sense that they “can wander between and around 
all these options without having to land clearly and definitely in any one.” Ibid., 351. 




the first to point out that if we have actually freed ourselves from the secularization thesis 
and from the widespread cultural assumption that secularism has obviated religious beliefs, 
we would perceive that disbelief is also optional. For optionality places the burden of proof 
not only on those who maintain a religious outlook but also on those whose maintain a 
humanist one as well.150  
 
The pressures on conscience 
 
High moral ideals place great moral demands on us 
 
During these past four centuries, the idea of moral order implicit in this view of 
society has undergone a double expansion: in extension (more people live by it; it 
has become dominant) and in intensity (the demands it makes are heavier and more 
ramified).151 
 
Modern secular culture, with its aspirations to universal benevolence and justice, sets high 
moral standards for us to live up to. It assumes that we ought to lay stronger demands on 
ourselves than we have in the past and that we are capable of making greater sacrifices to 
meet those demands. Reflecting on the legacy of Reform over the past four centuries, 
Taylor muses that “never before have people been asked to stretch out so far, and so 
consistently, so systematically, so as a matter of course, to the stranger outside the gates.”152  
The question for Taylor is whether the modern moral order has a moral source that is 
strong enough to empower us to meet those standards. The modern moral order’s ethic of 
benevolence is meant to be motivated by our recognition of the dignity of others but is that 
enough given how much is demanded of us?153  Does it actually enable us to overcome the 
limits to human action created by “our restricted sympathies, our understandable self-
preoccupation, and the common human tendency to define one’s identity in opposition to 
 
150 Here I concur with Jennifer Herdt’s reading of Taylor. Herdt, “The Authentic Individual in the Network 
of Agape.”  
151 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 5. 
152 A Secular Age, 695. 
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some adversary or out group?”154 Or does modern secular culture aim higher than is 
sustained by its moral sources?155 
Taylor holds that the moral sources undergirding the Enlightenment project cannot 
adequately inspire us with confidence or hope that the goods it aspires to are realizable, 
and that is the notion of the human good put forward by exclusive humanism is inherently 
unstable. The modern liberal virtues have a theoretical shakiness, because they are not 
securely grounded in the common good. Exclusive humanism has cut off altruism and these 
other virtues from the transcendent source of fullness and wholeness, agape, which had 
traditionally sustained the humanistic enterprise. That theoretical shakiness makes it 
difficult for us to say what moral consideration we want to give priority to and why. Given 
that the moral sources of exclusive humanism are not up to the task of overcoming moral 
inarticulacy, there is good reason to fear they are not up to the task of helping us live up to 
our moral commitments, especially when it comes to sustaining our far-reaching moral 
commitments to benevolence and justice. To put it another way, the modern moral order 
is underfunded: it places big demands on us while providing only weak moral resources for 
meeting them.156  
 
The dangers of living beyond our moral means 
 
The question which arises from all this is whether we are not living beyond our 
moral means in continuing allegiance to our standards of justice and 
benevolence.157  
 
Taylor says we cannot rely on benevolence or universal sympathy to help us forge an 
identification with the common good and create social solidarity, for those same solidarities 
can also engender violence, war, persecution, and every form of scapegoating. Taylor has 
in mind the way a desire to help the poor, vulnerable and oppressed can fuel both bitter 
disappointment in those who fall short in their offer of help and contempt for any who stand 
in the way. So, while altruism can inspire us to act for justice it “can slide into something 
trivial, ugly or downright dangerous and destructive.”158 Taylor explains: 
 
154 Kymlicka, “The Ethics of Inarticulacy,” 172. 
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The tragic irony is that the higher the sense of potential, the more grievously do real 
people fall short and the more severe the turnaround that is inspired by the 
disappointment. A lofty humanism posits high standards of self-worth and a 
magnificent goal to strive toward. It inspires enterprises of great moment. But by 
this very token it encourages force, despotism, tutelage, ultimately contempt, and a 
certain ruthlessness in shaping refractory human material–oddly enough, the same 
horrors that Enlightenment critique picked up in societies and institutions 
dominated by religion, and for the same causes. The difference of belief here is not 
crucial. Wherever action for high ideals is not tempered, controlled, and ultimately 
engulfed in an unconditional love of the beneficiaries, this ugly dialectic risks 
repetition.159  
 
The modern liberal virtues simply do not create a sufficiently firm identification with the 
common good; therefore, they have a propensity to become vices. This is the way 
philanthropy becomes misanthropy:  
 
Philanthropy–the love of the human–can gradually come to be invested with 
contempt, hatred, aggression. The action is broken off or, worse, continues but is 
invested now with these new feelings, becoming progressively more coercive and 
inhumane. The history of despotic socialism (i.e., twentieth-century communism) is 
replete with this tragic turn, brilliantly foreseen by Dostoyevsky more than a hundred 
years ago (“Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrived at unlimited despotism”), and 
then repeated again and again with a fatal regularity.160  
 
Taylor concludes it is self-destructive to continue to live beyond our moral means.161 So we 
have a choice to make. Either we need to lower our standards of justice and benevolence 
so that we do not expect as much of ourselves or we need to find stronger moral sources 
that can sustain our allegiance to high moral standards of justice and benevolence.  
 
Conscience as an existential imperative 
 
Taylor’s treatment of exclusive humanism and its moral sources offers a different kind of 
story about the shifts that led to secularization, as a story which permits us to see conscience 
not just as a political necessity for managing our conflicts but also as an experiential 
imperative in a secular age. The experiences of malaise associated with the immanent 
frame–contestability, cross-pressures, fragilization, optionality–show that we need a 
 
159 Ibid., 697. Cf. A Catholic Modernity?, 20. 
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pluralistic ethic with a firmer basis than altruism can provide. It also indicates why in the 
absence of such an ethic, we tend to turn to conscience to describe certain sorts of moral 
decisions. 
 
Weak moral sources lead to an over-reliance on modern conscience as individualistic. 
Modern conscience has an aura of universality about it and yet seems to hold the 
individual’s particular experiences and expressive aspirations. Understood as a feature of 
self-defining agency, that same particularism seems to performatively enact individuality 
thus containing its own rationale, which might be offered in lieu of other motivations we 
might struggle to articulate in a secular age given the moral sources we can invoke. In the 
absence of stronger moral sources, modern conscience promises to affirm the universal 
ethical imperative and the subject’s own individual experience of it and to ease the tension 
between the two. My contention is that appeals to conscience can be read as an attempt to 
break the ceiling of immanence, as part of the “revolt against immanence.”162 
 
Taylor sees this as a “revolt from within unbelief [...] against the primacy of life.”163 And it 
points to an ontological feature of selfhood, namely that human beings aspire to go “beyond 
life,” to have contact with something of intrinsic value beyond human flourishing.164 This 
human need to go beyond life is not without its dangers, whether it manifests itself outside 
of traditional religion or within it. In the first case, Taylor refers to a modern fascination 
with death and violence and in the second case, to human sacrifice and intercommunal 
massacres.165 Notwithstanding these darker sides of the longing to go beyond life, Taylor 
claims that humans aspire to some form of transcendence, whether this aspiration takes 
shape in religion, in a fascination with the sublime, an interest in the wilderness, or in art, 
where people also look for a quasi-spiritual nourishment. For all its secularity, “our modern 
culture is restless at the barriers of the human sphere.”166 
 
The way forward: sources outside the self 
Just having appropriate beliefs is no solution to these dilemmas, and the 
transformation of high ideals into brutal practice was demonstrated lavishly in 
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Christendom, well before modern humanism came on the scene. So, is there a way 
out? This cannot be a matter of guarantee, only of faith. But it is clear that Christian 
spirituality points to one. It can be described in two ways: either as a love or 
compassion that is unconditional–that is, not based on what you the recipient have 
made of yourself–or as one based on what you are most profoundly, a being in the 
image of God.167 
 
Taylor believes we need to find stronger moral sources outside the subject that can sustain 
our allegiance to our moral standards and overcome excessive individualism.168 Taylor 
wants us to recognize that humans owe their power to realize the highest good not to a 
source within themselves but to a source beyond them, which is more than immanent and 
yet “inseparably indexed to a personal vision.”169 That transcendent power is the source of 
agape, which allows us to show the unconditional love that is necessary for us to act beyond 
our capacities for unconditional love and sacrifice. He holds that “religious longing, the 
longing for and response to a more-than-immanent transformation perspective, what 
Chantal Milon-Delsol calls a désir d’éternité, remains a strong independent source of 
motivation in modernity.” 170  And only agape can overcome the individualism of the 
modern secular age. Agape creates the personal transformation of one’s capacities so one 
can act in love for the sake of others; it empowers the social transformation that can break 
the excessive individualism and excarnation of religion. It does this by creating new 
solidarities and by giving us “standing among others in the stream of love.” What is more, 
agape makes new forms of social existence possible, through which individual Christian 
identity might be ordered communally and embedded in traditions and institutions. 
 
Breaking the immanent frame to acknowledge a source outside ourselves holds significant 
potential to take the pressure off modern conscience. With a strong source such as agape, 
we no longer need to treat decisions of conscience as the way to overcome the inarticulacy 
of modern moral theories, something claims of conscience rarely do in any case. Agape also 
provides a way of reconciling the universal with the singular so that we do not have to 
appeal to conscience to ease the tension between them. For the Christian ethic, as one 
commentator on A Secular Age points out, “constitutes a way of beginning with the material, 
such that it might persuasively address and overcome the ‘gap’ between the universal and 
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the particular, between the measure of goodness and that which is to be measured–the gap 




This chapter has examined why it is difficult to provide reasons that would make plain the 
moral motivations behind claims of conscience. Positioning Charles Taylor’s work on moral 
inarticulacy alongside his treatment of self-defining subjectivity, allowed me to uncover the 
philosophical roots of modern conceptions of conscience and to situate the problem of 
conscience in the unresolved debates of modernity.  Extrapolating from Taylor’s work on 
secularism, I showed why people are pressured to rely on conscience as a moral principle 
despite the difficulties it poses.  I examined Taylor’s proposes that we need to give 
transcendent love credence as a strong moral motivation and that doing so opens the 
possibility of overcoming moral inarticulacy.  I argued that doing so may also alleviate the 
over reliance on conscience-talk, the showstopper designed to break the impasses of 
Enlightenment debates about justification through procedures and rules and give us a better 
starting place from which to reconceptualize conscience. Before that work can begin, we 
need to examine what the beautiful soul can teach about conceptualizing conscience and 


























Romantic self-expression epitomized: the figure of the beautiful soul 
 
Introduction  
What is entailed in organizing one’s moral life by drawing only upon sources found within 
the self? How would one go about generating ethical ideals and moral practices with 
nothing but one’s own mind and will? One particular figure in Romantic literature offers 
an important depiction of what following individual conscience looks like under those 
conditions, where one cannot or will not rely upon sources beyond the self.  That figure was 
known as the beautiful soul (die schöne Seele or la belle âme). The beautiful soul came to 
prominence at a time when few moral certainties existed. While discussions of what a good 
life consisted in drifted away from Christian doctrine and became moored in other 
philosophical and political projects of secular modernity, the beautiful soul stood in for a 
traditional saint, providing an ideal to aspire to and emulate. In this way, the figure of the 
beautiful soul acted as a guiding light inspiring not only the popular imagination but also 
the imaginations of diverse thinkers responding to the issues of the age such as the 
disenchantment of nature, the Kantian revolution, the French revolution, the industrial 
revolution, the growing influence of the bourgeoisie and the emergence of the nation-state.  
This chapter is concerned with the beautiful soul as an important trope of conscience and 
with what it can teach us about the pitfalls of relying upon weak moral sources.  I begin by 
situating the figure of the beautiful soul in literature and theory. I then examine the beautiful 
soul as a depiction of what it feels like to organize your life solely according to your 
conscience.   In order to show how the beautiful soul depicts this, the rest of the chapter is 
devoted to drawing out the key moments in one of the most influential narrative of the 
beautiful soul’s life, showing why she attempts to live by conscience alone and how as she 
comes to understand her conscience as the expression of her true individuality.  
The narrative of the beautiful soul that this chapter takes as its primary focus is found in 
Goethe’s novel Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship. Although there is in Goethe’s novel no 
explicit theorization of conscience, the close reading of the novel I offer here will make it 
possible to see how the beautiful soul attempts to generate ethical ideals and moral practices 
out of nothing but her own mind and will.  That attempt is understood as an exercise of 
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conscience by later theorists, including Hegel.  My reading of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship will proceed in some detail in order to provide counterbalance to the 
abstraction of Hegel’s representation of the beautiful soul, which is examined in the next 
chapter. Re-telling these stories of the beautiful soul will make it possible to explore why a 
theologian like Rowan Williams would claim the beautiful soul represents the temptation 
of the modern age, and what that temptation has to do with how claims of conscience are 
made.  
 
The literary career of the beautiful soul 
 
How recognizable, how familiar to us is the man so beautifully portrayed in the 
Grundlegung, who confronted even with Christ turns away to consider the judgment 
of his own conscience and to hear the voice of his own reason. Stripped of the 
exiguous metaphysical background which Kant was prepared to allow him, this 
man is with us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, brave, 
the hero of so many novels and books of moral philosophy.172  
 
In modern moral discourse, the beautiful soul is read as a trope for one who heeds the voice 
of conscience and acts out of loyalty to her moral or religious conviction, even if that means 
betraying other loyalties and having to turn away from her family, her station in life, her 
profession or her country or Christ himself, as Murdoch put it.173  A beautiful soul is 
prepared to be at odds with society for disregarding conventional norms; a beautiful soul 
will stand up for the law that is written on the heart without counting the cost. A beautiful 
soul directs her life according to her own conception rather than being pushed around by 
prevailing mores or other external forces. Her life is conceived of as natural and as free–
whether free from the playing at socially imposed roles by having cultivated an ironic 
detachment or free from what others think of her by having the able to retreat to a 
privileged sphere of interiority. In this vein, the figure of the beautiful soul has come to 
personify the pacifist and the conscientious objector claiming exemption from military 
service.174 But this is to significantly narrow the beautiful soul’s original set of associations. 
 
172 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 1970), 80. 
173 This is the sense in which beautiful souls are understood in contemporary studies by those such as Eyal 
Press when he looks at ways in which moral problems play out in the lives of dissidents. Eyal Press, Beautiful 
Souls: The Courage and Conscience of Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2012). 
174 Jean Bethke Elshtain has examined the trope of the beautiful soul as a figuration of the female non-
combatant in terms of women’s innocence of and abstention from war with the aim of challenging the cultural 
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The figure of the beautiful soul has had a long and varied literary career. From its earliest 
appearances, the beautiful soul denoted an ideal of moral and spiritual beauty. As such the 
figure of the beautiful soul–or at least the ideal of “beauty of soul”–can be glimpsed in 
Antique, Medieval, Reformation, Counter-reformation, Pietist and Idealist periods.175 For 
instance the ideal of the beautiful soul crops up in Plotinus’s treatises on divine 
contemplation and his discussion of kalokagathia in the sixth tractate of the first Enneads.176 
It appears again in the Church Fathers’ exegesis of the Song of Songs and meditations on 
spiritual beauty.177 The beautiful soul is invoked in the writings of Pietists like Francke and 
Zinsendorf who insisted on the importance of attaining beauty of soul in the context of 
becoming a spiritual bride of Christ.178  Later the idea is taken up by the Earl of Shaftesbury 
in his explorations of virtuous action, self-formation, conscience and character.179 In time 
the figure of the beautiful soul came to embody and in some way synthesize the qualities of 
goodness and beauty.   
 
Recent historical investigations of the beautiful soul concur that the idea of the beautiful 
soul was a complex one, drawn from themes found in otherwise discrete realms of 
discourse.180 The interplay of these themes has allowed the beautiful soul to take myriad 
forms in literature and in the lives of those who sought to cultivate their own beautiful souls. 
That there exists so many variations on the idea of being a beautiful soul and of having 
‘beauty of soul’ has caused speculation that the term is a retrospective labelling of what is a 
 
stereotypes that link women with pacifism and showing that the role that women actually play in combat is 
far more complex. Elsthain shines a light on the dialectic of activity and passivity of women moving through 
civil society and the state. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (New York: Basic Books, 1987). Elshtain’s 
work on the beautiful soul in this context has led to feminist reappraisals of the figure. For one recent example, 
see Laura Sjoberg, “Women Fighters and the ‘Beautiful Soul’ Narrative,” International Review of the Red Cross 
92, no. 877 (2010).  
175  Jeffrey S. Librett, “Rhapsodic Dispositions: Engenderments of the Ground in the Discourse of the 
‘Beautiful Soul’ (Shaftesbury, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger),” (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1989), 2. 
176 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
177  Bernard Clairvaux, Bernard of Clairvaux: Sermons on the Song of Songs, trans. Irene Edmonds (London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 1980), 206-08. See also Richard A. Norris, The Song of Songs: 
Interpreted by Early Christian and Medieval Commentators (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003).  
178 Men and women in Pietist communities were guided to write their own confessions in the style of the 
beautiful soul as a form of spiritual discipline, a practice which reinforced a particular pattern of conversion 
and spread this understanding of spiritual development through introspection. Ralph W. Buechler, 
“Germany, Austria, Switzerland: 17th-and 18th-Century Auto/Biography,” in Encyclopedia of Life Writing: 
Autobiographical and Biographical Forms, ed. Margaretta Jolly (London: Routledge, 2013), 365-66. 
179 Lord Shaftesbury, Shaftesbury: Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Cambridge Texts in the History 
of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
180 See Ralf Konersmann, “Seele, Schöne,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter u. 
Karlfried Gründer (Basel 1995); Marie Wokalek, Die Schöne Seele: Eine Denkfigur: Zur Semantik Von Gewissen Und 
Geschmack Bei Rousseau, Wieland, Schiller, Goethe (Göttingen: Wallstein 2011), 17-18; Robert Edward Norton, The 
Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 7. 
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rather diffuse phenomenon, especially among those who see the danger of imposing a false 
uniformity on the array of stories, plays, poems and polemical discussions in which the 
beautiful soul features.181  
 
By the eighteenth century, the beautiful soul had entered into popular currency due in large 
part to a spike in the publication of belles-lettres across Europe,182 and having a beautiful 
soul was held up as an ideal towards which all should strive.  A number of influential 
eighteenth-century thinkers–Goethe, Rousseau, Schlegel, Novalis, Hölderlin and Schiller–
offered their own rendition of the beautiful soul story in their novels, letters and reflections 
on authorship. Their depictions have decisively shaped the way the figure is read now.  
 
For that reason, the beautiful soul may bring to mind the countess who Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe popularized in Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795-6), and her account of the 
perceptions that had defined her life, as well as the young aristocratic pupil in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s instant best-seller Julie, or the New Heloise (1761), who poured out her true feelings 
for her middle-class tutor in a passionate exchange of love letters. Similarly mention of the 
beautiful soul can evoke the emancipated woman who stands for wholeness and perfection 
in Friedrich von Schlegel’s unfinished romance Lucinde (1799), as well as the young maiden 
Mathilde in Novalis’ unfinished fairy tale Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1800), with the face 
reminiscent of the mysterious image glimpsed in the petals of a blue flower. For others, the 
beautiful soul is personified by the character Diotima in Friedrich Hölderlin’s epistolary 
novel Hyperion, Or, The Hermit in Greece (issues in two volumes, which were published in 1797 
and 1799). The figure is also personified, more abstractly, by the goddess of beauty with the 
belt of grace with which Friedrich Schiller begins his essay On Grace and Dignity (1793). From 
the pages of these novels and essays, the beautiful soul emerged as one of the most important 
concepts in eighteenth-century moral philosophy defining how men and women should 
live. 
 
In all these texts the beautiful soul refers to an idealized woman or to an abstraction with 
feminine qualities; however, there are significant gender dynamics at play that make it 
 
181 This is something Stephenson sees in Norton’s treatment of beautiful souls. Roger Stephenson, “Review 
of Robert E. Norton, Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century,’ Modern Language Review 
(2001). 
182 Librett, “Rhapsodic Dispositions: Engenderments of the Ground in the Discourse of the ‘Beautiful Soul’ 
(Shaftesbury, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger),” 8.  
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difficult to determine whether the beautiful soul is a male ideal or a female ideal.  One way 
to understand these dynamics is to view her function in eighteenth century as akin to that 
of the Manic Pixie Dream Girl.  The Manic Pixie Dream Girl is a stock female character 
who exists to help the male protagonist achieve happiness by giving his life new meaning.183 
Each beautiful soul in eighteenth century German and French literature attains that 
designation not because of having intrinsic qualities or independent goals but because of 
the male gaze which determines that she is who she is.  
 
The gendering of the beautiful soul is also marked by significant inversions that flummox 
attempts to ascertain for certain whether the beautiful soul is feminine or masculine.  For 
instance the beautiful soul in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, to which this chapter will pay special 
attention, refers to an unnamed woman but that unnamed woman’s status as a beautiful 
soul is brought into question because in other places in the novel Goethe compares this 
unnamed woman to her niece who is said to be the true beautiful soul. This niece appears 
disguised as a man and is described as an Amazon; she is destined to be the wife of Wilhelm 
the male protagonist and the means by which he finds his true calling and fulfilment. These 
gender inversions are related to other inversions and diremptions that recur in the beautiful 
soul’s story and to those that mark the treatments of conscience in the work of Goethe, 
Hegel and Arendt, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.   
 
In this thesis, gender pronouns for the beautiful soul follow the cues given by each author. 
Goethe’s beautiful soul is therefore referred to using feminine pronouns and Hegel’s 
beautiful soul is referred to using masculine pronouns. While speaking of the beautiful soul 
in general the pronouns will be feminine (rather than alternating between the feminine and 
masculine) to ensure it is clear to whom I am referring. 
 
Today the figure of the beautiful soul serves as a jumping off point for wide-ranging 
discussions, which are not limited to issues of gender. In contemporary critical discourse 
the beautiful soul attracts interest as an expression of the moral beauty that might be 
attained through a self-conscious process of deliberate training and cultivation or Bildung, 
 
183 The term “Manic Pixie Dream Girl” term was coined in 2007 by film critic Nathan Rabin. For a good 




as the Germans called it.184 In this context the figure of the beautiful soul offers tantalizing 
hints as to how education in general, and novels in particular, might form us to respond to 
the complexities of the world.185 Given the sheer number of beautiful souls who crop up in 
Bildungsroman and the self-conscious nature of that literature, the beautiful soul attracts 
particular interest as an important trope of modernist literature and authorship.186  
 
In other quarters, the figure of the beautiful soul garners attention for helping to formulate 
the Romantic rejection of Kantian morals and the development of an expressive moral 
theory for modern society. 187  Where beautiful souls embody different versions of the 
critique of Kantian moralism, they represent the possibility of human fulfilment in a realm 
that transcends morality. In this vein, beautiful souls suggest ways of achieving a 
harmonious unity of the self by overcoming certain separations that divide us against 
ourselves, such as those between thought and feeling, freedom and nature, duty and 
inclination or desire and morality. Therefore the beautiful soul is tapped as a conceptual 
resource with which to examine the problem of self-grounding subjectivity, insofar as it 
portrays how to work out your rational commitments from within a conception of free, self-
determining subjectivity.188 For the same reason, the beautiful soul is also of interest to those 
who want examine the moral psychology that emerges when consciousness and identity are 





184 There does not seem to be a general treatment of the figure of the beautiful soul and Bildung, however, 
there are a number of studies of the cultivation of a beautiful soul as a specifically female ideal, see Mirianne 
Hirsch, "Spiritual Bildung: The Beautiful Soul as Paradigm," in The Voyage In:  Fictions of Female Development, 
ed. Mirianne Hirsch Elizabeth Abel, Elizabeth Langland (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983); 
Laura Deiulio, "The Voice of the Schöne Seele," in Challenging Separate Spheres: Female Bildung in Eighteenth- and 
Nineteenth-Century Germany, ed. M.E. Goozé (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007). 
185 This is something I take Jennifer Herdt to be exploring. Jennifer A. Herdt, "Between Imago Dei and the 
Bildungsroman:  Ethical Formation for Our World," (New Haven: Yale Divinity School, 2009). See also Forming 
Humanity: Redeeming the German Bildung Tradition (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming, 2019). 
186  David R. Ellison, Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Literature: From the Sublime to the Uncanny 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (London: Clarendon 
Press, 1997); Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Drew Milne, “The Beautiful Soul: 
From Hegel to Beckett,” Diacritics 32, no. 1 (2002).  
187 This is the context in which Charles Taylor and others read the beautiful soul, by focusing on Hegel’s use 
of the figure. See Taylor, Hegel; Alan Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (London: The Glass House Press, 2005).  
188 Librett, “Rhapsodic Dispositions: Engenderments of the Ground in the Discourse of the ‘Beautiful Soul’ 
(Shaftesbury, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger)."”  
189 To give just one example: Jacques Lacan, The Language of the Self, trans. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1968). 
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A trope of conscience and the temptation of the modern age 
 
The present work will focus on the beautiful soul as a critical trope that informs the use of 
conscience in the secular age. In short, the beautiful soul is one who stakes a claim against 
existing practices and societal norms on the basis of her conscience. In order to bring the 
key issues into as sharp a focus as possible, this work will confine itself to the beautiful soul’s 
aspiration to live according to her conscience. What is of interest to us here is that the way 
a beautiful soul stakes a conscientious position. In making a declaration of conscience she 
pits herself against the moral expectations and customs of the community. The beautiful 
soul is characteristically unwilling to share the hopes and concerns that motivate her or the 
structure of reality she has discerned in reaching that decision. Standing firm, the beautiful 
soul will not deny her most profound convictions and shuns any society that might compel 
her to do so. But she knows that she cannot justify her position. She is caught between what 
she takes as the definitive ground for holding certain beliefs or taking certain actions and 
what counts as an authoritative reason for doing so.  
 
Faced with this conundrum, she withdraws from the controversy that her actions have 
created, conceiving of her decisions as a matter of individual interest and self-
determination. For a beautiful soul, decisions of conscience–including the aims and ideals 
that inform them–cannot be explained or justified. Thus, a beautiful soul’s decisions have 
a certain finality to them, which seems to set them beyond dispute. Since her decisions 
remain inaccessible and inexplicable to others, the beautiful soul can be held accountable 
to no one else.  
 
In staking a position on a disputed matter, a beautiful soul is not engaging in any kind of 
process that might address the wrong she has taken a stand against. She does not aspire to 
improve conditions in her society or to make the changes that would eradicate the wrong. 
She merely seeks to obtain a personal exemption in order to avoid the taint of the wrong 
and thereby maintain her own moral standing and sense of integrity. For that reason, 
Rowan Williams has described the figure as one who witnesses to the temptation of the 
modern age: to withdraw from properly public tasks into the private cultivation of a 
beautiful soul.190  
 
190 Williams is particularly interested in what some of Gillian Rose’s discussions of the beautiful soul can tell 
us about the metaphysical dimension of political life. He wants to suggest ways in which metaphysics might 
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To see why this is so and what it might tell us about conscience in this age it is necessary 
first to fill in some more of the beautiful soul’s backstory. One of the most influential 
depictions of the beautiful soul is found in book six of Goethe’s novel Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship. Book six is entitled “Confessions of a beautiful soul.” It is a curious narrative 
which forms a story within the story. “Confessions of a beautiful soul” is thought to have 
been lifted directly from the personal papers of Susanna Katharine von Klettenberg, who 
was a friend of Goethe’s family and a devout Pietist.191 Book six is odd in that it represents 
a complete break in the narrative and a switch in voice from third person to first person. It 
also mixes realistic and idealized characters and treats those character with both irony and 
earnestness admiration. Despite these curiosities, Goethe’s portrayal of the figure of the 
beautiful soul so captured and enamored readers that “Confessions of a beautiful soul” was 
treasured even by those who would have been happy to see the rest of the book consigned 
to the flames.192  
 
Goethe’s depiction of the beautiful soul in book six became a touchstone for romantic 
writers who took up the trope later.193 For my purposes, Goethe’s rendition of the beautiful 
soul story is particularly helpful in that it furnishes some sense of the fictional world the 
beautiful soul occupied in the eighteenth century and details what such a life might look 
like. Setting out the details of this story in its particulars will provide the framework for 
reading Hegel’s critical characterization of the beautiful soul with all its abstractions, in the 
next chapter.  
      
 
 
     
 
lay bare the underlying structure of our political commitments and show what constitutes those commitments 
as more than arbitrarily willed options. Rowan D. Williams, “Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections 
in the Wake of Gillian Rose,” Modern Theology 11, no. 1 (1995): 11. 
191 Apparently Goethe was given von Klettenberg’s confessions to read when he was bedridden and after a 
haemorrhage. Jane Veronica Curran, Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship: A Reader's Commentary (Rochester: 
Camden House, 2002), 224. Goethe encountered a number of living beautiful souls in addition to Susanna 
Katharina von Klettenberg, whose confessions, lightly edited, formed the substance of Confessions in Wilhelm 
Meister’s Lehrjahre. Among them are Rahel Varnhagen (née Levin), who hosted a famous Berlin salon in the 
1800s, and Charlotte von Stein, who inspired him to write a drama about the life of a beautiful soul, Iphigenie 
auf Tauris (1779).  
192 Nicholas Boyle, Goethe: The Poet and the Age. Vol. 2, Revolution and Renunciation, 1790-1803 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 341-2.  
193 Novalis and Schlegel explicitly define their own projects over and against Goethe’s and cannot overstate 
the influence Wilhelm Meister holds over them.  
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The beautiful soul in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship 
Almost all the key features of the life of a beautiful soul can be distilled from Goethe’s novel 
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795-96) in its final version. This section will look at Goethe’s 
narration of the story of the beautiful soul in some detail after situating it within the novel 
as a whole. I will recount how the beautiful soul determined to shape her life so that it would 
be an expression of her true individuality. In what follows, I will pay special attention to 
how she went about fulfilling her aspiration to construct a beautiful, dignified, harmonious 
moral existence, what came of her rejection of social life and what that cost her. 
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship is the story of Wilhelm, a young man unsure of what to do 
with his life who decides to strike off on a journey of self-discovery. His wanderings lead 
him from his father’s world of double-bookkeeping, speculation and profit and into the 
world of the theatre. In searching out his true calling, Wilhelm takes up a vagabond 
existence with a troupe of actors and dreams of becoming a great actor himself. He has 
ambitions to establish a National Theatre through which he might play a role in 
transforming the lives of his contemporaries through staged productions that would appeal 
to the masses. He wonders whether he might become a second Shakespeare.  
 
Wilhelm wants to discern the meaning of his life. He aspires to learn how to live rightly, 
according to his inner nature. He wants to discover the law of his being, that is, a 
relationship with the external world around him that fits the essence of his inmost needs 
and inclinations. “Let me put it quite succinctly,” he tells his friend Werner as he turns 
down a job in commerce, “even as a youth I had the vague desire and intention to develop 
myself fully, myself as I am. I still have the same intention.”194 
 
Wilhelm’s coming of age story epitomizes the Bildungsroman form in European literature.195 
Bildungsroman narrates a young person’s education or, better, formation, as he or she grows 
into maturity. These stories of great expectations and lost illusions depict the young 
protagonist making his way in a world undergoing sweeping changes. Historically, 
Bildungsroman is seen as a product of social upheaval, especially as traditional societies 
 
194  Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Eric A. Blackall, and Victor Lange, Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 174. 
195  Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship has been identified with Bildungsroman ever since Karl Morgenstern 
introduced the term in a lecture he gave in 1819. Wilhelm Dilthy lifted up Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship as 
the prototype of the genre in his work Leben Schleiermachers (1870).  
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underwent political and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth centuries.196 It narrates not 
only the opportunities and crises of its young protagonists as they come of age, but also the 
opportunities and crises of modernity as it comes of age.197 
 
During this process of formation, the young protagonist comes to understand who he is by 
gaining self-knowledge or a self-image (where Bild refers to “image”). Going through 
formation includes learning for himself how the world works. It also involves finding and 
following his true course. For the protagonist to make his way in the world, he must use the 
materials he has been given–his innate impulses and circumstances; however, he is free to 
choose how to arrange and order his life much as an artist uses creativity to work with the 
materials to hand.  
 
The apprenticeship Wilhelm determines to undertake, to which the title refers, is in the art 
of living a good life. Although he is apprenticed to no one master-craftsman, Wilhelm meets 
a number of people who are also experimenting with various ways of ordering their own 
lives and who succeed to differing degrees in developing their potential. At a critical 
juncture in the narrative one of Wilhelm’s friends, an actress named Aurelia, becomes 
seriously ill and a physician advises her to look at a manuscript whose contents would 
provide palliative care while she is dying. The manuscript is entitled “Confessions of a 
beautiful soul” and Wilhelm reads it to Aurelia. 
 
After Aurelia dies and Wilhelm departs from the theatre company to set off into an 
uncertain future, there is a break in the narrative into which Goethe has inserted the full 
text of the physician’s manuscript, which comprises the whole of book six. This manuscript 
has an enormous influence on Wilhelm and shows him an attractive though also troubling 
form of existence. It leaves him wondering whether cultivating a beautiful soul might allow 
him to fulfil his potential amidst the social and material constraints of the world in which 
he lives.  
 
 
196 For a sample of the debate about how Bildungsroman should be defined, what other books ought to be 
included, and which features best characterized the genre, see Michael Beddow, The Fiction of Humanity: Studies 
in the Bildungsroman from Wieland to Thomas Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Marc 
Redfield, Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the Bildungsroman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); 
Martin Swales, The German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
197 Franco Moretti and Albert Sbragia, The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture (London: 
Verso, 2000).  
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In the “Confessions of a beautiful soul” an unnamed woman offers an account of the 
successive stages of her spiritual development. 198  She describes how her beliefs were 
challenged and deepened and how they shaped the course of her life. The life she pursues 
is marked by solitude and introspection. Storybooks, a wonder-cabinet full of natural 
objects, and fairy tales sustain her imagination during the long bouts of illness that marked 
her childhood. When she outgrows dolls, her great longing is for a pet lamb that might be 
turned–with nurture and love–into an enchanted prince and ask for her hand in marriage. 
All that she reads and imagines serves to awaken in her a latent “inclination for the 
Invisible.” Whatever the calling she was destined to follow, “God was to becomes my closest 
friend–that was certain.”199 
 
There are striking differences between Book six and the rest of the novel, and between the 
maturation of the beautiful soul and of Wilhelm. Wilhelm’s story is about adventures, 
surprise encounters and the guiding hand of secret societies that direct him along the path 
of recognizing and perhaps realizing his aspirations in life, whereas the beautiful soul’s story 
is about contemplation and introspection, about attending to inner thoughts and secret 
feelings to find one’s own interior guide. Wilhelm’s journey across the countryside, which 
takes him on and off theatre stages, and in and out of the arms of various lovers, is here 
contrasted with the beautiful soul’s journey within, as she discovers the strength of her 
convictions and learns to follow her conscience. 
 
The process of formation that both the beautiful soul and Wilhelm undertake entails 
cultivating their innate potential by engaging selectively with the world around them. This 
conception of Bildung represents a reworking of earlier conceptions of Bildung, that can be 
found in the writings of Pietists, of Meister Eckhart and the Rhineland mystics, and of 
Luther, where Bildung is conceived of formation in terms of God’s creation of humans in 
the image of God and of God’s restoration of this image through Christ. In earlier, more 
explicitly theological conceptions of Bildung, this process was culminated in a resemblance 
to God. The formation that Wilhelm and the beautiful soul undertake (in their separate 
ways) is supposed to culminate in a harmonious, unified existence that is unique to each. 
This reworking of Bildung points to the secularization of Pietist and mystical conceptions, or 
 
 
199 Goethe, Blackall, and Lange, Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, 218. 
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as Jennifer Herdt posits, to the emergence of new religious options of the sort Charles 
Taylor saw proliferating in A Secular Age.200  
 
When Wilhelm opens the manuscript he has been given and begins to read “Confessions 
of a beautiful soul,” he is quickly drawn into the story of this young woman’s life. She 
addresses her readers in this way:  
 
When I had just turned eight, I had a hemorrhage, and from that moment on I was 
all feeling and memory. Every little detail of what happened then is as present to 
me now as if it had occurred only yesterday. During the nine months of 
convalescence which I bore patiently, the foundations of my present way of thinking 
were laid–or it seems to me now. For during that time my mind received various 
impulses that helped in the shaping of a specific character. I suffered and I loved–
that was the rhythm of my heart. During my sharp spells of coughing and 
debilitating fever I kept very quiet, like a snail withdrawn into its shell.... Anyone 
who came and sat on my bed had to tell me a story. From my mother I liked to hear 
biblical stories, and my father entertained me with objects of nature.... [M]y aunt 
told me love tales and fairy stories. I absorbed everything, and it all took root. I had 
moments when I intimately communed with the Invisible Being, and I can still 
remember some verses which I dictated to my mother at the time.201  
 
In her manuscript, the young woman explains that as she grew she was able to enjoy better 
health, more learning, and a steady stream of balls, plays and court appearances, which 
slowly crowded out her thoughts and feelings towards the Invisible One. While attending a 
ball she befriended two brothers who charmed her, the oldest of which endured poor health 
too and in whom she thought she had found the beloved lamb for which she had been 
yearning.  Over time they drifted apart because of the teasing of the younger brother and 
she learns later that both brothers had passed away. At another ball she became acquainted 
with a young man whose ambition was to gain a diplomatic position at court. They fell into 
a conversation that evening which they resumed the next. She nicknamed him Narcissus 
and teased him about his self-satisfied manner; he lent her books that appealed to her 
interests.   
 
One night at a party during a game of forfeits a fight erupted, and a drunken guest drew 
his sword and attacked Narcissus in a fit of jealousy. While the rest of the company 
restrained the attacker, Narcissus was led into another room. When the young woman 
 
200 Herdt, “Between Imago Dei and the Bildungsroman:  Ethical Formation for Our World.” 
201 Goethe, Blackall, and Lange, Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship, 217. 
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realizes that Narcissus has in fact received serious wounds to his head and hand, she insists 
that a doctor is called, and tends to Narcissus injuries until the arrival of the doctor. 
Whatever occurred between them while waiting for the doctor’s arrival changed the way 
they felt for one another. When Narcissus returned to health some months later, the two 
became secretly engaged with an aim to marrying as soon as Narcissus had secured a 
position at court. 
 
She confesses that by this point in her life she felt quite estranged from God, having thought 
of her Invisible Friend only now and then over the previous three years. A sense of gratitude 
for her fiancé’s return to health brings her attention back to God. She begins to reacquaint 
herself with God first by paying “little ceremonial visits” out of duty and then gradually 
praying more frequently as she finds a way of expressing her thoughts to God. Narcissus 
does not share the feelings she has for God. When a position at court opened for which 
Narcissus was eligible and was given to a competitor, she rushed to her room, locked the 
door and burst into tears. Her tears subsided at the point in which she decides that this 
could not have happened just by chance. She holds firm to the belief that this 
disappointment would be turned right somehow and that it could be endured with the help 
she received in prayer from her Invisible Friend. 
 
The young woman admits that while she approaches God, she did not always do so in the 
right spirit. Sometimes she was greatly soothed by prayer and other times she felt like 
“someone wishing to warm himself in the sun when the shadow obstructs him.”202 It seems 
as if the feelings of consolation and pleasure she receives in prayer are in some way hindered 
by the pleasures and activities of her social circle. She tries to observe what is going on 
inside her and to think about how that relates to the world around her of which she is a 
part. She comes to the uncomfortable conclusion that her favorite pleasures and pastimes–
dancing, card playing and so forth–were not for her harmless diversions that she could 
engage with indifferently. These superficial pursuits leave her feeling conflicted and out of 
sorts with herself. Moreover, they are activities that she took part in more to please 
Narcissus than herself anyway. There is a growing sense of awareness that she can no longer 
live for pleasures and a realization that she will never find happiness this way. One 
consideration holds her back: she fears that abstaining will embarrassing Narcissus given 
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how sensitive he is to her appearing moralistic. Only after confronting her fear of offending 
him and her fear of losing the esteem of others, does she realize that she was in fact free to 
decide her own happiness and to follow her conscience come what may. 
 
She resolves from henceforth to live according to the dictates of her heart and not to accept 
pressure from others to do anything that was morally unsuitable to her. Her desire is for 
complete freedom to act in accordance with her convictions. When Narcissus obtains a 
position at court and requests her hand in marriage on the condition that she changes her 
way of thinking to match his, she turns him down. She records that “I thanked him politely 
and tore my heart and mind away from the whole affair, with the same eagerness as one 
leaves a theatre after the final curtain has been lowered.”203  
When the young woman breaks off her engagement to Narcissus, she regains peace of mind. 
Her longing for romance–for an enchanted prince to whom she might be betrothed–is 
replaced by an earlier longing, a desire to live in union with something, someone Invisible. 
The pet lamb is set free so she can recommence in her search for the lamb of God. Engaging 
in self-examination, a practice she nurtures in private prayer, helps her to respond to the 
growing awareness of these inclinations and to begin to structure a more authentic existence 
that might accord with her nature. In solitude she can hear the voice of conscience and 
interpret it, but to freely follow it she must take steps to disentangle herself from any 
restrictions that could be imposed by romantic attachments or societal expectations. This 
she does, as she feels that there is no longer any need to hide her piety now. The young 
woman finds a small circle of new friends among the nobility and to win tolerance, if not 
respect, for her sentiments. “My story had become common knowledge, and there were 
many persons curious to meet a girl who valued God more than her betrothed.”204  
A stepbrother of her father’s who she calls “Uncle” secures her the position of canoness, a 
Lutheran lay order, and offers to arrange a marriage for her younger sister. When her sister 
becomes a lady-in-waiting at a neighboring court, she accompanies her re-entering society. 
The canoness writes that she took to every aspect of court life; she talked to everybody, 
profited from the people she encountered, fell into the pattern of social duties required of 
her and met women who were models of all the virtues. Only upon her arrival back home 
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did she suffer another hemorrhage, which left her weak for some time. She decides to 
renounce court life out of a conviction that she would never find in society what she was 
seeking. 
 
This decision gave her peace, although life at home presented its own trials. Both her 
mother and father became ill and nursing them tested her poor physical stamina and her 
faith in her chosen path. Turning her thoughts over and over, she mulled over whether she 
truly acted in good conscience or whether she had only been imitating others. Was her 
heart’s refuge in God real? God’s presence returned as a constant comfort to her, but 
increasingly so did some troubling thoughts: To what extent did these experiences mirror 
the experiences of others? Could she be completely reliant on her own powers of thought 
without referring to others and without measuring her experiences by other systems of 
thought? The canoness resolves to consult the theological writings of the Pietists at Halle 
but balks at their image of a wrathful God. She admits to having no concept of sin or fear 
of death and rejects the teachings from Halle, determining that to live with a clear 
conscience would mean for her not relying on any such supposed authority to guide her in 
the future. The canoness gives the following account of her spiritual life at this stage: 
 
I can vouch that I never returned empty-handed when I went to God in distress and 
anxiety. That is claiming a lot, but I cannot, I dare not try to be more explicit.... I 
was constantly in His presence. That is what I can declare as the ultimate truth and 
can do so without resorting to the language of theological systems. How I wished 
that I could have lived without recourse to such systems. But who can so early reach 
a state of complete blissful absorption in his own self without reference to external 
forms and systems? I was seriously concerned about my external salvation, and 
humbly placed my trust in the experience and repute of others. I applied myself 
thoroughly to the system of achieving conversion advocated by the pietist 
theologians at Halle, but I could not adapt myself to it at all.... My decision to 
extricate myself in spiritual matters from the influences and advice of my friends 
resulted in my acquiring the courage to pursue my own course in external 
relationships.205  
 
The canoness explains that she would have remained at this stage of development, 
preferring to withdraw into solitude, if she had not met and befriended someone. She calls 
him Philo and tells us that he had been of service to her aging father and that he was much 
like Narcissus only with the advantage of a religious education. He shares with her the 
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circumstances of people she only knew by sight and over time confides some rather difficult 
circumstances in his own private relations. His story reminds her of the hero of Wieland’s 
novel Agathon, who was educated by Delphic priests but whose education was derailed by 
temptations of the flesh. Piecing together his story of seduction, she realizes that she too 
might have found herself in such difficult circumstances given her vow of celibacy and for 
the first time her own capacity for sin becomes “terrifyingly clear and conceivable.”206  
 
This discovery leads the canoness to question how a person is supposed to rid herself of 
such feelings of guilt: Is sin an inescapable human weakness? Can it be overcome with 
virtuous acts or with friendship with God or should we simply make a virtue of our instincts? 
How does one obtain purity of heart? Turning to scripture for an answer, she comes to 
learn something of the mystery of the Incarnation: 
 
What I was seeking was to be found in the mystery of the Incarnation through which 
the Word, in which we and all things are made, becomes flesh. It was revealed to 
me in darkling distance that our ultimate maker once descended to the depths in 
which we travail, penetrating and absorbing them, passed through every stage of 
our human condition from conception and birth to the grace, and, emerging from 
this strange detour, rose once again to those clear bright heights where we too much 
dwell in order to gain happiness.... And He became like us to that we might be a 
part of Him.207  
 
With her head in her hands, she prayed earnestly for the faith not merely to accept the 
Incarnation but to experience its reality and effect. At that moment, a strong pull, which 
she describes as something like the impulse that carries one towards an absent friend, drew 
her soul to the crucified Christ and showed her what faith is. She laments that neither words 
nor images can capture such feelings, but that she had been freed from the physical world: 
“I had taken on wings. I could now rise above all that had threatened me before, like a bird 
effortlessly soaring with joyful song above a raging torrent, beside which a dog remains 
standing, barking anxiously.”208 In that moment, she sensed she had found what she had 
been seeking all her life: the true form of her being. She felt her soul was able to leave 
behind embodied existence, and yet attached to something definite. After that she 
continued to listen to sermons which might supplement her private devotional practices, 
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but increasingly she feels as if the preachers were “gnawing away at shells, whereas I was 
enjoying the kernels.”209  
 
Here the canoness confides that her spiritual life took a lamentable detour. Philo’s parents 
had connections with the pietistic community at Herrnhut and had many writings by its 
founder Count Zinzendorf in his library. She had dismissed all this as heresy but one day 
lacking anything else to read, she picked up the Moravian hymnal. She felt at once that 
they aligned with her way of thinking. Further reading won her over to Zinzendorf’s way 
of thinking. If ill health had not made even venturing into her own garden an ordeal, she 
might have gone and joined him. Instead, she became a Herrnhut sister in her own way. 
The canoness explains that she did not disclose her Pietistic sympathies to her spiritual 
director, the court preacher, because he had been opposed to another courtier’s conversion 
to Pietism. But she did become acquainted with a worshipping community connected with 
Herrnhut that met clandestinely. While she enjoyed their fellowship, especially hearing 
their testimonies and sharing those things she had “worked out for myself and within 
myself,” this community proved a disappointment, as it seemed to her that few of them 
understood the higher things to which their words and expressions groped. When the court 
preacher discovered what his parishioners were getting up to there was uproar at court and 
in the town. The canoness would not take sides against the court preacher, partly out of 
respect for him, but mostly out of a disinclination to engage in doctrinal discussions which 
might unsettle her. In any case, the row ended when the court preacher died suddenly.  
 
In my reading of the “Confessions,” the beautiful soul’s efforts to cultivate her moral and 
spiritual life have led her to disentangle herself from the bonds of marriage, courtly life, and 
religious community. Each of these forms of institutional life disappointed her, for in each 
she felt some expectation that her way of thinking come into some conformity with that of 
others. Her chosen path is to rely on conscience alone as authoritative. As that path can be 
walked without having to venture beyond her own garden, she grows more self-assured 
about working out a form of life that harmonizes with her inner nature.  
 
In order to be guided only by her inner nature, she renounces any social relations, 





woman’s renunciation of the social, religious and cultural institutions that would confine 
her. On the reading I am offering here, she does not dispense with the features of her 
external world that cannot be harmonize with her internal world.  She internalizes them. 
In other words, she makes what is other to her–her own. For instance, after renouncing her 
fiancé’s offer of marriage, married life is internalized to the extent that it generates spousal 
devotion to her Invisible friend, the lamb who was slain. Next after renouncing her place 
at the court, courtly life is internalized until it generates the sentiments of nobility within 
her interior castle. Then once she stops sharing in the worshipping life of the Pietists, she 
internalizes the life of a Herrnhut sister until it inverts and manifests as piety that flourishes 
in secret seclusion. If her story is read as a story of renunciation, then these inversions are 
missed and are their connection to the diremptions in Hegel’s treatment of the beautiful 
souls and in Rose’s that will be explored in subsequent chapters.   
 
Returning to her “Confessions,” it is clear that these acts of renunciation and internalization 
bring some order, harmony and beauty into her life. And as her confidence about following 
only the dictates of her own conscience grows, the canoness becomes increasingly unwilling 
to rely on others to confirm or correct her conclusions, retreating further into her own world 
of private judgment.  
 
In the course of events, the canoness’ uncle finds a suitor for her younger sister and invites 
them to his castle where the wedding was to take place. The castle seems a world of its own 
to the canoness. She comments on its grandeur and cultured tastefulness, its dignity and 
harmoniousness. She is surprised to find that the unfussy magnificence of the space and of 
the wedding arrangements elicits from her a sense of calm and composure. In short, the 
castle, the wedding ceremony and the banquet are enormously pleasing to her to the extent 
that they reinforce the ideals of taste, dignity and harmony that she is trying to unite in the 
way she lives her life.  
 
On this occasion, the canoness’ uncle makes a special effort to speak with her, particularly 
on the subject of moral cultivation. Although he does not share her religious convictions, 
he tells her that he holds in high estimation her sense of mission and purpose. He believes 
her aim is to come to terms with her moral nature and that pursuing this aim necessitated 
the sacrifices she made. He concedes that if she had adapted herself to her family or to a 
husband, she would have been in continual conflict with herself and never would have 
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known peace. There is in his conversation more than a hint that the way she pursued her 
purpose impressed him more than her chosen way of life.  
 
As they talk, her uncle directs her attention to certain paintings hanging on the wall and 
describes the artists who made them, the spirit of their works, their techniques and the 
distinct places each holds in the history of art. Still the canoness can only see the paintings 
in terms that relate to moral instruction or her own moral perfection. He notices her 
inability to appreciate the artistry of these paintings–or any other qualities apart from their 
ability to move her or improve her–and warns her about developing proper perspective so 
that she does not make determinations according to her own standards only. He tries to tell 
her that self-cultivation is only profitable when one is actually learning something or actively 
engaged in some way, and he advises her not to pursue the cultivation of her moral life in 
isolation and seclusion. 
 
She does not take his advice to heart. As she prepared to depart from his castle, her uncle 
presents her with the cross of her order with a large diamond suspended from it, perhaps 
representing a token of reconciliation. She was also treated to another concert performed 
by the wedding choir, whose harmonies, so unlike the hymns she was used to, seemed 
capable of “speaking to the very best in us and making us fully aware of our godlikeness.”210 
 
Once she had settled back into life at home, her uncle attempted to draw her out by loaning 
paintings to her and other works of fine art that might prompt reflection. But the affairs of 
her heart and soul preoccupied her and she could attend to a work of art only for a short 
time before being drawn back into her own preoccupations.  There were other concerns to 
distract her as well: her unmarried sister caught pneumonia and died, her newly married 
sister admitted of some marital difficulties and had a miscarriage, and her father developed 
fever and died. She notes that dealing with these realities gave her the chance to think about 
the things that until that point she had only sung about in hymns.  
 
After her father died, the canoness tries to renew old friendships. She even gets 
reacquainted with some members of the Herrnhut community for a time but does not find 
in their meetings what she hoped for and eventually breaks off with them again. Despite 
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years of poor health, she records that she does not fear death; however, she feels she ought 
to use her remaining time to examine her soul and bring herself closer to God. Often times 
she felt as if her soul was separable from her body; and a physician she met at her sister’s 
wedding warns her that “such feelings, if nurtured without reference to external things, will 
drain us dry and undermine our existence. “Man’s first task,” he explained, “is to be active, 
and one should use those intervals when one is obliged to rest, to acquire a clear knowledge 
of external things, for that will assist us in all our further activity.”211 He asks her to think 
not just on the ills of the body and of all whom she had nursed but also on the objects of 
creation all around her. She disregards the doctor’s advice about becoming more active, 
but claims that she does learn how to perceive God in Nature as well as in her own heart, 
thanks to him.  
 
Sick and weak as she was, the canoness outlived her brother-in-law, who died in a riding 
accident, and your younger sister, who died shortly after bearing a fourth child. The 
canoness feels that there is little she can do for her orphaned nieces and nephews, given her 
infirmity, and is relieved when her uncle decides to devote himself to their upbringing. She 
has reservations about the unconventional way in which he is educating them to follow their 
inclinations and is pained that he treats her as a detrimental influence on them. Her delight 
is in her eldest niece Natalie who looks most like her and whose moral instincts “put her to 
shame.” She explains,  
 
one could not imagine a more noble presence, a more peaceful disposition, a greater 
evenness of attention to every kind of goal or object.... I must confess that I myself 
never had the ability to make an occupation out of works of charity. I was not 
parsimonious in my gifts to the poor, and often gave more than I should have in my 
circumstances, but in a way I was buying myself off.... But with my niece it was just 
the opposite, and I admired her for this.212  
 
Still it pains her that the children’s upbringing deprives them of anything that would “lead 
to their communing with themselves and with their Invisible, and only true Friend.” 213  
 
“Confessions of a beautiful soul” concludes with a reassertion of her intention to continually 
strive after the true form of her being, experienced as a perfect union with the divine, and 
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a final affirmation that she will be guided from within by her own impulses alone. These 
are her last words: 
 
I am always moving forward and never backward, since my actions are always 
drawing nearer and nearer to the idea of perfection which I have worked out for 
myself, and I find it easier every day to do what I think is right, despite my bodily 
infirmity that restricts me so much–is this accountable solely to human nature, 
whose corruption I have become so profoundly aware of? Not for me, at least. I 
cannot recall having followed any commandment that loomed before me as a law 
imposed from without: I was always led and guided by impulse, freely following my 
own persuasion, and experiencing neither restriction nor regrets. Thanks be to God 
that I am fully aware to whom I owe my happiness and can accept my good fortune 
in humility.214  
 
Here the story of the beautiful soul comes to an end and Wilhelm’s story resumes. Wilhelm 
has been told by the physician that the “Confessions” were meant to relive the distress of 
his dying friend Aurelia. Later he will come to understand that the story of this beautiful 
soul was also intended as an object lesson for him about the dangers of adopting this model 
of self-formation, though not before attempting to renounce his past and find a more inward 
existence. 
 
Along the way, he will meet in person Natalie, the niece of the beautiful soul mentioned in 
the manuscript, and the woman he has been searching for (consciously or unconsciously). 
Natalie lives out a purer form of individuality and a more complete Bildung. She endeavors 
to show Wilhelm how to view himself and the world around him more objectively. With 
her help and the help of members of a secret society, who help him reflect on his past actions 
and reconcile the polarities within his personal experiences, Wilhelm becomes more 
conscious of the true contours of his own individuality and the true nature of the world.  
 
In this coming of age novel, individual’s self-identity is disclosed and developed through 
acting in the world and reflecting on those actions. Wilhelm will not complete his own 
education by the end of the novel, but he will have begun to understand that forming his 
identity depends upon direct and sustained involvement with the world around him. As one 
reader put it, Wilhelm will have learned that “his identity is not just the unfolding of some 
innate form but an active interplay between his specific nature and a specific world, and 
that the proper language of this mode of selfhood is not just the personal confessions of his 
 
214 Ibid., 255-6. 
  
82 
past actions but a commonly defined and accepted language arising from a series of mutual 
confessions.”215  
 
The beautiful soul’s inner life and the life of conscience  
 
My reading of Goethe’s “Confessions” has shown how, over the course of a lifetime, the 
beautiful soul tried to work out what was right for her based on what was in line with her 
innermost convictions. In pouring over her past and trying to understand it, she relived 
those times that she betrayed her conscience, whether by conforming to the expectations of 
others or accepting pressure to do anything that did not suit her. She aspired to an authentic 
existence. As she came to view it, being true to herself was possible only if she acted solely 
through the strength of her own pure convictions, without reference to other authorities or 
recourse to ethical theories and principles. For that reason, she was always trying to 
apprehend what was not herself in relation to her own self and to ensure that the motives 
for her actions came only from within.  
 
She poured all of her energy into cultivating her soul and creating something morally 
beautiful of her life. She structured her daily existence according to the demands of her 
inner form. Her confessions detail how she gained understanding of her proper inner form 
and knowledge of her deepest personal convictions through self-reflection. To better hear 
the voice of conscience, she shut out all other competing voices and shut out any relation 
that might have disquieted her. She sought complete freedom to act according to what she 
alone had heard.  
 
Renouncing social ties seemed to bring direction, order, harmony and even beauty into a 
life which otherwise would be lost in a bewildering array of competing desires. As she 
understood it, renunciation intensified the specific form of her identity and helped to unify 
her personality. On my reading, those renunciations do not actually allow her to dispense 
with the external realities she wishes to be free from (the institutions of marriage, religion, 
courtly life and so on). Instead they cause her to internalize them, re-instating them in her 
inner life.   
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What is more, the harmony she believes she has achieved in her efforts to construct a 
coherent existence based only on the true form of her heart has come at a cost. And it costs 
her the world. For the canoness, pursuing her true love involved rejecting every inclination 
that could have drawn her out of herself and into the world. Cultivating a beautiful soul 
meant giving her life a harmonious and authentic form, a form that could only emerge from 
within; therefore, it seemed crucial that there be no moral or religious constraints upon any 
of her actions. Accomplishing this required cutting herself free every relationship of 
responsibility or obligation and from all bonds of solidarity. In following her conscience, 
the beautiful soul distanced herself from her fiancé, her friends, her fellow courtiers, her 
religious communities, and the needs of the poor on the other side of her walled garden. 
She involved herself in community life only when doing so might strengthen her to live 
according to her own will.  
On this reading, it is now possible to see how the beautiful soul of the “Confessions” depicts 
one response to having weak moral sources, which is to turn away from the needs of the 
world and the demands of universal benevolence, and to focus on smaller, more achievable 
goals.216  In this case, the young woman feels she does not have the motivation or health or 
character to undertake acts of solidarity or combat injustice. For that reason, 
she concentrates on self-fulfillment rather than on the demands of the courts, society, 
religious community or nature. She is absorbed in the task of constructing a life for herself 
that is internally consistent, unified, beautiful. She identifies that life with the life of 
conscience. To maintain a certain consistency with herself implied by the life of conscience, 
Goethe’s beautiful soul aspires to draw upon only moral sources that can be found within 
and she does that by systematically extricating herself from all external influences and 
constraints. She side-lines or suppresses the external factors that condition her possibilities. 
And she shuts out every demand that does not come from within, courting triviality and 
insignificance, as her uncle might have wished to say, and, undermining any actual, 
meaningful existence in the world, as the physician warned. In so doing, the figure of the 
beautiful soul shows us what it looks like to try to generate ethical ideals and moral practices 








This chapter examined the beautiful soul’s role in literature and theory before exploring 
the beautiful soul as a trope of conscience.  It argued that the beautiful soul offers a depiction 
of how we might respond to having weak moral sources, namely, by relying only moral 
ideal and principles generated by one’s own mind and will.   In order to show how the 
beautiful soul does this, Goethe’s narrative was re-told so as to draw out why the beautiful 
retreats from society and from any source of conflict that might prevent her from being in 
tune with herself.  It permitted us to see why she made it her goal to live by conscience 
alone, as an expression of her true individuality. It also permitted us to see that whenever 
she renounced institutions of social, cultural and political life, in the hopes that withdrawing 
would free her to work on her own inner life without interference, those institutions inverted 
and became interiorized.  Finally, the reading of “Confessions of a beautiful soul” offered 
here made it possible to see why Rowan Williams holds that cultivating a beautiful soul is a 



































If the prospect of cultivating a beautiful soul still seemed like an attractive option, Georg 
Wilhelm Hegel’s critical characterization of the figure offers a word of caution. Hegel’s 
portrayal of the beautiful soul in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) is definitive, because it 
constitutes a re-reading of the entire tradition of writing on the beautiful soul.217 Hegel 
considered the beautiful soul in several different contexts;218 however, his most extensive 
treatment of the beautiful soul is found in the sixth chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit in a 
section on morality entitled “Conscience. The ‘beautiful soul’, evil and its forgiveness.”219 
Here Hegel’s analysis of moral knowledge culminates in a discussion of a conscientious 
attitude Hegel terms “Spirit that is certain of itself.” In that pivotal section, he lays out the 
pitfalls associated with adopting this kind of moral stance.220  
 
This chapter considers that pivotal section closely in order to show why Hegel interrogates 
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individuality as a justified norm. It looks first at the Kantian context of Hegel’s writing on 
conscience and second at how Hegel sets up this cautionary tale as an internal dialogue. 
Then each of the protagonist’s discoveries about living according to conscience are re-
narrated.  This reading of Hegel’s narrative will focus on how living according to conscience 
can lead to cultivating a beautiful soul, and why cultivating a beautiful soul can be 
understood as a way of framing a particular matter as a moral issue in instances when one 
is unable or unwilling to engage with it as a political issue.  My reading will clarify why 
Hegel believed the project of cultivating a beautiful soul to be futile and self-defeating. In 
opening up this second cautionary tale about the conscience of the beautiful soul, I argue 
that here in Hegel we discover how to avoid the fate of the beautiful soul.  
 
Hegel’s conscience in its Kantian context 
 
Hegel’s concerns about acting according to conscience and becoming a beautiful soul 
require some contextualization. For instance, Hegel’s discussions of conscience depend 
upon the etymological associations of the German word Gewissen, a word that means “sure” 
and that emphasizes certainty.221 Reading Hegel’s morality tale also requires that we keep 
key elements of conscience’s conceptual and social framework in view. Here I follow Terry 
Pinkard’s work on Hegel, which will be the focus of what I have to say about the social and 
conceptual context of Hegelian conscience. 
 
Hegel sets his exploration of conscience in the context of the eighteenth century reaction 
against Kantian moral theory. The “Moral World-View” of Kant was perceived as an anti-
sentimental ethic of pure duty, because it separated two elements of moral action: duty and 
inclination. A morally significant act is the expression of duty done for duty’s sake and is, 
as such, universal. Moral consciousness is the consciousness of universal duty; it is not the 
consciousness of one’s own particular inclinations or feelings of obligation. There is no 
scope in this account for particular agents and their own inclinations. 
 
To the extent that Kantian moral theory separated the universal and particular elements 
of moral experience and excluding the inclinations peculiar to the individual agent, it was 
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thought to provide an inadequate account of the relation between duties and inclinations 
in ethical deliberation.222 Duty for duty’s sake was seen as too much of an abstraction to be 
an accurate character of moral action. Our ethical deliberation is never between willing 
pure duty and following mere inclination. In most cases, it is not simply a matter of pure 
duty because any number of opposing courses of action could qualify as one’s duty. Nor is 
it simply a matter of mere inclination, because in most cases the action is commanded by 
the array of moral commitments in which the agent finds himself.  
 
Fichte and others extolled conscience as offering up an alternative: the consciousness of a 
romantic individual.223 This was a type of moral consciousness that acknowledged the 
uniqueness of the individual and brought deeply held subjective feelings into play in the 
pursuit of the moral life and in the making of ethical decisions. Whereas Kantian moral 
theory held that one could only be free by assuming a detached impartial standpoint, the 
romantics held that the ground for a truly free and non-alienated life was to be found within, 
by exploring one’s own subjectivity. As Pinkard explains in his commentary on the 
Phenomenology: 
  
The romantics shift the conception of modern freedom away from the ideal of 
rational, anonymous self-determination towards something more like the ideas of 
authenticity, irony and true feeling. In particular, they shift moral consciousness 
away from the idea of obedience to a self-imposed law toward the idea of being 
“true to oneself.” The idealist transcendental self that is beyond appearance is 
displaced in favor of the actual, individual self, which is available to certain forms 
of introspection…. What is to bind free agents together in the world would not be 
an appeal to a common rational law, which each would freely impose on himself, 
but an appeal to conscience, to being true to oneself and one’s convictions. Genuine 
freedom for the transcendental idealist consists in bringing one’s personal 
convictions into line with what was required from an impersonal (“universal”) point 
 
222 For a more detailed exposition of the way in which the Moral World-View functions as a critique of 
Kantian ethics, see Moltke S. Gram, “Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel’s Critique of ‘the Moral World-
View,’” in The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Jon Stewart (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1998). 
223 Hegel followed Fichte’s reworking of the categorical imperative: “always act according to your strongest 
conviction concerning your duty; always act in accordance with your own conscience.” Ludwig Siep, “The 
‘Aufhebung’ of Morality in Ethical Life,” in Hegel's Philosophy of Action, ed. L.S. Stepelevich, et al. (Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983), 144. This ethic of conscience found in Fichte’s System der Sittenlehre 
replaces the conception of the moral law which is externally imposed with a conception of the moral law 
expressed in the deliverances of conscience. But making the moral law a function of conviction does not 
resolve the problem of conflicting duties, because one can feel the same amount of conviction toward two 
conflicting courses of action. Gram explains, “Just as the moral law could sanction either of two opposed 
duties, so also conscience can sanction either of two conflicting courses of action, so long as each carries with 
it the stamp of conviction.... So conscience fails just where the moral law failed: both purported to specify the 
sense in which a particular moral action is performed out of principle.” Gram, “Moral and Literary Ideals in 
Hegel’s Critique of ‘the Moral World-View,’” 312. 
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of view (the standpoint of “reason”). Genuine freedom for the romantic consists in 
acting from the personal point of view, in acting in accord with one’s deepest 
personal convictions; it consists not merely of acting in terms of what is impersonally 
rationally justifiable but in terms, for example, of the agent’s religious views, his 
concrete conceptions of the good life, his own personal biography, and so on–
provided that these conceptions can be said to be genuinely his own.224  
 
In Hegel’s phenomenological account of the conscientious disposition, the figure of the 
beautiful soul stands in for a number of different arguments that Hegel wants to open up 
about how we are to live by our deepest convictions. For that reason, the figure of the 
beautiful soul Hegel describes is a philosophical abstraction; however, the task of specifying 
the beautiful soul’s conceptual content is not straightforward. Hegel’s descriptions are 
peppered with suggestive allusions. At various points he alludes to some of his 
contemporaries who dissented from the prevailing norms, pursued conscientious 
convictions or aspired to be beautiful souls, such as, Novalis. At other points he alludes to 
the fictional beautiful souls portrayed in the works of Goethe, Schlegel, Hölderlin, Schiller 
and Jacobi.  
 
Commentators have had a field day unpacking the allusions in this section of the 
Phenomenology and trying to ascertain which historical and literary personages Hegel is 
singling out to elevate or demolish at each stage in the story,225 often with the aim of 
establishing that these are in fact descriptions of real people who did exist outside their 
representation in writing.226 The game of unpacking all of the allusions should not cause us 
to lose sight of the fact that in the Phenomenology Hegel treats forms of consciousness that 
admit of any number of embodiments.  And we can speak of the beautiful soul as being 
existentially lived even if no one has fully embodied this typology. I propose reading this 
section not with the aim of teasing the referents out of the text but rather to ascertain how 
Hegel presents the possibility of getting beyond the problems of subjectivity through claims 
of conscience, counterclaims, confessions, recognition and reconciling forgiveness.  
 
 
224 Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
209. Italics his. 
225 See, for example: Harris, Hegel: Phenomenology and System; Donald P. Verene, Hegel's Recollection: A Study of 
Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).  
226 Norton does not think the beautiful soul had a life outside of writings about it, see Norton, The Beautiful 
Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century. Whereas Gram wants to establish that Hegel is finding the forms 
of consciousness that he criticizes in actual life and not just manufacturing them from the machinery of the 
dialectic. Gram, “Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel’s Critique of ‘the Moral World-View,’” 308.  
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It may be something of a surprise that Hegel took an interest in the romantic conception of 
conscience, and that is because Hegel did not have much good to say about conscience. 
Hegel is often taken to be a critic of the form of moral consciousness called “Conscience” 
(Das Gewissen) on account of his blistering attacks on overly subjective conceptions of 
conscience. References to these attacks are sometimes coupled with a concern, raised by 
reading passages in the Philosophy of Right, that Hegel does not leave enough room for 
individual conviction in the institutions of ethical life.227 Nevertheless there is a positive view 
of conscience in his work. Indeed, Hegel insists that conscience is central to an individual’s 
personality and that it plays a vital role in ethical life.228 In this section of the Phenomenology, 
Hegel is concerned to show the possibilities as well as the pitfalls of living according to one’s 
conscience.229 
  
On the romantic conception of conscience, you do your duty and act authentically when 
you follow your conscience. Following your conscience means doing what you have elected 
to do based on your own deepest convictions. These convictions determine the content of 
your action. The romantic individual discovers his deepest personal convictions by looking 
into his own subjectivity and by acting only on the convictions he can count as his own. In 
this way, he can be certain that he does what is true to his own self.  
 
 
227 A number of scholars have worked to clarify the role that Hegel’s concept of conscience plays in his 
ethical and political philosophy. Those who see Hegel as an apologist for the absolutist nineteenth century 
Prussian monarchy find his account stifles agents of conscience under indifferent institutions. However, in 
recent years a range of scholars have concluded that these interpreters have got something wrong about 
Hegel’s conception of conscience and its relation to the modern state. They argue that it is a misreading to 
overstate the authority of the modern state to limit freedom of conscience. On their view Hegel’s account of 
modern ethical life in Philosophy of Right recognizes individuals as persons and secures for them an arena 
within which they are free from the incursion by the state and by others to act as they think appropriate, 
guided only by their own assessment of the good. See for example, Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of 
Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 255-80; Siep, “The 
‘Aufhebung’ of Morality in Ethical Life.” Martin J. De Nys, “Conscience and Ethical Life,” The Owl of 
Minerva 43, no. 1-2 (2011). For a recent study of the consistency between Hegel’s conception of conscience 
and contemporary liberalism and communitarianism, and how best to relate Hegel’s treatments of 
conscience, religion and political life in his later writings, see Timothy Brownlee, “Conscience and Religion 
in Hegel's Later Political Philosophy,” Ibid. (2011-12). 
228  Dean Moyar has offered the most recent and most robust defence of the indispensable role conscience 
plays in Hegel’s thought; so, it is disappointing that his treatment gives no space to the story of the beautiful 
soul. See Dean Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
229 In reading of this section of the Phenomenology, the aim is to draw out what Hegel has to say about conscience 
and the beautiful soul, rather than to offer a detailed commentary on the Phenomenology. The number of 
commentaries has ballooned in recent years. A selection of the most recent would include: Michael Inwood, 
Phenomenology of Spirit: Translated with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
Kenneth R. Westphal, The Blackwell Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2009). 
John E. Russon, Reading Hegel's Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
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In following their consciences, individuals can pursue their reflexively determined goals 
through their actions and be bound only by what they believe to be good. In that individuals 
are bound only by principles they themselves recognize as good, they do not need to rely 
on anything external to their own subjectivity to know what duty requires of them. A person 
needs only to act in accordance with his own understanding of the good to realize himself 
as an autonomous moral agent and an authentic individual. Nevertheless, as Pinkard points 
out, “such a self-exploration makes sense only in a social context in which the declarations 
of conscience and conviction are set off against the requirements that others make of 
him.”230 In other words, a person is able maintain that he has done his duty because others 
confer recognition on his actions and affirm his self-conception as an authentic individual.  
In this conception of conscience, subjective convictions about what one should do matter,231 
but they matter within the context of relationships. So, while you are free to do as you will, 
that freedom can be exercised only within the limits set by those among whom you act.232 
Therefore any claim about your freedom to express your point of view–an assertion that 
characterizes selfhood–relies upon the recognition of others and must appeal to them. What 
Hegel finds compelling in the romantic conception of conscience is the assertion that our 
true motives can be found only in and through a process of social recognition.  
Receiving the acknowledgement of others and their recognition that your decision is a 
conscientious one is what gives the subjective content of a claim of conscience its objective 
or universal element, uniting the personal and impersonal points of view. As Hegel puts it, 
recognition is what turns the deed into a reality.233 That is not because others can tell you 
what your duty is, but because “what is implicit may depend on the possibility of making it 
 
230 Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 212. 
231 Hegel states, “duty is no longer the universal that stands over against the self; on the contrary, it is known 
to have no validity when separated. It is now the law that exists for the sake of the self, not the self that exists 
for the sake of the law.” Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 387. §638. Later he states this explicitly in Elements of 
Philosophy of Right, “Conscience expresses the absolute entitlement of subjective self-consciousness to know in 
itself and from itself what right and duty are, and to recognize what it thus knows as the good. As this unity 
of subjective knowledge and that which has being in and for itself, conscience is a sanctuary which it would 
be sacrilege to violate.” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 158. §131. 
232 How is the need to receive the recognition of others not coercive? How does Hegel ensure moral subjects 
are free to act, guided only by their own assessment of the good? This is a key point of contact between Hegel 
and the liberal tradition. The question of how to ensure the social order gives adequate expression to moral 
subjectivity is the fundamental problem of political philosophy. Further examination of how political 
association should accommodate the ineliminable divergence among modern individual’s conceptions of the 
good can be found in Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom, 226. 
233 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 388. §640. 
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explicit,” as Robert Brandom clarified in another context.234 In other words, the set of 
considerations that were perhaps only implicit to you until you acted, invite reflections 
about what was socially embedded in the implicit norms on which you acted. So my action 
involves a mode of expression that opens that action up to the interpretation of others; 
therefore, “my sense of how I understand myself to be motivated must stand in some 
relation to what other agents would say is behind actions of such a types.”235 This means 
that “our own ‘mindedness’ requires a form of ‘like-mindedness,’” and as Pinkard explains, 
“we always begin with a practical sense of ourselves as in the world, sharing a view-point 
with others, and adjusting our judgments in light of how we take those others to be ‘carrying 
on,’ and ultimately, in light of how we take the ‘idealized community’ of others to 
proceed.”236 
The community of romantic individuals is therefore bound together by a shared sense of 
who they are which is born out of the mutual declarations of their deepest convictions about 
what counts as having inherent and absolute value. Uniting a person’s own subjective point 
of view with a universal one is conceivable in communities where the romantic individual 
can provide assurances that he is indeed acting in an appropriately self-determining matter 
when he makes declarations of conviction or protests in the name of conscience, and others 
can recognize those declarations and protestations as such.  
 
The highest good in this conception is something like “the union of my particular projects, 
plans and view of the world... with what is required for me to act according to reasons that 
can be recognized by others as valid.”237 Or as Hegel phrases it, the highest good is the 
combining of the universal with the particular. And that is precisely what an appeal to 
conscience is meant to do, assuming the agent is acting with authenticity, that is, out of his 
most deeply held convictions, and that he says so explicitly in terms that communicate his 




234 Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 8-9. 
235 Speight, Hegel, Literature, and the Problem of Agency, 5. 
236 Terry Pinkard, “Virtues, Morality, and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices,” European Journal of Philosophy 
7, no. 2 (1999): 10, 221. 
237 Ibid., 224. 
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The romantic conception of conscience thus gives place to moral subjectivity and to social 
recognition, both of which play constitutive roles in Hegel’s vision of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit).238 The self does not first exist as an independent individual and then enter into 
society. Instead the individual is constituted by social relations in the communities he is a 
part of, in the sense that the self-interpretations that define him are drawn from the 
language of the continuing conversations carried on by the community. While each 
individual is free to go his own way and acts only on the basis of his own conscience, in the 
process of trying to get clear about ourselves and about what ultimately matters, “we find 
ourselves committed to a common project of securing the conditions under which we can 
be free.”239 As Pinkard goes on to explain, “The community of romantics thus determines 
for itself as a community what is to count and what is not to count by virtue of each 
attempting to become an authentic individual and in each assisting the other through his 
acts of recognition to become such authentic individuals.”240 The problem with the post-
revolutionary idealist moral worldview, as Hegel sees it, is that it does not have a place for 
this element of social recognition in the determination of motives.241  
 
Narrating the protagonist’s discoveries 
 
In taking up the topic of conscience, Hegel offers a critical assessment of the romantic 
attempt to bring together the universal and particular elements of moral experience that 
had been separated in the Kantian account of duty and inclination. His cautionary tale 
invites us to imagine what we are doing when we stake a claim of conscience, in the wake 
of these romantic attempts, in order to show us how and where we will run into difficulties.  
 
The protagonist in this tale is an unnamed romantic who is trying to live according to this 
conception of conscience.  In the process, he reaches a number of impasses that challenge 
his self-understanding.242  Pinkard describes that self-understanding as something like an 
 
238 Hegel envisions Sittlichkeit as a system of community-specific principles, practices, and virtues that should 
give our everyday practical reasoning about what is right and good. They are embedded in the social 
institutions of modern life (family, civil society and the state) and internalized through acculturation. Hegel 
reserves discussion of Sittlichkeit for a later work. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. 
239 Pinkard, “Virtues, Morality, and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices,” 221. 
240 Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 210. 
241 Ibid. 
242 I have used masculine pronouns to refer to Hegel’s unnamed protagonist in this study, as there is no reason 
to assume Hegel was using terms such as consciousness, conscience, individual and self in a more inclusive 
way, given his views about women and their capacity for rational agency. Carla Lonzi has generated one of 
the more provocative deconstructions of the patriarchal character of Hegel’s theories: Carla Lonzi, “Let’s 
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“initially inarticulate sense of what our life’s ‘project’ is about”; it is “the standard by which 
we determine which of our various desires and preferences ought to be fulfilled, pursued, 
put off, repressed, or sublimated.”243 For the most part, that self-understanding has arisen 
dialectically out of the limitations of previous ones: “each new fundamental orientation was 
required by virtue of the way in which the insufficiencies of that prior mode of orientation 
had, in light of failing to achieve some collective goal implicit in itself, unraveled and 
thereby committed agents to a different position vis-à-vis each other.”244 Hegel holds that 
this happens in the course of reflecting on the self-understanding you have. The conceptual 
tensions that emerge eventually make it “impossible for the participants to rationally sustain 
an allegiance to that way of articulating their lives, their relation to nature, and to each 
other.”245 Hegel’s protagonist experiences these modern tensions and comes up against the 
limitations of each concept of conscience that he tries to live by. Hegel lays out both the 
self-defeating and the constructive ways in which his protagonist responds to these 
limitations.  
 
As Hegel tells it, the protagonist’s experiences of these modern tensions unfold something 
like a dialogue. It could be an internal dialogue with an antithetical consciousness or a 
discussion that is taking place between the protagonist and his counterparts. Either way, it 
is meant to be a formative experience for both the protagonist of this morality tale who 
finally comes to adopt a new normative orientation in life and for all who read this 
Bildungsroman.  
 
Discovering the subjective reality of conscience  
 
To draw us into this morality tale, Hegel asks us to consider a particular case of moral 
action.246 The protagonist has made a decision of conscience. In coming to this decision, 
his sense of what he must do is not based on abstract universal reasons or goods, such as 
love or happiness, but rather on an awareness of his own individuality and of a specific duty 
he must fulfil.247 The protagonist is also conscious that when he acts out of the conviction 
 
Spit on Hegel,” in Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel, ed. Patricia J. Mills (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1996). 
243 Pinkard, “Virtues, Morality, and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices,” 221. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid., 221-2. 
246 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 385. §635. 
247 Ibid., 386. §637. 
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of his individuality, he is in touch with the universal. What the protagonist is discovering is 
the subjective reality of conscience. He knows what he believes. He knows who he is. And 
he has the certainty of his convictions. He no longer thinks of morality in terms of 
performing pure duty. He can say, “I am my duty,” as Harris points out, “and my duty is 
to be me.”248 
 
Our protagonist is conscientious because he wholeheartedly identifies with certain bedrock 
concerts and commitments that he experiences as being of crucial importance to who he 
understands himself to be. In order for his decision of conscience to be recognized as such 
by others, the protagonist needs only to be convinced that he knows his duty and be able to 
declare his conviction.249 For in this conception of conscience it is the form of the act–a 
person’s declaration of certainty about his conviction–rather than the content that makes it 
universal.250 To put it another way, a person’s duty as conviction is simply what he claims 
it to be; therefore, what becomes crucial is that he explicitly says he is acting on conscience. 
In staking a position of conscience, a person is therefore making an avowal: “whoever says 
he acts in such and such a way from conscience, speaks the truth, for his conscience is the 
self that knows and wills. But it is essential that he say so.”251  
 
The protagonist receives confirmation of the morality of his action through the recognition 
of others who acknowledge that this action is what duty demands of him in these specific 
circumstances. The conferral of recognition is not only one sided; there is a mutually to it. 
When our protagonist makes a declaration of conscience, he is at the same time recognizing 
others when they act on decisions of conscience and say so making their own 
declarations.252 In this romantic community, “the spirit and substance of their association 
are thus the mutual assurance of their conscientiousness, good intentions, and the rejoicing 
over this mutual purity, and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and 
uttering, of cherishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs.”253  
 
At this point in the tale, our protagonist could be likened to a moral genius. For he relies 
 
248 Henry S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 463. 
249 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 396. §654. 
250 Ibid., 397. §655. 
251 Ibid. §654. 
252 Ibid. §654. 
253 Ibid., 398. §656. 
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not on norms or principles for his ethical knowledge but solely on the deliverances of 
conscience to provide the inspiration he needs.254 He has so honed his skill that he has 
become attuned to the normative saliences of particular situations without being able to 
state general rules for them. There is a virtuosity to his discernment of just what should be 
done given who he is and what the situation demands. Moreover, pursing what is best for 
him takes account of the possible moral judgments of others and therefore puts him in 
harmony with the rest of his community.  
 
The protagonist begins to see his moral deliberation as analogous to artistic creation. 
Because he has honed his skills, he has become attuned to the normative saliences of 
particular situations without being able to state general rules for them or having to rely on 
any kind of algorithm. He makes moral judgments by having had his moral sensibilities 
trained in the right way, just as an artist makes aesthetic judgments by having had his eye 
trained in certain ways.255 As the protagonist sees it, his conscience “is creative of moral 
experience in just the way that an artist creates a work of art.”256  He also believes that 
others will see it as he see it, if they have taste, and be in a position to recognize that what 
he does is right and beautiful.257 
 
When our protagonist hears the voice of conscience, he now believes he hears the voice of 
God. It is not the voice of God as lawgiver, but rather the voice of God as creator. That is 
because our protagonist no longer sees himself as an autonomous legislator laying a law 
upon himself. He sees himself as a creator who has a revelation of his own creative 
essence.258 In taking this view, Hegel says his protagonist’s conscience “in the majesty of its 
elevation above specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it pleases into 
its knowing and willing. It is the moral genius which knows the inner voice of what it 
immediately knows to be a divine voice.”259 Our protagonist now has “the majesty of 
absolute autarky, to bind and to loose.” 260  
 
254 Ibid., 397. §655. 
255 Pinkard, “Virtues, Morality, and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices,” 227. 
256 Gram, “Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel’s Critique of  ‘the Moral World-View,’” 314. Gram argues 
that this is the very form of conscience depicted in Jacobi’s novels.   
257 For more on how an individual with a romantic conscience taking this aesthetical approach would express 
his adherence to a standard other agents might accept and the problems such an approach raises, see Terry 
Pinkard, “What Is a ‘Shape of Spirit’?,” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide, ed. Dean Moyar and 
Michael Quante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 123-4. 
258 Harris, Hegel’s Ladder, 458. 
259 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 397. §655. 
260 Ibid., 393. §646.  
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As an inspired, creative, moral agent living according to his conscience our protagonist has 
discovered a new dignity. He could even be said to possess a certain moral beauty. This 
beauty consists in having found a way of living in the world where he can do the right thing 
at each opportunity as if by feel, without having to make determinations about his duty at 
every turn. What others find compelling and attractive about his mode of life is that “his 
own individuality and emotional life supposedly line up almost perfectly with the demands 
of reason, such that his own conscientious action is the best guide to what is really required 
by the moral law.”261 
 
Losing hold of his conviction  
 
In the wake of the discovery of the subjective reality of consciences, the protagonist becomes 
aware of new insights and new difficulties. What a decision of conscience requires in order 
count as a decision of conscience is self-certainty, namely, the self-certainty that this is what 
our protagonist must do in these circumstances. But on reflection that self-certainty is very 
hard to maintain. What undermines his self-certainty is, firstly, a growing awareness of the 
emptiness of his claim. Conscience affirms his individuality and tells him what not to do, 
but not necessarily what to do.  To put it another way, our protagonist knows that what he 
must do depends on who he is, but conscience does not specify any determinate duty or 
action.262 That is because conscience is formal. All our protagonist can really be certain of 
is that he is exempt from doing anything that goes against his conscience.  
 
Other doubts begin to chip away at his certainty too. For instance, the certainty he should 
have rests on his knowledge of his own individuality. But he simply does not have full 
knowledge of his own motives or of his intentions. Nor does he know all the circumstances 
or consequences that should shape his decisions. 263  Knowledge of his own purposes, 
projects and circumstances was meant to show him what conscience dictates that he should 
do, but it is simply not possible for him to fully know himself. He is neither aware of his 
unconscious convictions nor of his deeper motives. A perfect self-conception of individuality 
is not attainable. Feebleness, fallibility and finitude place a perfect self-conception beyond 
 
261 Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 241. 
262 Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 211; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 391. §644. 
263 Phenomenology of Spirit, 389. §642. 
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reach. So, while he claims his action to be universal and that he has total responsibility for 
it, his claim is unsupportable.  
 
To make things worse, he is also beginning to perceive that there could be a disjunction 
between the specific duty he believes he is called to perform and the specific duty that any 
other individual might be called to perform in a similar situation. The problem is that his 
individuality - by which Hegel means his own personal standard about what is right for him 
- is not necessarily the same as anyone else’s. While this may seem obvious, this implication 
is that his action is not impersonal and, if so, it could not attain universality.264 This new 
awareness of the potential disparity between his own particular purposes and the universal 
throws our protagonist into doubt. With these three discoveries–of the emptiness of 
conscience, of the limited self-knowledge he can obtain, and of the possibility that his action 
might not attain to universality after all–he can no longer maintain unwavering self-
certainty.  
 
Losing control over how his actions are viewed  
 
Our protagonist is not only struggling to maintain certainty in his conviction about his duty, 
he is also struggling to assure others that his appeal to conscience is valid. He knows that he 
fulfils his duty in this specific case as its content is contained in his certainty of himself. But 
he cannot help but look at his action from the point of view of others, as he needs their 
recognition. The problem is that those who must judge whether or not his action does 
conform to duty might see it differently. And that causes him to oscillate between his own 
self-certainty and self-doubt stemming from how others might react.265  
 
Hegel asks us to imagine that the protagonist determines to increase his wealth in a certain 
way. The protagonist may think that it is everyone’s duty to provide for himself and to 
support his dependents. Alternatively, he may think to himself that he ought to become 
more prosperous because the more he has, the more he would be able to give to neighbors 
 
264 Ibid., 400. §659. “[T]he language in which all reciprocally acknowledge each other as acting 
conscientiously, this universal identity, falls apart into the non-identity of individual being-for-self: each 
consciousness is just as much simply reflected out of its universality into itself. As a result, the antithesis of 
individuality to other individuals, and to the universal, inevitably comes on the scene....”  
265 Ibid., 393-94. §647-8. 
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in need. In fact, he may be motivated by any number of good reasons.266 The point is that 
he has self-certain conviction that increasing his wealth fulfils this duty in this particular 
case, however he came to that conclusion. But his action might have a different meaning 
for other people, and they may not find it morally acceptable. For instance, the more 
skeptical might suspect he is not acting in order to fulfil his duty based on what is best for 
all and that he is only doing what he likes.267  
 
The only assurance others have that the protagonist is acting morally is the protagonist’s 
word that he convinced of his duty and knows in his own mind what that duty is.268 While 
the declaration of conviction is supposed to be taken as absolute explanation, it offers no 
reasons. Even if the protagonist declares, “I assure you, I am convinced that I am doing 
what is right,” that declaration of conviction is all anyone has to go on. The problem is that 
others can only evaluate his claim of conscience on the basis of his self-certainty, and self-
certain declarations of conscience–“This is my duty because I say it is”–sound 
indistinguishable from statements of self-assertion or fiats of will. So, others may judge him 
to have taken the universal will as his principle, thereby recognizing the truth of his claim. 
Or they may also conclude that he has acted in his self-interest, giving it priority over the 
universal. The protagonist’s growing awareness that he may be perceived as acting 
according to caprice, rather than according to conscience, gives rise to an antithesis 
between what he is for himself and what he is for others.269  
 
Spaemann describes the protagonist’s predicament when he writes that “the problem with 
saying my conscience tells me to do X and leaving it at that, is that it assumes that calling 
something a decision of conscience constitutes a sufficient reason in and of itself not to do 
something and that by its very nature it is conclusive or unassailable.” 270  What our 
protagonist is now confronted with is the fact that his declaration of conscience cannot be 
placed beyond dispute, even if it comes with the assurance of his certainty. For others 
cannot be as certain about his motives and his assurances cannot dispel skepticism.  
 
 
266 Ibid., 391. §644.  
267 Ibid., 395. §650.  
268 Ibid., 396. §653. 
269 Ibid., 401. §659. 
270 Robert Spaemann, Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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Speight relates the dilemma of Hegel’s protagonist back to us in this fashion: “on the one 
hand, your claim that you have acted conscientiously cannot be denied, since no one but 
you has access to your conscience in this sense; on the other hand, my interpretation of 
your action as stemming from an un-charitable motive (greed, ambition) also cannot be 
denied, since it, too, is dependent on an introspection that cannot be communicable.”271 A 
question mark is now placed over the protagonist’s actual motivating reasons and 
commitments and whether they align with his declaration to have acted according to 
conscience. As long as there is a lack of identity between the protagonist’s claim of 
conscience and the acknowledged universal, any attempt to win the acknowledgement of 
others that what he has done was really his duty, seems to undermine his claim to have 
universal validity and therefore to legitimacy.272 To put it another way, our protagonist is 
now caught between competing interpretations of his action and is unable to have his claim 
to have acted conscientiously legitimized.  
 
The risks of taking action and the discovery of evil 
 
At this point the romantic conception of conscience presumed by our protagonist threatens 
to undermine his aspiration to live conscientiously. The problem with asserting that the 
ethical nature of an action is determined by the certainty with which he the agent holds 
something to be right is that his subjective opinion becomes the criterion for judging what 
is good and right. His inner law has become the moral law. Because there is no disputing a 
declaration of conviction, simply calling his action “conscience” is enough to make anything 
right. Therefore, the protagonist could rationalize whatever he does. He alone determines 
whatever ties he feels are appropriate, and whatever he does is good insofar as his 
convictions determine it to be good.273  
 
He must be his own moral index now. For our protagonist this brings with it a new sense 
of consciousness–the awareness of “evil consciousness.” Evil has a specific meaning here. It 
is not a matter of possessing malice or vice. An evil act is simply one where a person has put 
his own law above the demands of universal law.274 Any instance in which self-interest takes 
 
271 Speight, Hegel, Literature, and the Problem of Agency, 105. 
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priority over the universal is evil. So evil might take the form of believing that “all that 
matters is a decision one way or the other” or that it is my arbitrary will is what makes an 
action good. My subjective conviction rather than reason makes the decision and therefore 
my conviction becomes “the master over good, right, evil, truth.”275  
 
The protagonist has come to the unhappy realization that when he follows his conscience, 
he may in fact be perpetuating evil. For as soon as he acts, his declaration becomes a public 
deed which is open to the interpretations of others. Once his declaration becomes a deed, 
it takes on the form of particular individual duty, which is indistinguishable from something 
base such as an assertion of subjective will. As other people have only his declaration of 
conviction about his duty to go on, they are just as likely to conclude he is doing some evil 
based on self-interested motives and to discredit him as they are to conclude that he is doing 
his particular duty and give him recognition. So the protagonist is stuck between a rock and 
a hard place. He is pulled between the need to put his private judgment into action, but he 
also needs universal recognition that his action was indeed conscientious. 
The protagonist knows that when he does act, he has no control over what his action means. 
So he adopts a new strategy and begins to speak of having done his duty without actually 
acting upon it.276 He understands the importance of action but dreads its possible evil 
consequence, given that taking action invites the possibility of a clash between what he 
intended (or thinks he intended) and how what he does is interpreted, especially if others 
concluded he is mistaken. Pinkard describes how precarious it now feels to take any action 
given that it is possible that “one can mean one thing but have it end up meaning something 
else, one can disguise one’s motives from oneself, and one can continue to insist that what 
one did was beneficial when it is clear to all around that it was harmful.”277  
What the protagonist has discovered in his quest for universality, and tried to eschew, is the 
violence of this evil. Sax describes the crisis of conviction that strikes the protagonist in these 
terms:  
 
or the arbitrariness of its own particularity, giving the latter precedence over the universal and realizing it 
through its actions – It is capable of being evil.”  
275 That is how Ludwig Siep draws out Hegel’s meaning based on his reading of Philosophy of Right. Siep, “The 
‘Aufhebung’ of Morality in Ethical Life,” 144; Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 178. §140. 
276  “Just as every action is capable of being looked at from the point of view of conformity to duty, so too can 
it be considered from the point of view of the particularity [of the doer]; do, qua action it is the actuality of the 
individual.” Phenomenology of Spirit 403-4. §664-5. 
277 Pinkard, “What Is a ‘Shape of Spirit’?” 124. 
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Every deed is an act of violence. To act at all is to interfere with the course of 
things, to impinge on others. There is always violence involved... a violence which 
is overcome neither in conviction’s good intentions nor in individuality’s attempts 
to justify its activity through mutual recognition. A world that is free of violence is 
not a world of true selfhood and certainty of individuality.... To be an individuality 
is to be in conflict with others but also with their judgments.... It must declare that 
there are no innocent actions and must unmask all attempts to cover up or 
displace this evil under the claim to the universal.278  
 
Moreover, taking a position on the basis of conscience necessarily involves claiming 
something over against another and treating it as privileged. It is more akin to pushing an 
agenda than to making an innocent remark. Asserting individuality means throwing your 
weight around; and for that reason, every act of conscience entails violence. That violence 
may be motivated by conscientious convictions about what is right that attain universality 
or it could be driven by sheer power interests, but there is always violence, because to act 
at all is to interfere with the course of things and to impinge on others.279  
 
The protagonist’s realization that there are no innocent actions leads to paralyzing anxiety 
about moral complexity of his situation and his own complicity in perpetuating the wrongs 
he sees all around him. He does not want to be implicated in these injustices or to have his 
own self-understanding and moral reputation tarnished by them in any way. The problem, 
as one sociologist described it, is that “there’s no way for a person living in the world to 
truly do no harm.”280 
 
Renouncing action seems the only way to place his moral judgment beyond criticism. The 
protagonist can think of no other way to avoid discord. He sees himself as pure of heart not 
as wicked or violent, but the only way he can preserve that self-image is to avoid putting his 
conscientious convictions into action, given the exposure that would bring. For any action 
he might take could be re-cast as a self-aggrandizing imposition of his own subjective 
opinion. There seems to be only way to keep his hands clean and that is by staying out of 
it. So he refuses to get involved. He reasons that if he takes no action, he can do no wrong.281  
 
278 Sax, “Active Individuality and the Language of Confession: The Figure of the Beautiful Soul in the Lehrjahre 
and the Phänomenologie,” 456. 
279 Robert R. Williams, Hegel's Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 194. 
280  Julie Beck, “The Folly of ‘Purity Politics’: An Interview with Alexis Shotwell,” The Atlantic (2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/01/purity-politics/513704/. 
281  Unfortunately, as Lauer observes, “the negative satisfaction of an un-sullied conscience is an empty 
satisfaction–one, perhaps, does no wrong if one does not act, but one does no right either.” Quentin Lauer, 
A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 253. 
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How to cultivate a beautiful soul  
 
The protagonist no longer tries to represent himself as the universal voice of morality to 
others, as he cannot hope to do that without inciting conflict, perpetuating evil or doing 
violence, but he believes he can be true to himself and he makes that his goal. His social 
world may be riven by conflicting interpretations about what things mean, but he knows 
there is a world within him and that he can be at one with himself there. In his inmost self 
he can achieve some expression of peace, harmony and authenticity, if nowhere else. He 
thinks that by turning inward he will find what Terry Pinkard calls “a way of being a law 
unto oneself that does not implicate oneself in the messiness of life but keeps one free and 
pure.”282 It is the dream of attaining a unified subjectivity, apart from the divisions of the 
world, and of living in such a way as to be unsullied by the existence of those divisions. 
 
The protagonist aspires to be a beautiful soul. As a moral and spiritual pathway to 
perfection, cultivating a beautiful soul could be likened to an interior pilgrimage to the 
secret core of the self. It is a path of intense self-scrutiny and self-examination. The hope is 
that the end of all our exploring will be to arrive at a dimension of our self that somehow 
transcends our particularity.283  
 
To attain a beautiful soul, the protagonist must construct a world for himself out of his 
inmost being. He wants to pursue this project with maximum freedom, so he begins by 
cutting his social ties and extricating himself from any substantive social involvement that 
would check or direct his will in any way. His goal is to create a self-sufficient life, one in 
which there no sense of limitation or constraint.284  
Most of all, he wants to place his certainties where they cannot be shaken by the doubts of 
others. In withdrawing from his associations and detaching himself from everything around 
him, he retreats to a private realm to contemplate his inmost self. He hopes contemplating 
his identity will intensify his convictions, strengthening and sustaining them from within. 
 
282 Pinkard, “What Is a ‘Shape of Spirit’?” 124. 
283 For a concise treatment of the imperative to turn within and a critique of the claim that an authentic self 
can be discovered through introspection see Charles Guignon’s treatment of authenticity. Charles Guignon, 
On Being Authentic (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2004), 60. 
284 This desire certainly persists. Christian Smith sees this concern for unfettered self-creation as the typical 
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of eclectic self-definition, innovation, and metamorphosis with little need for a rationale or account.” Christian 
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This is how Hegel depicts his mindset: “It lives in dread of besmirching the splendor of its 
inner being by action and an existence; and, in order to preserve the purity of its heart, it 
flees from contact with the actual world....”285 This flight from participation is one of the 
hallmarks of the beautiful soul.  
 
The beautiful soul’s conscientious objections look increasingly like separation rather than 
effectual protest. Unfortunately, this separation from his social world does not shore up our 
protagonist’s beliefs; it creates further problems for him. Inaction presents just as many 
conceptual traps as action. For instance, the protagonist knows that a decision of conscience 
is a judgment about his conduct–about what he has to do or what he must not do–and not 
a judgment upon a speculative truth or a general proposition. His decision of conscience 
pertains to a concrete action. For him to claim to know his moral duty according to 
conscience is for him to know what action fits his concrete set of circumstances. It makes 
no sense to declare what his conscience demands that he do if he has no intention of actually 
doing that. He cannot really be said to have followed his conscience. 
 
The protagonist continues to make declarations about the wrongs he opposes in the name 
of conscience. He still wants to be heard but he does not want to listen, especially if that 
means listening to criticism or being challenged by the skepticism of others.286  So his 
communications tend to go only one way. His hope is that the mere fact of stating what his 
conscience says will be a sufficient explanation and justification of his position and will 
curtail any discussion about what he is or is not going to do. At this point his reluctance to 
engage with others or with the world around him is seriously curtailing his agency. It seems 
that all he can do is record his impressions in his diary and continue to cultivate a beautiful 
existence.287 His desire to be at peace with himself and in harmony at any cost leaves him 
no other scope for self-expression. Pinkard describes the trap that the protagonist and other 
beautiful souls fall into by renouncing action and retreating from the world:  
The beauty of their actions is an internal harmony that in principle cannot be tested 
by the world; like Wittgenstein’s ‘‘private language,’’ the various meanings existing 
in harmony in a beautiful soul are thus private affairs that in principle cannot be 
expressed, since any expression automatically disrupts that harmony. The 
‘‘beautiful soul’’ cannot even tell others about its own internal harmony since doing 
 
285 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 400. §658. 
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even that would disrupt the harmony (since even saying something opens oneself up 
to possible misunderstanding).288 
 
The beautiful soul had reasoned that the best way to stand by his convictions was not to act 
on them but rather to preserve them. If the only thing he could be sure of in a world of 
misunderstanding and violence is that he has conscientious convictions, then it is better to 
remain silent about what he believes and do nothing. Once he is no longer willing to put 
his convictions speech, let alone action, preserving the beauty of his existence comes at the 
cost of self-erasure, and it feels like vanishing.289  
 
His attempts to preserve the harmony he has attained in contemplation of his individuality 
now threaten to be his undoing. Trying to internalize what ought to be external robs him 
of any objectivity. He edges closer towards solipsism. Hegel describes the emptiness of this 
existence by stating that the beautiful soul now has no more substance than a “hollow 
object.” 
 
Its activity is a yearning which merely loses itself as consciousness becomes an object 
devoid of substance, and rising above this loss, and falling back on itself, finds itself 
only as a lost soul. In this transparent purity of its moments, and unhappy, so-called 
“beautiful soul,” its light dies away within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapor 
that dissolves into thin air.290  
 
So far, the beautiful soul’s unwillingness to compromise the authenticity, purity and 
harmony of his conscientious beliefs has amounted to a beautiful life, perhaps, but also to 
life of inaction. As long as he persists in this solitary way of life, the beautiful soul continues 
down a path that leads to madness. This is how the journey ends: 
The “beautiful soul,” lacking an actual existence, entangled in the contradiction 
between its pure self and the necessity of that self to externalize itself and change 
itself into an actual existence... being conscious of this contradiction in its 
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unreconciled immediacy, is disordered to the point of madness, wastes itself in 
yearning and pines away in consumption.291  
 
The beautiful soul can only break out of this bind if he asserts himself and takes action. 
Taking that step opens up two possible modes of existence. Both offer the illusion of 
preserving the harmony and beauty he has cultivated for himself. He may decide to adopt 
the attitude of a judgmental critic going forward or he may decide to take the attitude of an 
ironic actor. 
 
The hypocrisy and hard-heartedness of the beautiful soul 
 
As a judgmental critic the beautiful soul is seen as “quick to condemn while being glacially 
slow to act, so worried about dirtying his hands that he can never bring them into contact 
with anything in the world.”292  His attitude is judgmental because he is constantly assessing 
the correspondence between the particular actions and principles of others and is “quick to 
point out and denounce what he sees as the stain on others’ hands.”293 His own tendency 
is to assume that the moral condemnation he metes out amounts to action. 
Alternatively, the beautiful soul may adopt the attitude of an ironic actor. When he takes 
an ironic stance, the beautiful soul is seen as “the man behind the mask, who can never be 
pinned down to any particular identity.”294 He acts but is unwilling to be identified with 
any plan, action or belief he might hold. He distances himself from all commitments by 
insisting his inward unity can never be determined by his particular actions. He is unwilling 
to be held to anything “except the smug assertion of… [his] own moral and aesthetic 
superiority.”295  
When an ironic actor purports to act with moral purpose, declaring that he is a spokesman 
of a moral order that opposes the existing moral order, the judgmental beautiful soul takes 
issue. This opens a dialogue between these two oppositional stances, with their rival 
attitudes towards the universal constitutive of conscience. The judgmental beautiful soul 
who is reluctant to act tries to unmask the moral pretensions of the ironic beautiful soul 
 
291 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 406-7. §668. 
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who is reluctant to be defined by his deeds. The judgmental beautiful soul accuses the acting 
beautiful soul of evil in order to expose the supposed universality of actor’s claims for what 
they are: merely a mask for self-interested motives.296  
In trying to discredit the ironic actor, the judgmental beautiful soul inadvertently exposes 
himself to the charge of hypocrisy.  For he does what he accuses the actor of doing: claiming 
to be a representative of the moral order. But he has not acted morally. He just feigns 
morality by representing his condemnation as moral action.297 In this he wrongs others by 
trying to suggest this evil is really something good. Pinkard describes the two mindsets like 
this: 
Each sees the other as what Kant called ‘‘radical evil,’’ the perpetual temptation to 
substitute one’s own self-love for the messiness of trying to sort out the moral law in 
the real world, with the judgmental moralist seeing the ironist as an attempt to flee 
responsibility, and the ironist seeing the judgmental moralist as somebody trying to 
impose his own contingent set of values on others under the pretext of claiming 
universal validity for them.298 
 
Neither the ironic actor nor the judgmental critic can relinquish their emotional and 
psychological investment in the way they see the world. Both of these mindsets have “an 
obsession with its own sense of self-righteousness,” as Howard puts it, and refuse “to admit 
the authority of public reasons for fear of what impact this will have on its own sense of 
superiority and self-esteem.”299 This launches a string of allegations. When one denounces 
the other for imposing his own views on others while feigning to act of respect for the 
demands of morality, that accusation is immediately met with a contemptuous counter-
claim.  
 
At a certain point, “the fact that each accuses the other of doing only what he himself if 
doing makes it more or less explicit to the agents taken up in these flurries of moralistic and 
ironic accusation that each is after all only a particular point of view.”300 The ironic actor 
is the first to intuit this. He realizes that his actions really do determine who he is and sees 
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that the judgmental critic who tried to discredit him was right: in refusing to be identified 
with his actions he was avoiding the responsibility of having to sort out what the moral law 
demanded.301 The ironic actor recognizes that he is on a level with the moralist in that they 
both perpetuated evil. For the perspective of the agent and the perspective of the one 
observing the action are partial.  
 
The actor confesses this, expecting that the moralist will recognize himself in this 
description and come to see what each of them has been doing and how one sided and 
biased their accusations really are.302 But in a further turn of the dialectic, the critic declines 
to respond with a reciprocal confession.303 Instead he repulses the repentant actor. At this 
point the critic becomes “the Hard Heart.” The Hard Heart is unable to recognize himself 
in, or as, his counterpart, who he exposed as evil. As Harris explains, the Hard Heart is 
loath “to find itself guilty of not acting to create the better life of which it was pretending to 
be the expression.”304  So he condemns the evil of the age and steels himself against the 
existing order.  
 
Only when the Hard Heart faces up to having sinned in the same way as the actor had can 
he confess and receive pardon.  When the Hard Heart finally breaks, the self-enclosure 
effected by individual conviction breaks opens too.  This is what makes mutual recognition 
possible. Mutual recognition is not about appreciating “the rationality of the modern state 
or the fact of pluralism in it.”305 Mutual recognition is about seeing themselves in one 
another and realizing their differences are not going to go away. The two sides reach a 
reconciliation when “each comes to understand that it is impossible to prize apart the 
demands of personal interest (and the aims, projects, and evaluations bound up with being 
an individual agent) and the demands of morality.”306 And on that basis they can forgive 
each other for the accusations they made.307 
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What the beautiful soul comes to understand 
 
One of the discoveries that the protagonist makes in being reconciled is of the need 
for accountability. That means finding ways of reflecting on the background 
assumptions about his values and motives that he might be unaware of or take for 
granted. It also means finding ways of putting those things that go without saying 
into words, however difficult that may be.  As Pinkard puts it, “individual agents to 
be able to state what it is that counts as their individually adhering to the rules they 
have laid down for themselves (or what those ‘projects’ require).”308 And they need 
to state that in a manner that is not purely self-referential.  
 
What the beautiful soul has learned is that confidence in conscientious judgments is 
dependent on identifying with obligations that are larger than he is. And that he needs to 
bind himself to them without surrendering his commitment to freedom. Hegel insists that 
to be true to our consciences in this way is an achievement. This is genuine conscience: 
conscience that holds together the particular and universal and is both intersubjective and 
rational.309 As Howard explains: 
 
The demand for universality is supplied at the level of modern ethical life through 
the universal institutions of the family, Civil Society and the State, while the demand 
for particularity is met at the level of the specific individual and her personal 
concerns. In willing that her particular purposes be satisfying and reasonable, while 
also matching up with larger obligations of a more universal sort, the demand for 
individuality is met with the singular individual knowingly committing herself to 
larger moral norms but doing so through the standpoint of her own personal 
obligations.310 
 
The task is to find reasons for our conscientious decisions that we can share. One of the 
lessons we are meant to take from Hegel’s cautionary tale is that good reasons for our 
actions are not subjective (existing only in relation to individuals) or objective (therefore for 
everyone) but intersubjective. This lesson here, according to Pinkard, is that “what counts 
as ‘rational for us’ is not going to appear in abstracting ourselves from all social 
participation, but “must appear within a determinate type of mutual dependency.”311   
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Hegel’s emphasis on mutual recognition is meant to show us that good reasons are 
established communally in the process of reflecting on what it is that binds us together 
without denying our distinctively modern sense of individuality. As Speight observes, “a 
successful reason for action, as Hegel will come to elaborate in the Philosophy of Right, can be 
neither a purely moral imperative nor a purely prudential reason for action, but must 
involve both an ethical connection to another and some sense that I myself desire that 
connection.” 312  In other words, our reasons need to refer to the particular desires, 
inclinations, interests and purposes that we have developed over the course of our lives. 
And those reasons need to be put into terms that can be reasoned, discussed and debated.313  
 
In being reconciled, the beautiful soul has come to understand that the true language of 
conscience cannot be the language of individual conviction. The language of conviction 
was meant to reveal the inner law of the heart but was only partially revelatory.314 The 
language of conviction permits the protagonist to declare that his actions are his own (“the 
truth of his being”) but not to acknowledge that his actions might impinge on or deny the 
individuality of others. He needs a language that will help him talk about the way contingent 
interests and power shapes and distorts his actions.  
 
When the protagonist tried to obtain universal acknowledgement of his actions with only 
the language of conviction at his disposal, he had no way of conceding that his actions may 
wrong others or be innately evil. He could only try to convince others of their goodness, 
undermining his claim that his actions are indicative of who he truly is. The beautiful soul’s 
painful discovery was that the language of conviction could express one truth about 
individuality but only by masking another truth. It is no wonder he felt he could not put his 
convictions into action and that eventually even speaking about his convictions was self-
defeating. The language of conviction simply is not up to the task. 
 
New possibilities come into being with the language of confession. Sax draws out this 
importance of this discovery for the beautiful soul when he explains that: 
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In confession, the act and the language of the act are one. It is only through an 
understanding of the specific nature of the self, its natural impulses and inclinations, 
its form of self-understanding, its knowledge of circumstances, and of the deed that 
it performed, that the self is revealed and opened to others. No generalization of 
human nature, no claim to be expressing the universal in every action, is adequate 
to this purpose.... The self exhibited in confessional language is neither a mere doer 
of deeds nor some bundle of impulses and inclinations, some unrealized nature, but 
a self that acts and has acted and recognizes itself both as the agent of these actions 
and as the self who is acknowledged by others as this agent. The self is the mutual 
constitution of individuality in language in the community of Spirit.315 
 
Conscience does not only require the language of confession. Hegel wants us to the 
understand that it also needs social practices and institutions which can help us acquire the 
dispositions, habits and virtues necessary to risk taking action under the conditions of 
modernity.316  Without those it is all too easy to take one look at issues of moral complexity 
and decide to respond by carefully curating our lifestyles. For the romanticism of the 
beautiful soul lives on in the notion that we might simply work on attaining purity or 
tranquility instead of engaging in actual political processes. The sociologist Alexis Shotwell 
recently observed that when we start wondering how we are going to solve all the problems 
of modern life–environmental degradation, institutional racism, forced migration and so 
on–a certain tendency is evident, for “both professional ethicists and everyday people turn 
very quickly to focusing on what we personally, individually, can do to either manage our 
responsibility or to protect ourselves from how hard it is to be in this world. We say, “Oh 
we’re so connected, and it’s so complicated, and then the first thing we do is try to manage 
our own personal situation in relation to that.”317  Hegel’s morality tale speaks to that desire 
to escape our predicament rather than face the complexities and messiness of life: the ways 
in which we are compromised, the ways in which our own attitudes present obstacles, the 
one sidedness of our judgments and the ways in which we refuse to recognize ourselves in 
others.  
While trying to live with a clean conscience may seem like a perfectly reasonable response 
to complex moral problems, it is a risky strategy. In Hegel’s tale of the fate of the beautiful 
 
315 Ibid. 
316 Pinkard, “Norms, Facts and Forms of Life in the Phenomenology.” 19-20. 
317 Julie Beck, “The Folly of Purity Politics; an interview with Alexis Shotwell,” The Atlantic (2017). Available 
at: https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/01/purity-politics/513704/Alexis Shotwell notes 
that when individualism is combined with the desire for moral purity that translates into what she calls purity 
politics or ‘‘purism.” For more, see Alexis Shotwell’s recent book: Alexis Shotwell, Against Purity: Living Ethically 
in Compromised Times (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016). 
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soul, it is shown to be both futile and counter-productive. Cultivating a beautiful soul is 
futile because there is no way of living in the world and doing no harm. And when we 
realize we are still complicit–despite our best efforts to extricate ourselves–we are liable to 
give up.  Cultivating a beautiful soul is also counter-productive. It does not do us any good 
to aim for our own purity or integrity. When we start doing that, we become solipsistic and 
narcissistic; we become very focused on our own personal project rather than aiming to 
make the bigger, more systemic changes that are called for, as Shotwell warned. Focusing 
on what I can do in my own sphere for the sake of my conscience forecloses all sorts of 
social practices and forms of solidarity, whereas many of the wrongs that need to be righted 
in the world can only be adequately addressed by working together. 
 
So how are we supposed to conscientiously work for peace or justice in the world, 
stomaching the potential conflicts and inevitable compromises that come with that, without 
retreating into projects that are simply focused on giving us some peace of mind?  Hegel’s 
verdict is that we cannot escape the moral crises of our age by retreating from them but 
that we can confess the ways in which we are implicated in them. That means 
acknowledging the difficulties and complexities of our relationships and of our place in 
society, recognizing the need to work through difficult situations with others and 




This chapter examined the figure of the beautiful soul as Hegel deployed it in his cautionary 
tale. First it laid out the Kantian context of conscience to which Hegel was reacting. Then 
it looked at how Hegel sets up this cautionary tale as an internal dialogue. Finally, it re-
narrated what the protagonist learned in the process of living according to conscience: that 
conscience is a subjective reality; that conscience is formal; that others cannot intuit whether 
his motives are truly conscientious or merely self-serving; and that taking action invites risk. 
To avoid that potential risk, the protagonist no longer takes any action at all. Renouncing 
action, he cultivates a beautiful existence instead. He hoped that the mere fact of stating 
what his conscience says will be a sufficient explanation and justification of his position. In 
passing off his words for deeds, he can take the stance of an ironic actor or of a judging 
critic. Either way he must learn to see the one-sidedness of his position and be reconciled 
with the other or end his days narcissistically cultivating a beautiful but empty existence.  
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This chapter then examined the discoveries that come with being reconciled. Hegel’s 
protagonist comes to understand that if he is going to follow his conscience, he needs to put 
the reasons for his action into the language of confession and mutual recognition. Hegel’s 
protagonist also comes to understand that he needs to work through difficult situations with 
others, to create new solidarities and to participate in institutional life. They will help him 
to acquire the dispositions, habits and virtues necessary to risk taking action under the 
conditions of modernity. This is how to avoid the fate of the beautiful soul. Otherwise, we 
will to shy away from the demands of justice and benevolence, as Hegel’s protagonist did, 
making moral purity or inner peace our goal rather than engaging in actual political 
processes.  


















One of the most subtly devastating critiques of a political thinker in the twentieth century 
was meted out by Gillian Rose when she described Hannah Arendt as a beautiful soul. 
Hannah Arendt had engaged with the beautiful soul tradition when studying the 
correspondences of the writer Rahel Varnhagen (1771-1833). Varnhagen hosted one of the 
most prominent salons in Europe. She was an acquaintance of Goethe, and he had called 
her a beautiful soul, which may or may not have been praise. Arendt found Varnhagen 
incredibly compelling as an emancipated woman and an emancipated Jew, and she closely 
identified with Varnhagen’s experiences in her own search for a German Jewish identity 
and her struggle as a female philosopher. So closely, in fact, that the biography she 
published of Varnhagen is written “from within,” taking Varnhagen’s letters as her own 
and assuming her voice in an attempt to reflect on both of their lives at the same time.  
Arendt declared that Varnhagen ultimately had become “my closest friend, though she has 
been dead for some hundred years.”318  But it was not merely this identification with 
Varnhagen that led Gillian Rose to critique Arendt as a beautiful soul. 
 
Gillian Rose singled out Arendt as representing the beautiful soul in Germany during the 
transition from Social Democracy to totalitarian rule.319 This chapter elucidates what Rose 
meant by that assessment. It argues that Arendt’s attempt to rework the concept of 
conscience is key to understanding why Rose critiqued Arendt as a beautiful soul and what 
Rose thought was at stake. The argument proceeds by summarizing how Arendt’s work 
addresses the problem of conscience, that is, how conscience can be both formal and moral. 
This enables me to build up the case that Arendt’s work provides an intellectual 
instantiation of the dilemmas of conscience, and of the temptation to represent the beautiful 
soul in response to those dilemmas. My contention is that familiarity with Hegel’s 
cautionary tale would have helped Arendt anticipate that series of pitfalls. 
 
318 Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, trans. Richard Winston and Clare Winston 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 5. 
319 Rose, The Broken Middle, 155. 
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The first thing to see in order to proceed is why Arendt went to Jerusalem in 1961. 
 
Otto Adolf, son of Karl Adolf Eichmann and Maria nee Schefferling, caught in a 
suburb of Buenos Aires on the evening of May 11, 1960, flown to Israel nine days 
later, brought to trial in the District Court in Jerusalem on April 11, 1961, stood 
accused on fifteen counts: “together with others” he has committed crimes against 
the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes during the whole period 
of the Nazi regime and especially during the period of the Second World War. ...To 
each count Eichmann pleaded: “Not guilty in the sense of the indictment.” 
Throughout the trial, Eichmann tried to clarify, mostly without success… his plea 
of “not guilty in the sense of indictment.” The indictment implied not only that he 
had acted on purpose, which he did not deny, but out of the base motives and in 
full knowledge of the criminal nature of his deeds. As for the base motives, he was 
perfectly sure that he was not what he called an innerer Schweinehund, a dirty bastard 
in the depths of his heart; and as for his conscience, he remembered perfectly well 
that he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been 
ordered to do–to ship millions of men, women, and children to their death with 
great zeal and the most meticulous care.… Nobody believed him. The prosecutor 
did not believe, because that was not his job. Counsel for the defense paid no 
attention because he, unlike Eichmann, was, to all appearances, not interested in 
questions of conscience. And the judges did not believe him, because they were too 
good, and perhaps also too conscious of the very foundations of their profession, to 
admit that an average “normal” person, neither feeble-minded nor indoctrinated 
nor cynical, could be perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong. They preferred 
to conclude from occasional lies that he was a liar–and missed the greatest moral 
and even legal challenge of the whole case.320 
 
When Hannah Arendt learned that the Israelis intended to try Eichmann in Jerusalem, she 
approached the editor of The New Yorker, William Shawn, about covering the trial. Arendt 
had established her reputation as a political theorist, not as a journalist, but she got the job 
and attended Eichmann’s trial which ran from April 11 to August 14, 1961. Her report of 
the trial was published as a series of five articles, re-published as a book in 1963 entitled 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.   
 
Arendt had already gained attention as an original thinker for her work The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (published in 1951) on National Socialism and Stalinism and for The Human 
Condition (published in 1958), a study of the ways in which labor, work and action played 
out in modern political, social, public and private life. In these works, she sought to show 
how the horrors of the twentieth century affected our categories of moral and political 
judgment and sought to develop a new set of philosophical categories to illuminate the 
 




nature of political life. But it was this report that grabbed headlines, stirred up controversy 
and made her a household name.321 As Benhabib succinctly wrote: “the Eichmann trial 
was a watershed of sorts because it brought to the fore the contradictions with which she 
had struggled with existentially and conceptually all her life.”322 The concept of conscience 
was one of those contradictions. 
 
Eichmann, a traveling salesman, began dealing with “Jewish questions” for the Nazi regime 
two years after Hitler came to power in 1933. Rising through the ranks of the SS, he was 
entrusted with carrying out the “final solution,” a goal of annihilation that he pursued with 
unrelenting bureaucratic zeal. There was no question that Eichmann had committed the 
crimes with which he had been charged, for he admitted his role in the Final Solution; 
however, for Arendt the trial of Eichmann raised troubling questions about moral judgment 
and motivation. It was unclear how to interpret Eichmann’s protestations that he had not 
acted out of base motives and that he was unaware of the criminal nature of his acts. Arendt 
records that as far as Eichmann was concerned, he had never had any intentions to kill 
anybody; he had never hated Jews; and he had never done anything out of his initiative but 
always obeyed the law. Throughout the trial he presented himself as one driven to organize 
the mass murder of millions of Jewish men, women and children out of a sense of duty and 
not out of any sense of hatred or fanaticism. In doing his duty, he understood himself to be 
acting in good conscience and on the right side of the law.323  
So, was Eichmann lying? The court assumed that only an utterly depraved villain could 
have committed such atrocities, but, according to Arendt, Eichmann was neither perverted 
nor sadistic. In fact, he was “terribly and terrifyingly normal.”324 In her court report Arendt 
stressed that Eichmann was not an Iago or a Macbeth:  
 
321 The public outrage to Eichmann in Jerusalem that was stirred up did not simmer down until 22 November 
1964 when John F. Kennedy was assassinated. For a good account of the controversy, see the biography 
written by her student Young-Bruehl and the recent graphic biography by Krimstein: Elisabeth Young-
Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 339, 47-53; Ken 
Krimstein, The Three Escapes of Hannah Arendt: A Tyranny of Truth (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2018). 
322 Seyla Benhabib, “Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem,” in Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. D. Villa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 80. 
323 Arendt records that this led him to boast that “I will jump in my grave laughing, because the fact that I 
have the death of five million Jews [or ‘enemies of the Reich,’ as he always claimed to have said] on my 
conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction.” Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 
46. 
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Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, 
he had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; he 
certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He 
merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing.325  
 
Arendt reported that judges in Jerusalem simply could not accept that a normal person was 
incapable of telling right from wrong. They held that he must be aware of the criminal 
nature of his acts, and that the more plausible explanation was that he had lied to the police 
about his motives and had perjured himself in court when he claimed he had always obeyed 
orders.326 In this way, the judges sidestepped what Arendt saw as the greatest moral and 
legal dilemma of the whole case, which was that Eichmann seemed to lack motivation to 
have committed the crimes. 327  Arendt’s point is that the existing conception of guilt 
presumes that criminals must know at some basic level that what they are doing is wrong 
or unlawful. She argues that in putting Eichmann and other criminals who have committed 
‘legal crimes’ on trial, we are demanding that “human beings be capable of telling right 
from wrong even when all they have to guide them is their own judgment.”328 But if 
Eichmann did not realize what he had done was morally wrong, he lacked “the very thing 
our legal concept of guilt demands: mensa rea, or criminal intent.”329 The very fact that 
Eichmann claimed to have acted in good conscience and to have followed the law posed a 
profound problem. 
 
Arendt referred to the central chapters of Eichmann in Jerusalem, as her report on Eichmann’s 
conscience. In this report she aimed to take seriously both Eichmann’s claim to have no 
base motives and his claim to have followed his conscience. It is significant to her project 
that Eichmann had not only committed a new kind of crime (organized genocide and 
crimes against humanity) but also presented us with a new type of criminal, who lacks the 
conventional motives we associate with evil doing.  This new kind of criminal commits his 
crimes in a context which breaks down the capacity for forming independent moral 
judgments and “make[s] it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing 
wrong.”330 Arendt’s conclusion is that in the context of these regimes, enormous crimes do 
 
325 Ibid., 287.  
326 Ibid., 14, 26.  
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not require evil perpetrators with wicked intentions, in fact such crimes might be committed 
for reasons that are petty or self-serving. For Arendt, the trial demonstrated that “it was 
sheer thoughtlessness–something by no means identical with stupidity—that predisposed 
him [Eichmann] to become one of the greatest criminals of that period” and that “such 
remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil 
instincts taken together.”331 This is the substance of Arendt’s claim about the banality of 
evil. As one commentator elaborates, “Arendt’s claim was not that such action was trivial 
but that souls generally go at bargain rates. Thirty shekels, another notch in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy–the things for which people are willing to betray everything that 
matters are appallingly insignificant.”332  
 
What grabbed Arendt’s attention during the trial was Eichmann’s total absence of thinking 
and what implications the inability to think had for the proper functioning of conscience.333 
The commonly held assumption that conscience referred to a normative experience, an 
experience of the good, now seemed naïve. The thoughtlessness Eichmann displayed 
demanded a new account of conscience. Arendt was spurred to return to a Socratic ethic 
in order to rework conscience and draw out the significance of thinking. In the process, 
Arendt came to the conclusion that conscience is “unpolitical,” which set up the basis for 
Rose’s critique. 
 
The indictment of conscience 
 
Arendt had written on conscience at the end of the 1920s in her doctoral dissertation, The 
Concept of Love in St. Augustine. She read Augustine as treating conscience as the moral basis 
of judgment. Conscience is understood to be “of God” in Arendt’s reading. It is the voice 
of God entering into one’s mundane life, testifying from within us to the divine law. It issues 
particular commands of divine law, such as “Thou shalt not covet,” which makes a claim 
 
331 Ibid., 287-88. Arendt believed Eichmman’s unwillingness to think was his most distinctive trait: “He was 
genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché…. The longer one listened to him, the 
more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to 
think from the standpoint of somebody else. No communication was possible with him, not because he lied 
but because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against words and the presence of others, 
and hence from reality as such.” Ibid., 49.  
332 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2015), 301.  
333 Arendt continues to mull over these concerns in Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: 
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over and against the other possibilities one might will.334 Hearing the voice of conscience 
leads to the discovery of one’s true source in God, directing one beyond the world to which 
one was accustomed:  
 
Conscience directs man beyond this world and away from habituation. As the voice 
of the Creator, conscience makes man’s dependence on God clear to him. What the 
law commands, conscience addresses to the one who had already succumbed to the 
world in habit. The voice of the law summons him against what habit previously 
entangled him in.… While man lives in habit, he lives in view of the world and is 
subject to its judgment. Conscience puts him coram Deo, into the presence of God.335  
 
Hearing the voice of conscience reconciles us to God through grace and love, caritas. With 
caritas we can accept the help of God the Creator and do what the law commands out of 
love not out of fear.336 Caritas not only changes a person’s relationship to the law, it changes 
a person’s relationship to the world: so that we are not lost in the world but know the good 
and perform the good by acting in concert with others.337 There is more that needs to be 
said about Arendt’s interpretation of caritas and “neighborly love” in her dissertation on 
Augustine. At this stage, I simply want to draw out the lineaments of the fairly traditional 
conception of conscience which she attributes to Augustine, so we can see why it had to be 
put in the dock for failing to prevent the evil Eichmann did in its name.  
 
In this traditional conception of conscience, conscience serves as the moral basis of 
judgment. It is supposed to tell us to do good and avoid evil and to remind us of the moral 
commitments we have, by giving voice to divine commandments. But what if a person’s 
conscience did not counsel him to do good and avoid evil, but counselled him to do evil? 
What if, instead of speaking the divine law to him from within saying, “Thou shall not kill,” 
conscience said, “Thou shall kill”? Eichmann had testified in his defense that his conscience 
had not sanctioned resistance against evil, it demanded participation in it. Therefore, the 
question “in the minds of nearly everyone who followed the trial,” Arendt reported, was 
whether the accused had a conscience at all. But could the faculty of conscience be missing 
in some people? How could it be absent in certain people or at times, given that conscience 
 
334 Love and Saint Augustine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 84. 
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is meant to be “always present within us just like consciousness?” 338 Arendt presumed that 
Eichmann did have a conscience, for he said he did.339 The problem, as she saw it, was that 
his conscience did not operate in the “normal” fashion, given he was incapable of telling 
right from wrong.340  
 
Arendt wanted to retain the idea of conscience as a faculty which counsels us to do good, 
so she reasoned that it must be rather precarious. She tried to establish whether Eichmann’s 
conscience had been over-ridden by other considerations and circumstances which had 
silenced it, but she was not convinced Eichmann’s conscience had been silenced, as he had 
testified that his conscience actually sanctioned his behavior and had continued to tell him 
what his duty was all the way to the end. So, if it was not right to speak of his conscience as 
having been muffled or silenced, then how had it ceased to function? Was it preferable to 
think of it as having been co-opted or incapacitated? The traditional view of what 
conscience was or how it functioned was no longer holding up for Arendt, and her concern 
was that neither ethics nor the legal framework had taken the failure of that view into 
account. 
 
It was clear to Arendt that the socio-political conditions created by the Third Reich had 
had the effect of preventing the proper functioning of conscience: 
 
Just as the law in civilized countries assumes that the voice of conscience tells 
everybody “Thou shalt not kill,” even though man’s natural desires and inclinations 
may at times be murderous, so the law of Hitler’s land demanded that the voice of 
conscience tell everybody: “Thou shalt kill,” although the organizers of the 
massacres knew full well that murder is against the normal desires and inclinations 
of most people.341  
  
 
338 Which is how she framed the question in her last book: The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation 
on How We Think, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1981), 190. 
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What was unclear to her was how Eichmann’s conscience functioned, or stopped 
functioning, under those conditions. Arendt struggled to see how conscience could be 
universal and actual, rehearsing the difficulties scholars have had conceiving of the 
normativity and formality of conscience, explored in previous chapters of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, her suspicion was that in a regime where murder was lawful, Eichmann’s 
refusal to think or to judge for himself might offer the most significant clues for making 
sense of his enthusiastic participation in the crimes. Finding the connection between 
thinking, judging and conscience seemed the most promising way forward in terms of re-
conceptualizing conscience. There were two portions of Eichmann’s testimony that Arendt 
relied most heavily. In one of them Eichmann signaled that he had satisfied his conscience 
by listening to “respectable voices” and in the other he tried to explain that he had done 
his moral duty by following the law.  
 
Respectable voices and the refusal to think or judge 
 
At one point in Eichmann’s testimony, he describes attending the Wannsee Conference in 
January 1942 as secretary, a gathering which aimed to coordinate the efforts of all 
Ministries and branches of the Civil Service in implementing the Final Solution. Before the 
meeting, Arendt records that he had still had some reservations about “such a bloody 
solution,” despite having “done his best right along to help with [it]” but that those doubts 
were dispelled once “he could see with his own eyes and hear with his own ears that not 
only Hitler, not only Heydrich or the ‘sphinx’ Muller, not just the S.S. or the Party, but the 
elite of the good old Civil Service were vying and fighting with each other for the honor of 
taking the lead in these ‘bloody’ matters.”342  Eichmann said that after witnessing the 
enthusiastic response of the “best” people, he no longer had any doubts and his conscience 
was satisfied. Arendt concludes that for Eichmann “the most potent factor in the soothing 
of his own conscience, was the simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all, who 
actually was against the Final Solution.”343 When the prosecution tried to prove that there 
were other voices he could have listened to Eichmann could honestly claim that “there were 
no voices from the outside to arouse his conscience” once it had been set at ease by the 
unanimous agreement of his social betters.  
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Arendt’s interpretation was that Eichmann “did not need to ‘close his ears to the voice of 
conscience,’ as the judgment has it, not because he had none, but because his conscience 
spoke with a ‘respectable voice,’ with the voice of respectable society around him.”344 But 
this raised further problems for her about Eichmann’s motivation and his conscience. 
Conscience is supposed to put the individual coram Deo, in the presence of God, thereby 
freeing him from the prevailing social norms; however, Eichmann’s conscience did not 
work like that. Arendt tries to make sense of his testimony in this way:  
 
What he fervently believed in up to the end was success, the chief standard of “good 
society” as he knew it.… Hitler, he said, “may have been wrong all down the line, but 
one thing is beyond dispute: the man was able to work his way up from lance corporal 
in the German Army to Führer of a people of almost eighty million…. His success 
alone proved to me that I should subordinate myself to this man.” His conscience was 
indeed set at rest when he saw the zeal and eagerness with which “good society” 
everywhere reacted as he did.345  
 
Instead of freeing him from social norms and directing him to speak out against the Final 
Solution, Eichmann said that his conscience counselled him to adopt the opinions of those 
around him. He testified that after hearing the views of his social betters, “I sensed a kind 
of Pontius Pilate feeling, for I felt free of all guilt.” Who was he to judge? Who was he “to 
have [his] own thoughts in this matter”? 346  Having heard the voice of conscience, 
Eichmann believed he could do nothing but yield to it. Arendt concluded that in the context 
of a regime where murder was lawful, if one does not think for oneself, it is all too easy to 
conflate the voice of conscience with respectable voices. 
 
Following the law instead of thinking or judging 
The other half of Eichmann’s defense, in which he asserted that he has not only followed 
conscience, but also followed the law, was baffling as well. Arendt relays in her report that 
he told the police over and over that “whatever he did, as far as he could see, he did as a 
law-abiding citizen” and that “he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law.”347 
Eichmann was not troubled by the temptation to do evil. He only seemed troubled by the 
temptation to disregard his duty as dictated by the law. On Arendt’s analysis, Eichmann 
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had deeply internalized the duties of a law-abiding citizen, and she hypothesized that the 
verdicts of his conscience were based on the law but understood in a particular way. Her 
report picks up on one strange turn the trial took:  
[Eichmann] suddenly declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life 
according to Kant’s moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition 
of duty. This was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, since 
Kant’s moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man’s faculty of judgment, which 
rules out blind obedience. The examining officer did not press the point, but Judge 
Raveh, either out of curiosity or out of indignation at Eichmann’s having dared to 
invoke Kant’s name in connection with his crimes, decided to question the accused. 
And, to the surprise of everybody, Eichmann came up with an approximately correct 
definition of the categorial imperative.… [He] then proceeded to explain that from 
the moment he was charged with carrying out the Final Solution he had ceased to 
live according to Kantian principles, that he had known it, and that he had consoled 
himself with the thought that he no longer “was master of his own deeds,” that he 
was unable “to change anything.” What he failed to point out in court was that in this 
“period of crimes legalized by the state,” as he himself now called it, he had not simply 
dismissed the Kantian formula as no longer applicable, he had distorted it to read: 
Act as if the principles of your actions were the same as that of the legislator of the 
law of the land–or, as Hans Frank’s formulation of “the categorial imperative in the 
Third Reich,” which Eichmann might have known: “Act in such a way that the 
Führer, if he knew your action, would approve it.” …Kant, to be sure, had never 
intended to say anything of the sort; on the contrary, to him every man was a legislator 
the moment he started to act: by using his “practical reason” man found the principles 
that could and should be the principles of law. But it is true that Eichmann’s 
unconscious distortion agrees with what he himself called the version of Kant “for the 
household use of the little man.”348  
 
For Eichmann, morality had become synonymous with legality. As one commentator put 
it: “in a regime where the will of the Führer was indeed, both theoretically and practically, 
the source of law, this ‘Kantian’ reification of duty and law-abidingness was morally fatal. 
Eichmann was a law-abiding citizen of a regime which had made murder into a law, a legal 
(and thus “moral”) obligation.”349  Eichmann was so committed to lawfulness, that is, 
following the will of the Führer completely, that he sabotaged Himmler’s orders to stop the 
deportations towards the end of the war.350 It was this strictness in cleaving to the law of 
the land that the judges in Jerusalem interpreted as definitive proof of Eichmann’s anti-
Semitic fanaticism. In doing so, Arendt says they missed the moral challenge of the case 
and “they never came to understand him,” since “the very uncomfortable truth of the 
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matter probably was that it was not his fanaticism but his very conscience that prompted 
him to adopt his uncompromising attitude during the last year of the war.”351 Arendt felt 
the court had failed to come up with an adequate account of Eichmann’s guilt, and failed 
to appreciate that, as another commentator put it, “the greatest threat in our age may not 
be the criminal mastermind but the thoughtless, law-abiding citizen.”352 Again, in the 
context of a regime in which murder was legal, Arendt concluded that it was the refusal to 
think for oneself that allowed conscience to condone acting in accordance with those laws, 
and, in fact, use those laws as the metric for the moral law. 
 
Passing sentence on conscience 
 
Holding onto the notion of conscience as normative, informed by principles and directed 
by caritas to produce new forms of solidarity lead to intractable difficulties. To Arendt, it no 
longer made any sense. Arendt wrote that facing the moral challenge of the case head on 
required coming to terms with the traditional understanding of conscience and its total 
inadequacy in the context of criminal regimes. Coming to terms with the case meant letting 
go of the assumption that conscience functioned as a reliable, independent moral faculty 
that counsels us to do good and avoid evil, as Eichmann’s did the reverse. It also meant 
letting go of the assumption that conscience is guided by old values, moral maxims and 
religious principles stemming from commandments such as “Thou shalt not kill,” for under 
Hitler those principles had been inverted. Finally, it meant letting go of the notion that 
heeding conscience freed people from habituation to the world around them and 
conformity to its norms, providing a barrier against tyranny and totalitarianism, for 
National Socialism had created conditions of complicity which effectively incapacitated 
conscience and undermined moral agency. 
 
Arendt had already begun to explore how Nazism created these conditions in her 1951 
work On the Origins of Totalitarianism.353 In that book, she talks of evil as radical but when 
confronted with the figure of Eichmann she, as Canovan said, “came to the conclusion that 
to speak of evil as something ‘radical’ was to credit it with a depth that it did not possess, 
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which is why after the trial she drew attention to evil’s ‘banality’ instead.”354 Eichmann had 
become for her the “paradigm case for analyzing how neither particularly evil nor 
particularly intelligent people could get caught in the machinery of evil and commit the 
deeds they did.”355 Holding that paradigm in mind, Arendt began working on material that 




Arendt’s new understanding of conscience has to be assembled from a number of different 
lines of investigation she pursued over the next fifteen years, but it can be seen taking shape 
across a range of lectures, essays and publications she produced up until the time of her 
death. 356  In her last work, The Life of the Mind, Arendt asked: “Might the problem of good 
and evil, our faculty of telling right from wrong, be connected with our faculty of 
thought?”357 In the trial she had witnessed how Eichmann’s unthinking attitude precluded 
judging and blocked his ability to discriminate between good and evil. So could thinking 
liberate the faculty of judgment enabling us to tell what is right from what is wrong? Arendt 
sought to find out whether conscience, if linked more closely to thinking and judging for 
oneself, could help avoid moral catastrophe in dark times. Her goal, as she later reflected, 
was to examine the experience of thinking in order to explore the “inner connection 
between the ability or inability to think and the problem of evil.”358 In what follows, the 
connections she saw between thinking, judging and conscience are drawn out so that the 
weaknesses of her new account of conscience can be assessed and the basis of Rose’s critique 
becomes evident. 
 
354 As she explained, “It is my opinion now that evil is never ‘radical,’ that it is only extreme, and that it 
possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can over grow and lay waste the whole world precisely 
because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is ‘thought-defying’, as I said, because thought tries to reach 
some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is 
nothing. That it its ‘banality.’” Hannah Arendt et al., The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 209. Richard J. Bernstein, “Did Hannah Arendt Change Her 
Mind?” in Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, ed. Larry May and Jerome Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); 
Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, 301-2. Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A 
Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24. As Arendt later 
wrote, “The greatest evil is not radical, it has no roots, and because it has no roots it has no limitations, it can 
go to unthinkable extremes and sweep over the whole world.” Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral 
Philosophy,” 95.  
355 Benhabib, “Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem,” 68. 
356 While it has a definite shape, Arendt’s treatment of conscience is still of contradictions and loose ends. 
Synthesizing Arendt’s work on conscience has required following a quite a few different “thought trains,” to 
use Canovan’s expression. Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 6.  
357 Arendt, The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think, vol. 1, 5.  
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Thinking without bannisters  
 
In light of the trial, Arendt called for a new kind of thinking that could liberate judgment, 
foster the formation of conscience and sustain political life. She envisioned thinking as a 
‘weapon’ that could push back against oppressive forces.359 This kind of thinking would be 
an imaginative activity that required remembering and was able to draw from stories and 
examples with creativity. It would require “no pillars and props, no standards and traditions 
to move freely without crutches over unfamiliar terrain.”360 Arendt termed this new kind 
of thinking Denken ohne Geländer–thinking without banisters.   
 
Her focus was not on thinking understood as the activity of philosophers or ‘professional 
thinkers’ but on thinking as an activity open to everybody.361 This kind of thinking she has 
is mind is an internal dialogue, “the encounter of the self with itself.” Arendt took Socrates 
as her model for thinking, for Socrates exemplified thinking as a dialogue with oneself. Two 
passages from the Gorgias and one from Hippias were central to the account she was 
developing of this internal dialogue and to her efforts to delineate its relationship with 
judgment and conscience.362  
 
In the passages from the Gorgias, Socrates has failed to convince others by reasoned 
arguments but retains an unshaken conviction that he is right even though the whole world 
stands against him. In that context, Arendt reads Socrates as asserting that “it is much better 
to be in disagreement with the whole world than being one [with the whole world] to be in 
disagreement with myself.”363 The possibility of being in disagreement with oneself reveals 
the self to be “two-in-one.” This is true not only in the sense that whatever I do I am at the 
same time aware of doing it, Arendt writes, but also “in the very specific and active sense 
of this silent dialogue… of being on speaking terms.”364 So thinking is an activity of asking 
 
359  Richard J. Bernstein, “Arendt on Thinking,” in Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. D. Villa 
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360 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970), 10. 
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as The Promise of Politics], “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” (1965) and in “Thinking and Moral 
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1974) which formed the basis of her last work, The Life of the Mind (1978), which was unfinished at the time of 
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363 Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 18. 
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and answering in which I converse with myself. To put it another way, thinking is dialogical 
and when thinking I am both the one who asks and the one who answers.365 Given that I 
am two-in-one, I can either be in agreement with myself or disagreement.  
 
Socrates claims it is better for him to be in disagreement with the whole world than to be 
in disagreement with myself, on Arendt’s reading, because “if I disagree with other people, 
I can walk away; but I cannot walk away from myself, and therefore I better first try to be 
in agreement with myself before I take all others into consideration.”366 Arendt makes use 
of a passage from Hippias Major to substantiate this. Socrates tells Hippias, who has proved 
to be unthinking, “how blissfully fortunate” he is to go home and find himself alone, 
perfectly able to live with himself. By comparison, when Socrates returns home, although 
he is alone, he finds he must keep company with a very obnoxious fellow “who always cross-
examines” him.367 And Socrates has to find a way of living in accord with him.  
 
Arendt considers this kind of thinking fundamentally important but not unavoidable. If you 
do not want to start thinking, avoiding that internal dialogue is as simple as making sure 
you never go home and examine things.368 Arendt explains just how straightforward a life 
without thinking would be, about which she writes:  
 
This is not a matter of wickedness or goodness, and it is not a matter of intelligence 
or stupidity. A person who does not know that silent intercourse (in which we examine 
what we say and what we do) will not mind contradicting himself, and this means he 
will never be either able or willing to account for what he says or does; nor will he 
mind committing any crime, since he can count on its being forgotten the next 
moment…. Unthinking men are like sleepwalkers.369  
 
Eichmann was one such sleep-walker, an unthinking man who avoided the self-questioning 
dialogue of conscience.370 For those who are willing to think, engaging in the thought 
process depends upon being able to spend time in your own company, which requires 
 
365 The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think, vol. 1, 185. 
366 Responsibility and Judgment (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 89. 
367 “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” 443.  
368 Ibid., 444; The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think, vol. 1, 190-1. 
369 The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think, vol. 1, 191.  
370 Arendt does not explain how it could be that Eichmann’s conscience was never activated, as he had testified 
that he had followed his conscience. Perhaps she meant that because he was unthinking, his true conscience 
was never activated and that he was in fact perjuring himself when he claimed to have followed his conscience. 
There is nothing to suggest she would have subscribed to the notion of a true conscience or how she would 




solitude. 371 At times Arendt casts this in terms of friendship, for solitude is what makes it 
possible for us to befriend ourselves and this is a precondition of befriending others. She 
writes that “only someone who has had the experience of talking with himself is capable of 
being a friend, of acquiring another self. The condition is that he be of one mind with 
himself, in agreement with himself.” 372  Avoiding self-contradiction is of fundamental 
importance here. A person who contradicts himself undermines his friendships with others 
because somebody who contradicts himself is unreliable.373 So the possibility of acting in a 
way that puts me at odds with myself should provoke me to stop and think.374 
 
In the account Arendt develops, the thought process is a safeguard against doing what is 
wrong, or even a weapon to employ against prevailing norms. Where thinking causes me 
to question whether a given action would put me at odds with myself, the mind’s internal 
dialogue is likely to put limits on what I will do. The desire to avoid internal conflict will 
prevent me from doing certain things, even when everyone around me is doing them. In 
this way, it will enable me to resist certain political evils.375 Arendt holds that a person like 
Hippias, who does not think, “will never be either able or willing to account for what he 
says or does; nor will he mind committing any crime, since he can count on its being 
forgotten the next moment.”376  
Arendt maintains that the Socratic formula, “It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong,” 
should be placed alongside the criterion of having to live with yourself. This generates an 
interior moral principle that can be distinguished from legal ones, because it is indexed only 
to the individual and his own standard: being able to live with himself by avoiding self 
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contradiction.377 The question “What ought I to do?” is thereby clarified by the question 
“What kind of company do I want to keep?”378 She explains:  
The criterion of right and wrong, the answer to the question, what ought I to do? 
depends in the last analysis neither on habits and customs, which I share with those 
around me, nor on a command of either divine or human origin, but on what I 
decide with regard to myself. In other words, I cannot do certain things, because 
having done them I shall no longer be able to live with myself. This living-with-
myself is more than consciousness, more than the self-awareness that accompanies 
me in whatever I do and in whichever state I am. To be with myself and to judge 
by myself is articulated and actualized in the process of thought, and every thought 
process is an activity in which I speak with myself about whatever happens to 
concern me.379 
 
The one waiting for us at the end of the day 
 
In the account Arendt developed from those Socratic texts, conscience is the anticipation 
of the presence of someone who waits for me with reproaches when I come home at the 
end of the day.380 Thinking actualizes the internal dialogue of me and myself which is given 
in consciousness, and it produces conscience as a by-product.381 Therefore, what thinking 
generates is not knowledge but the ability to tell right from wrong.382 The only criterion 
conscience provides, by which I can evaluate my action, is that if I want to be at home with 
myself, then I should act in a way that makes it easier to live with the silent partner within 
me. That means taking care not to do anything that would make it impossible for us to 
maintain harmony. In thinking about my words and deeds, what matters is whether I shall 
be able to live with myself in peace.383 So the inner principle of conscience is “never act in 
a way that afterwards you can no longer be your own friend and enjoy your own company.” 
If what I fear most, or ought to fear most, is the presence of this partner to whom I must 
give an account of my actions, then Socratic conscience is the experience of having a bad 
conscience, for conscience is the experience of contradiction.384  
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In committing oneself to thinking, I am committing myself to staying loyal to what 
conscience, the by-product of thinking, upholds as right and wrong, and taking it upon 
myself to act according to my own standard only.  It is crucial to Arendt that conscience 
does not tell me what to do. What it tells me is “do not contradict yourself,” so that I know, 
“I’d rather suffer than to do that.” While conscience says what to avoid in my dealings with 
others, it gives no positive indications for my conduct. In other words, conscience is empty, 
or formal, in that it has no moral content. Arendt maintains this formalism by insisting that 
conscience does not create values and that “it will not find out, once and for all, what ‘the 
good’ is.”385 While conscience is morally empty, it is still normative on Arendt’s account, 
by virtue of taking harmony with myself as its sole standard for telling right from wrong. 
So, we can still talk of conscience as conditioning us against wrong-doing–and this is what 
is of importance to Arendt–even when all other moral principles have been supplanted.  
 
The total moral collapse of respectable society during the Hitler regime may teach 
us that under such circumstances those who cherish values and hold fast to moral 
norms and standards are not reliable: we now know that moral norms and standards 
can be changed overnight, and that all that then will be left is the mere habit of 
holding fast to something. Much more reliable will be the doubters and skeptics, not 
because skepticism is good or doubting wholesome, but because they are used to 
examine things and to make up their own minds. Best of all will be those who know 
only one thing for certain: that whatever else happens, as long as we live, we shall 
have to live together with ourselves.386 
 
Conscience, so conceived, has the advantage of making us more morally reliable by moving 
us from the position where we say, “I ought not to” (a position which does not prevent us 
from acting against that knowledge) to the position where we say, “I can’t,” and stand firm. 
As one commentator explained, “Arendt became convinced that no one who possessed the 
sort of personal conscience that goes with the habit of thinking would be carried along so 
unquestioningly by the trends of the times, or have fulfilled with such robot-like precision 
the appalling demands of Eichmann’s bureaucratic function.”387 With the connections 
Arendt draws between thinking and conscience, now in place, we can turn to Arendt’s 
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Judging freely, representative judgments and enlarged mentalities 
 
Arendt conceives of conscience as connected not only with thinking but with making moral 
judgments, that is to say, with the judgments about right and wrong that lead to moral 
action. Thinking generates the soundless dialogue of conscience and is what enables us to 
“judge freely.” The thought process, with its continuous questioning, dispenses with 
established criteria. In liberating us from the accepted rules of conduct, it gives us the 
opportunity to judge for ourselves. Arendt characterizes the thought process as liberating 
me to judge freely, by enabling me to form a general opinion by judging on the basis of the 
particular case itself, without the aid of universals388  Piecing together Arendt’s line of 
reasoning, Maurizio D’entreves explains: “It is not that thinking provides judgment with 
new rules for subsuming the particular under the universal. Rather, it loosens the grip of 
the universal over the particular, thereby releasing judgment from ossified categories of 
thought and conventional standards of behavior.”389 Therefore one who thinks will be less 
liable to be carried away by the opinions of the majority.   
With this view of the operation of conscience in mind, judging freely might prevent 
catastrophes in exceptional circumstances. At least in times of crisis when “standards are 
no longer valid anyhow.”390 Arendt clarifies that judging freely “seems to operate only in 
emergencies, in those exceptional moments where individuals, faced with the collapse of 
traditional standards, must come up with new ones and judge according to their own 
autonomous values.”391 Only then does judging freely come to the fore: “When everybody 
is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those who think 
are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is conspicuous.”392  
In addition to judging freely, Arendt also writes of another kind of moral judgment that is 
not restricted to moments of crisis. In this mode of judging, I form an opinion by considering 
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a given issue from different viewpoints, making present to my mind the standpoints of those 
who are absent. I represent those standpoints when I make what she calls a “representative 
judgment.”393 Arendt proposes that representative judgment works in this fashion: “the 
more people’s positions I can make present in my thought and hence take into account in 
my judgment, the more representative it will be.”394   
 
Arendt associates this capacity to judge from the standpoint of everyone else with having 
an “enlarged mentality,” adopting the terminology that Kant used to characterize aesthetic 
judgment in his Third Critique.395  On her account, enlarged thought is best realized 
through discussion and debate. In order to “think from the perspective of everyone else,” 
we need to know how to listen to what others are saying. I can enlarge my perspective by 
listening to as many people as possible, even those whose voices are absent, and dialoguing 
with them, but this requires imagination. I need to be able to imagine how I would feel in 
someone else’s specific situation and to imagine how they might view it.396 She writes that 
there is a need to “train your imagination to go visiting.”397 To go visiting is to think outside 
your own experience. It involves deliberately trying to understand the needs and interests 
of others, by envisioning how they experience the world and by imagining how they might 
perceive your actions. In this way thinking outside your own experiences enlarges your 
mentality. 
 
Arendt’s objective in introducing the idea of having an enlarged mentality is to bring the 
contextual judgment that attends to particulars into alignment with a universal moral 
standpoint. 398  She holds that thinking with an enlarged mentality permits us make 
judgments that are not merely subjective but intersubjective.399  So although judgment 
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depends upon thinking, which is an internal dialogue, thinking also involves putting oneself 
in the place of another to take their perspectives into account.400  
 
Assessing Arendt’s account of conscience 
 
Arendt re-worked conscience by linking it to thinking and judging for oneself. It was her 
attempt to respond to the crimes that Eichmann had perpetrated, supposedly in accord 
with his conscience, as a result of what appeared to be his thoughtlessness and unwillingness 
to judge right from wrong. Reworking the concept of conscience, as she did, was meant to 
emphasize its formalism, in that conscience arose out of dialogical self-reflection as a formal 
principle for maintaining inner harmony. Conscience would not tell you what the good is 
or help you find it. 401  Nevertheless, Arendt also tried to preserve the normativity of 
conscience in that it enjoined acting in such a way as to maintain that inner harmony and 
refuse self-contradiction in one’s thinking, which might put limits on what one would be 
willing to do. Arendt tied thinking and judging together in her account of conscience to 
constrain action in political situations where traditional moral principles had collapsed. 
Heeding my internal dialogue partner to whom I must give an account of my actions would 
enable me to draw independent judgments about right and wrong. As an internal moral 
principle, conscience is meant to be able to move me from the position where I think, “I 
ought not to” to the position where I say definitively, “I can’t” and not be swept along with 
the crowd.  
 
Nevertheless, Arendt’s account is unsatisfactory on three fronts. First, her account of 
conscience is not sufficiently normative and her claim that a principled moral standpoint 
could emerge out of the self’s desire for unity is not persuasive. It is an unwarranted 
assumption that merely spending time with myself thinking and living in my own presence 
will be sufficient to put limits on what I will allow myself to do. Second, Arendt’s depiction 
 
400 Arendt, The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think, vol. 1, 241. Arendt’s work on 
reflective judgment is inconclusive. Some wonder whether Arendt might have used reflective judgment to 
underwrite a universal procedural ethic and then gone on to develop a political ethic. I am not convinced that 
judgment, even enlarged judgment, alone can provide a sufficient political culture to form and sustain 
conscience. A taste of the discussion can be found in: Marguerite La Caze, “The Miraculous Power of 
Forgiveness and the Promise,” in Action and Appearance: Ethics and the Politics of Writing in Hannah Arendt, ed. Anna 
Yeatman, et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2001); Steve Buckler, “Ethics and the Vocation of Politics,” 
Ibid., ed. A. Yeatman, et al. (2011). Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's 
Thought,” 125; Buckler, “Ethics and the Vocation of Politics.” 125. 
401 Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” 445. 
  
133 
of moral acts as intellectual decisions or judgments is not satisfactory. Without having given 
due consideration to the way virtues, character and practices shape our knowledge of what 
is to be done, her conclusion that good people are those who think or who live in harmony 
with themselves fails to convince. Finally, Arendt’s account is predicated on a problematic 
distinction between morality and politics that relegates them to different spheres. Arendt is 
reluctant to give conscience a place in a shared world and pushes it from the public into the 
private sphere denying it any chance to obtain an intersubjective dimension. 
 
Arendt’s account is not sufficiently normative 
 
Arendt formulated conscience as an inner moral principle of harmony, but it remains 
insufficiently normative. There is no reason to think that concern about the company one 
keeps and threat of internal dissonance set sufficient limits on what a person would do. 402 
Kampowski points to the issue at hand by raising the question “What if Eichmann were to 
respond to the charges brought against him that he would not mind living with a 
murderer?” 403  After all, one of Eichmann’s characteristics that Arendt found most 
perplexing was precisely that he seemed at home with himself and claimed to be following 
his conscience, as Benhabib reminds us.404 While Arendt’s account of conscience might 
allow a person’s practical principles to become truly interior, those practical principles may 
still be very wrong.405 Mary McCarthy and Seyla Benhabib are right to question whether 
Arendt has assumed too quickly that a principled moral standpoint could emerge out of the 
self’s desire for unity and consistency.406 Arendt’s theses about thoughtlessness and living 
with oneself do not on their own account for the idea that some ordinary people become 
complicit in evil while others do not.  
 
Part of the problem is that Arendt did not want to work within the framework of morality 
based on norms. Universal norms and traditional moral imperatives were far from stable 
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on her view, and the events of the thirties and forties had witnessed to this.407 Arendt 
frequently observed that “almost overnight and with scarcely any resistance the traditional 
commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’ was transformed into a new imperative, ‘Thou shalt 
kill for the sake of the Fuḧrer.’”408 Not only had the traditional moral commands and 
traditional moral imperatives given way, they had been replaced “with hardly more trouble 
than it would take to change the table manners of an individual or a people.”409 Far better, 
then, to proceed without bannisters. 
 
Arendt also distrusted traditional moral imperatives, because it seemed to her that what 
people believed to be true regarding God, the good and human nature had little impact on 
what they actually do. She claimed that what was of most importance was that people acted 
right, not that people believed the right things. As she wrote, “knowledge of ultimates about 
God or man or moral truths–can easily remain external to the person and his deeds, so that 
it does not immediately influence a person’s behavior; it does not as such keep someone 
from committing evil.”410 For that reason she held, as Kampowski put it, that “if ‘ultimates’ 
are necessary to prevent moral catastrophes, we are heading for disaster.”411 
 
Arendt is therefore wary of traditional morality, with its universal norms that could be 
applied to individual concrete cases, because she believed norms where neither stable, nor 
God-given. Moreover, norms were too extrinsic to effectively guide conduct. Arendt 
maintains that we must act and judge without divine commandments or the guarantee of 
divinely underwritten moral rules that will determine our judgments unfailingly. The task 
is to think, judge and act without such supports. This is how Canovan depicts Arendt’s 
position:  
 
She was convinced that religious authority no longer existed and that philosophy 
could not fill its place. In this situation, the danger of moral nihilism was immense, 
but it did not seem to her to be inescapable.… Authority as a concept and as an 
institution had had a beginning (in Roman political experience) as well as an end in 
 
407 Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” 52. 
408 Bernstein draws this from some of her unpublished letters, but Arendt frequently discussed the overnight 
collapse of self-evident principles and moral commands. See: Ibid., 50. “Thinking and Moral Considerations: 
A Lecture,” 436; Bernstein, “Arendt on Thinking,” 284; Arendt, The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking 
Investigation on How We Think, vol. 1, 177. 
409 “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” 43. The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We 
Think, vol. 1, 177. 
410“Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” 78. 
411 Kampowski, Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in 
Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine, 109. 
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the twentieth century. This meant that although it might be very difficult to manage 
without authoritative traditions and rules, human beings had done this before.… 
Arendt took comfort from the fact that since action and judgment had been possible 
before the establishment of the great Western trinity of religion, tradition and 
authority, these same human capacities must still be available after its collapse.412  
 
Arendt argued that we could still develop the capacity to judge, even if we do not have rules 
handed down from on high, by learning to judge particulars without subsuming them to 
general rules. Thinking liberates judgment by clearing a space. The Socratic dialogue that 
I carry on with myself, when I think, challenges rules that are assumed to be true and clears 
a space by removing the primary obstacle to apprehending the particulars of concrete cases: 
the rules and values that are taken as given. Kampowski indicates that here Arendt sees a 
“danger involved with people being so used to simply applying universal rules to concrete 
cases that they begin to care more about having rules than about what these rules actually 
say.”413 So in order for “the particular to become real to him, a person needs to liberate 
himself form the sway of the universal–taken to be unexamined opinions, values, or norms–
which may blur the particular’s realness for him.”414  As Arendt saw it, universals are 
abstract entities detached from reality that “are to be respected because they are the rules 
and not because they are protecting a specific concrete good.”415 Rather than relying on 
universals, Arendt proposed that we attend to particulars, arguing that it was better to 
dispense with universals and focus on concrete reality. “The best we can do is to make 
judgments on the basis of the situation we find ourselves in, trying not to allow our judgment 
to be distorted by maxims and rules that are not appropriate.”416   
 
Arendt’s distrust of traditional morality with its universal norms leads her to invest all of 
conscience’s normativity in the inner principle of harmony and to the act of judging what 
to do in any particular context without norms or principles to guide those judgments. This 
displacement of the normative dimension in Arendt’s account of conscience is disturbing. 
To some, it makes conscience sound self-interested.417 Others worry that “the thinking 
 
412 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought.173-4 
413 Kampowski, Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in 
Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine, 121. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid., 123. 
416 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 189. 
417 Katab understands Arendt to be saying that what founds or justifies the norm, “Thou shall not kill” is 
nothing other than the pain of self-reproach. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (Lanham: 
Rowman & Allanheld, 1987), 101-3. 
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attitude cannot prescribe any concrete measures regarding particular courses of action, and 
that the best it can provide is a general, vague even, sense of openness and respect for 
humanity.”418 Arendt fails to make the case that spending time thinking in solitude would 
be sufficient to put limits on what I will allow myself to do. 
 
Arendt’s account does not consider the role of character and virtue  
 
Arendt’s account of conscience is premised on the idea that “thinking makes us moral.”419 
But thinking in and of itself does not seem sufficient to explain why some people choose 
good over evil and others do not. Arendt does not consider how having strengths and 
weaknesses and certain dispositions of character might shape an individual’s moral 
judgments; she dismisses virtues and habits as if they restrained the will’s capacity for 
freedom and spontaneity.420 Because Arendt was unable to see moral acts as anything other 
than intellectual decisions, she did not entertain “the alternative hypothesis that 
Eichmann’s failure may have been one of lack of feeling (empathy) rather than lack of 
thinking.”421 To put it differently, thoughtlessness might be more often the result of vice 
than the cause of it, as Kampowski suggests. 422 A theory of conscience which factors in the 
role the virtues and vices play in moral knowledge is in a better position to account for the 
phenomena of thoughtlessness. In depicting conscience as an interiorized moral principle, 
Arendt construes the central question of morality as a matter of who we wish to be and with 
whom we wish to spend our lives. Yet I cannot ask what kind of person I wish to be 
independently of the question of my character and disposition. As Kampowski reminds us, 
“How we perceive practical matters depends on who we are, and who we are depends not 
only on the capacity of our minds but also on the presence or absence of virtuous 
dispositions.… In the same way in which the virtues sharpen our view of the good, so the 
vices can dim it to the point of making us completely blind to it.”423 
 
 
418 Deirdre L. Mahony, Hannah Arendt’s Ethics (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 106.  
419 Ibid., 209. 
420 Arendt seems to think that virtues and habits would limit possibilities for natality. Suzanne D. Jacobitti, 
“Thinking About the Self,” in Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, ed. Larry May and Jerome Kohn (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1996), 207. 
421 Arne Johan Vetlesen, “Hannah Arendt on Conscience and Evil,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 27, no. 5 
(2001): 9. 
422 Kampowski, Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in 
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Arendt’s failure to see moral acts as anything other than intellectual decisions is especially 
glaring, because she so clearly understood that totalitarianism took hold not because of the 
acceptance of certain ideas but because of the establishment of certain practices. 424 
Nevertheless, she does not consider the way virtue, character, and stable dispositions might 
influence our knowledge of what is to be done or affectively dispose us towards the good. 
Nor does she explore how they shape the way conscience is formed and exercised. Without 
some consideration of virtue or character, it is very hard for her to show that good people 
are those who think. All she can do is “guide us to the conclusion that the good among us 
are those to whom evil is intuitively unthinkable and who therefore lack the capacity to 
become complicit in it. And the basis of the distinction between these virtuous few and the 
rest of us remains enigmatic and impenetrable.”425  
 
It is not that Arendt has nothing to say about the virtues, because she certainly esteems 
courage and gratitude, even if she does not see them as virtues,426 or that she has nothing 
to say about practices, as she singles out promise-making and forgiveness for having 
particular significance, even if she does not see them as practices.427  My point is that the 
virtues and practices that matter to Arendt–courage, gratitude, promise-making and 
forgiveness–are those which she identifies as features of the public realm.428  These moral 
precepts are appropriate to political action to the extent that they create favorable 
conditions for people to live together in the world, reflecting her hope in the world’s 
plurality, and that they create favorable conditions for people to begin human relations 
anew, reflecting her hope in the world’s natality.  Arendt explains: 
 
 In so far as morality is more than the sum total of mores, of customs and standards 
of behavior solidified through tradition and valid on the ground of agreements, both 
of which change with time, it has, at least politically, no more to support itself than 
the good will to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to 
be forgiven, to make promises and to keep them. These moral precepts are the only 
ones that are not applied to action from the outside, from supposedly higher faculty 
or from experiences outside action’s own reach. They arise, on the contrary, directly 
out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking.429  
 
 
424 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 23.  
425 Mahony, Hannah Arendt’s Ethics, 208. 
426 Arendt sees courage is a sentiment and gratitude is a principle.  
427 Arendt views promise-making and forgiveness as principles.  
428 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition: Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 22-78.  
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Arendt’s belief is that the only precepts appropriate to politics are the ethical practices, 
principles and considerations which emerge from within the activity of politics itself, not 
those that are derived from supposedly eternal principles.430 The issue here is that Arendt 
sees morality and politics as two distinct spheres, and it is of importance to her that the 
former does not impinge on the later.431 But having cordoned off the sphere of morality 
from the sphere of politics, Arendt is left without the resources to explore how social and 
political practices (and institutions) shape moral decisions, and she is left without the means 
to say how ethical consideration might guide and constrain political actions–the exception 
being the limit that individual conscience might place on one’s behavior in exceptional 
political circumstances. To put it plainly, Arendt’s conception of conscience is seriously 
weakened because it is abstracted from political ethics. 
 
Arendt’s account banishes conscience from the city 
 
Arendt’s treatment of conscience is embedded in a set of distinctions designed to separate 
morality and politics, as she sees moral standards of conduct and political standards of 
conduct belonging to wholly different spheres.432 Although personal morality and political 
action are both informed by principles, goodness and political action exclude each other. 
Personal morality is concerned with relations between private persons or with the relation 
of a person to himself; political action is concerned with the public world. In the moral 
realm individuals follow the silent prompts of conscience which issue non-negotiable 
demands, whereas in the political realm a plurality of actors argues about what is to be 
done. If the political realm is characterized by the life of the world and by action in it, then 
the sphere of the moral realm is characterized by the life of the mind and the solitude that 
thinking requires. Morality is motivated by concern for the self and its integrity, whereas 
politics depends upon assuming shared responsibility. The focus of morality is the good 
man while the focus of politics is the good citizen.  
 
430 Dana Villa, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Villa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 14. 
431 On Arendt’s determination to keep morality out of politics, see Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, 
Evil. Kampowski, Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in 
Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine. Buckler, “Ethics and the Vocation of Politics.” Francis X. Winters, “The 
Banality of Virtue: Reflections on Hannah Arendt’s Reinterpretation of Political Ethics,” in Amor Mundi: 
Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt, ed. James W. Bernauer (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1987). Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship (Chicago: 
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Having drawn a line between personal morality and politics, Arendt places the Socratic 
proposition on one side (“It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong”) and its political 
response on the other (“What is important in the world is that there be no wrong…. Never 
mind who suffers it; your duty is to prevent it.”)433 Conscience, whether it is conceived along 
Christian or Socratic lines, must be kept in the sphere of personal morality.434 Arendt holds 
that Christian conscience does not belong in the sphere of the public world, because it 
speaks the voice of the law which shows me the way leading beyond the world. To use 
Arendt’s often quoted phrase, Christian conscience, and the caritas it engenders, make “a 
desert of the world.”435  Arendt holds that Socratic conscience does not belong in the sphere 
of the public world either because its sole criterion, “I must not act in any way that makes 
it difficult to live with myself,” also puts the focus on the self and its integrity. In both 
conceptions, she saw the concern of conscience to be the individual, his inner world of ideas 
and experiences and the solitude he required for introspection.  Conscience in both 
conceptions pulls us away from concerns about the affairs of the world and weakens our 
commitment to it. It provides no motivation to get outside of ourselves and no motivation 
to engage with the others. As such, conscience is incapable of promoting solidarity. 
Construing conscience in this way drains it of any political power it might have obtained.436 
Arendt’s description of a person of conscience helps explain why she separated conscience 
and politics:  
 
He is characteristically interested only in not doing wrong, in not transgressing 
certain limits. In the absence of atrocity or its possibility, he remains inactive. As a 
citizen, he rarely acts; and when he acts, all he does is say no, and then carry through 
on that response as economically as possible. Withdrawing from wrongdoing, he 
does not organize resistance to it.437   
 
As Arendt sees him, the person of conscience is primarily interested in avoiding the taint of 
wrong; he is not “interested in the world where the wrong is committed or in the 
consequences the wrong will have for the future course of the world.”438  In a liberal 
democracy, following conscience might motivate you to be a good person by keeping clear 
of wrong-doing, but it would not motivate you to be a good citizen, who worked to prevent 
 
433 “Collective Responsibility,” 153. 
434 For a close examination of her discussion of Christian absolute morality and Socratic absolute morality, 
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the wrong that others might suffer. Arendt criticized the mindset that sought to obtain 
exemption from society’s ills instead of improving conditions in society, arguing that this is 
the consciousness of a moral purist not a political activist.439 As long as a person believes 
his only obligation is to be true to his own subjective sense of right and wrong, his conscience 
will “not say, with Thomas Jefferson, ‘I tremble for my country’…because it trembles for 
the individual self and its integrity.”440  
 
Having separated morality and politics and situated conscience on the side of private 
revelation rather than on the side of political action, Arendt can treat conscience as largely 
irrelevant within functioning liberal democracies. She sought to persuade Americans that 
they should not dissent on the basis of conscience but instead exercise a right to public 
dissent by participating in civil disobedience. She argued that the civil disobedience 
practiced during the Civil Rights Movement and in the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations 
constituted genuine political action, because citizens were making a concerted effort to act 
on questions of public interest. They were meeting their obligations as citizens by consulting 
others (engaging in dialogue and discussion) about their shared responsibilities and not 
simply consulting their consciences privately. 441  Arendt argued that Socrates and his 
American heir, Thoreau, modelled individual conscience not civil disobedience. Canovan 
explains that “like Socrates, who believed that to suffer wrong was better than to do it, 
Thoreau refused to be a party to injustice, and was prepared to accept the old adage about 
letting justice be done even if the world perishes.” 442  In comparison these dissidents 
engaged in civil disobedience were genuine political actors, who intervened in public life 
through joint public violation of the laws in order to change the life of the community.443 
Arendt argued that when conscientious objectors reduced their moral intervention to the 
assertion of an individual will, their dissent from the current moral order amounts to little 
more than tacit consent. 
 
 
439 She summed up the political function of conscience, by calling it “the ethics of impotence” in her “New 
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participation in revolutionary council governments.  
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Arendt was opposed to attempts to complicate the distinctions she drew between the moral 
and political spheres. She argued that the motivations, concerns and experiences that 
pertained to the moral sphere were, by nature, private ones that could not be admitted into 
the political sphere. That is not simply because she considered them inappropriate to a 
political context. In a public context, they also have the potential to be destructive. Arendt 
sees the life of goodness and virtue, with its moral demands, as liable to cause people to 
neglect the priorities of politics. Canovan explains: “The greatest temptation for those 
recoiling from radical evil was to retreat into personal relations, where morality seemed 
relatively clear, and to take one’s political cues from there. But attempts to publicize and 
generalize private experiences could be disastrous, because personal morality, concerned 
with one’s relation to one’s self and to one’s neighbors, did not include concerns for the 
establishment and survival of sound political institutions, which alone could stand against 
totalitarianism.”444 It is not just that conscience is self-interested.445 The danger is that 
conscience is prone to single-track thinking and, as Canovan says, “in the absence of 
genuinely pluralistic public discourse we can neither have a firm grip on reality nor any 
guarantee of political sanity.”446 But by purging morality from politics and politics from 
morality, Arendt denied conscience any way of surmounting its personal nature or of 
challenging single-track thinking, for conscience without a social or political dimension is 
conscience without an intersubjective dimension. In Hegel’s terminology, there is no scope 
for mutual recognition.   
 
This lack of mutual recognition is disappointing for two reasons. First it is disappointing 
because of the central place Arendt gives to human plurality and its implications, for 
instance that “human affairs are in constant flux from the continual irruption of new 
initiatives and new ideas; it means that each individual is unique, and suffers the consequent 
pathos of morality…being plural, human beings can gather to form a space amongst 
themselves, and in that space can see their common world from different points of view and 
therefore talk about their common affairs.”447 Second, it is disappointing because Arendt 
explored various forms of solipsism and rejected them. Yeatman brings this to the fore in 
her study of the individual in Arendt’s thought: “[she] holds that the activity of thinking 
requires a human to withdraw from immersion in worldly practices and relationships–
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thereby creating a space within which to think undisturbed by worldly ties–but not only 
does she insist that such withdrawal is only relative and partial, she refuses to accept the 
proposition that it is in the process of inner retreat that a person finds his own true being, 
his individuality.”448 Mutual recognition could have illuminated the connections between 
individual morality to politics and the connection between inner plurality and worldly 
plurality.449 
 
Arendt does allow that there are some situations in which the voice of conscience can have 
some public relevance, but restricts them to political emergencies.450 Arendt terms these 
political emergencies “boundary situations” following Karl Jasper, and describes them as 
“times of crisis when, so to speak, we find ourselves with our back against the wall.”451 In 
those extreme situations when the mores of the day become distorted and one is asked to 
do something that one simply could not live with, would one have an excuse for not 
participating in politics. Then, and only then, conscience does become vital. Arendt says 
that “when everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes 
in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join in is conspicuous 
and thereby becomes a kind of action.”452 This action might then provide a safeguard 
against political evil, but as we have seen, only to a limited degree. And this is because, 
“those who say ‘I can’t’ when the chips are down are ‘neither heroes nor saints,’ and if they 
become martyrs, which of course may happen, it happens against their will. In the world, 
moreover, where power counts, they are impotent.”453 Canovan explains: 
 
What gave her message urgency was the conviction that whereas good men would 
be martyred rather than participate in the horrors of totalitarianism, only good 
citizens could have prevented it in the first place.… She recognized that once 
totalitarianism was in place, it might well be that no place remained for citizenship, 
and that retreat into as much personal integrity as one could salvage was the best 
one could do.… She emphasized that it is only in extreme situations that this retreat 
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into personal integrity is unquestionably appropriate and was anxious that her 
overall message of the duty of citizenship should not be diluted by it.454   
 
The upshot of separating morality from politics is that conscience is “thereby exiled from 
the genuine life of the city” as Francis Winters wrote.455 He goes on to describe Arendt’s 
political philosophy as having the effect of turning politics into a walled city and conscience 
into a refugee:  
 
Politics, in her definite reconstruction, is an enclosed city, man’s habitat. Truth and 
conscience are recognized as neighbors, affecting the city indirectly, by maintaining 
their own secure borders where the city many not expand. The space for change in 
the human condition, the realm of freedom, is not unlimited but is bordered by the 
imperatives of truth and morality. But these neighbors, however honored, remain 
aliens to the city. Their only power, beyond definition, is negation: they may refuse 
to join the life of the city if invited, but they are allowed themselves no initiative.456  
 
 
Christian love and politics 
 
Love, for reasons of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and 
separates us from others…. Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this 
reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical, but anti-political, perhaps the 
most powerful of all anti-political human forces.457  
 
Arendt explores many facets of love in her dissertation on Love and Saint Augustine (Der 
Liebsbegriff bei Augustin), which I have touched upon earlier in their connection to her reading 
of Christian conscience,458 but she also thought about love in On Totalitarianism,459 and 
returned to it in The Human Condition as well.460 There is not sufficient space here to treat 
the reasons why her reading of Christian love in Augustine went so badly wrong in the 
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dissertation,461 or to detail the ways in which her understanding of Augustine had changed 
by the time she wrote On Totalitarianism, or even to do more than touch upon her later efforts 
to theorize a counter-point to amor dei: amor mundi, a form of friendship which was to be the 
central virtue of active citizenship and what enables genuine political action. 
 
What I want to point to here is one serious problem with her assessment of Christian love, 
encapsulated in her claim that love is unpolitical, a claim that is tied into her separation of 
ethics and politics. For Arendt’s view was that caritas, like conscience, had no genuine place 
in the political arena. On her reading, caritas was something private, worldless and 
destructive of solidarity; therefore, it threatened to render political action impotent. As Eric 
Gregory pointed out, Arendt was unable to see Christian love as anything but misdirected 
or misplaced.462  She viewed love “solely in terms of sentimental benevolence”; it was 
concerned “with the integrity of the self and with the neighbor’s good–so it leads either to 
inwardness or intimacy.”463 So love too would be banished from public spaces. With this 
final backward glance at the lengths Arendt went to for the sake of defending political action 
from any subordination to ethical or religious concerns, we can now turn to Gillian Rose’s 
identification of the re-emergence of the beautiful soul, with which this chapter began. 
 
Hegel contra Arendt 
 
At an Oxford Symposium on the beginning of the Polish administration of the site and 
museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Rose proposed that treatments of conscience which 
abstract an individual’s moral judgment from the institutions that play a role in the 
formation or “socialization” of moral judgment, as Arendt does, undermine moral identity 
and moral agency. Exhibitions at Auschwitz which invite visitors to ask of themselves, 
“Could I have done this?” are thus misleading because they suggest that conscience is a 
single, weighty decision that changes everything. Separating conscience from the social and 
political institutions that shape it has the result of directing far too much attention to 
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462 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship, 208. 
463 Ibid., 208, 17. 
  
145 
conscience as a form of moral decision-making and not giving enough consideration to the 
conversations that hinder and help us in envisioning the real moral possibilities in front of 
us. Arendt’s thesis that “modernity made the Holocaust possible because its prevalent 
socialization–bureaucratic, technological, instrumentally-rational–robs us of moral 
autonomy and responsibility” is simply not helpful Rose contends, because it does not tell 
the full story.464 What is more, it obscures the “far more difficult thought”: 
  
That it is the very opposition between morality and legality–between inner, 
autonomous “conscience”, and outer, heteronomous institutions–that depraves us. 
Simultaneous possession of inner freedom and outer unfreedom means that the 
border where cognitive activity and normative passivity become cognitive passivity 
and normative activity is changeable and obscure. There is a diremption in our 
agency and in our institutions, which any call to post-natural ethics (Levinas, 
Fackenheim or Bauman) will reinforce in its imaginary transcendence. To provoke 
a child or an adult who visits the “site” of Auschwitz not only to identify herself in 
infinite pain with “the victims”, but to engage in intense self-questioning: “Could I 
have done this?” would be to reinforce the same conscience-stricken Innerlichkeit that 
counts for one half of this diremptions in our socialization. Exhibitions at Auschwitz, 
which are at present divided, lamentably and apparently unnegotiably, into 
“national” pavilions, might instead instantiate discussion “How easily could we have 
allowed this to be carried out?” Are we Germans “or” Polish Jews “or” Polish 
peasants? This might contribute to a chance in awareness and a questioning of our 
sentimentality as modern citizens, protected in all “innocence” by the military might 
of the modern state. For, in modern dirempted polities, it is the relation between 
different oppositions–innocence and might, authority and force–between the inner 
and outer boundaries of our self-identity and lack of self-identity that turns us into 
strangers to ourselves as moral agents and as social actors.465 
 
 
Against these Auschwitz exhibitions and against Arendt’s construal of conscience as a limit 
that might preserve moral sanity, Rose argued that conscience is less a question of whether 
you would stand up when a totalitarian leader comes to power and more a question about 
what you had been doing up until that point. To focus on the singular decision of 
autonomous conscience for or against heteronomous institutions, as Arendt does, is to fail 
to see the way the practices of institutional life inculcate virtues and vices that shape what 
decisions actually come before conscience and its moral vision. In opposing individual 
conscience and social institutions, Arendt also misses what Rose called in her talk at the 
symposium “the border where cognitive activity and normative passivity become cognitive 
 
464 Gillian Rose, Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 35. 
465 Ibid., 35-6. 
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passivity and normative activity.”466 This border or boundary is the site where one set of 
meanings or representations is most prone to turn into the opposite term against which it is 
defined. The problem is that such oppositions cannot be thought apart or together. 
 
Rose’s critique, which could be called “Hegel contra Arendt,” is spelled out more fully in 
The Broken Middle. There Rose argues Arendt is getting lost in the oppositions she relies on 
when she separates conscience from social and political institutions, inner freedom from 
outer freedom, innocence from force, love from law, the individual from the modern state. 
Rose sees these separations as indicative of Arendt’s failure to appreciate in her work on 
modern life that modernity is not a project; modernity is diremptive.467 “Diremptive” is the 
way Roses characterizes neo-Kantian philosophy which has separated law from an 
uninvestigated transcendent which authorizes it. As Lloyd explains it, a diremption takes 
place when there is “an evasion of the investigation of the law itself.”468 By “law” Rose 
means: 
 
the falling towards or away from mutual recognition, the triune relationship, the 
middle, formed or deformed by reciprocal self-relations. The law, therefore, in its 
actuality means full mutual recognition, “spirit” or ethical life, but it can only be 
approached phenomenologically as it appears to us, modern legal persons, by 
expounding its dualistic reductions, when it is posited as modern legal status–the law 
of subjective rights separated from the law of the modern state.469  
 
Law then, is mutual recognition, and, as Rowan Williams adds: “Law is what reason serves: 
the possibility, always present and always lost or to be lost, of a universal mutual ‘inhabiting’ 
of particular consciousnesses.”470  Rose’s assessment of Arendt is that Arendt has separated 
the terms of ethical life “so that ‘love’–discursive, friendly, saintly, agapic, aporetic, 
political–is opposed to ‘the law’–the world, the city of man.” What is more, Arendt focuses 
on love at the expense of law, in generating apolitical readings of Christian love and of 
conscience. There is simply not enough mutual recognition in Arendt’s portrayal of 
Augustine’s Christian community, which is social not political and thus lawless as if it were 
 
466 Ibid., 35. 
467 The Broken Middle, 240. 
468 Vincent Lloyd, “On the Use of Gillian Rose,” Heythrop Journal 48, no. 5 (2007): 701. 
469 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 75. 
470 Rowan D. Williams, “‘The Sadness of the King’: Gillian Rose, Hegel, and the Pathos of Reason,” Telos 
173, Winter (2015): 25. 
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a “sociality of the saints.” Likewise, there is not enough mutual recognition in Arendt’s 
portrayal of the conjoined operation of thinking, conscience and judgment. 
 
Rose sees these separations as both valorizations and denigrations of ethical life, which are 
exposed in Kierkegaard, Hegel and Weber’s treatments of the Reformation. She finds that 
their writings: 
 
all uncover the inversions of instituted meaning attendant on a culture which has 
separated religion and politics since the origin of Christianity; which has subordinated 
religion to politics since the Reformation; which has “emancipated” religion into civil 
society since the early nineteenth century, and has, effectively, delivered politics to 
“religion,” dissipating both in subjectivity. Under such conditions, every meaning or 
representation is prone to turn into its contrary. Partial in origin yet holistic in 
ambition, every meaning is equally implicated in the meaning against which it is 
defined; infected with institutions it seeks to eschew: individual inwardness inverted 
into the ruthlessness of social institutions, or lack of inwardness colluding in new 
tyrannies.471  
 
Separating religion and politics is deeply problematic because it leads to the inversion of 
institutions and inversions of intentions.  That was the lesson Hegel tried to teach in 
recounting the story of the beautiful soul, which Rose offers back to Arendt.  Rose sees 
Arendt representing this changing relation of religion and politics during a particular 
diremption of state and civil society in Germany, namely, the transition from Social 
Democracy to totalitarian rule.472 At that juncture, Arendt’s writing makes a distinction 
“between the aporetic individual at the mercy of incalculable agape and the public political 
world of equals.”473  This is how Arendt appears phenomenologically as the beautiful soul: 
 
While the beautiful soul withdraws herself from the world by repulsing it and 
retreating from it, the hard heart remains in the world but survives by retreating 
from and repulsing the other in judgment–judgment of hypocrisy–the self-conscious 
disparity between declaring universal duty yet living particular inner being, which 
is itself hypocritical in appealing to its own law and also failing to act–making duty 
a mere matter of words. This judgment, exalted into a culture, would eliminate 
barbarism–of evil, of hypocrisy, of “banality” of evil.474 
 
471 Rose, The Broken Middle, 164. 
472 Ibid., 155. 
473 Ibid., 216. 
474 Ibid., 237. 
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There is some irony in Arendt’s presenting the beautiful soul, given her antipathy towards 
interiority, romantic isolation and any permanent withdrawal from public life, which she 
shunned early on in her study of Rahel Vahargen.475 Nevertheless, Arendt’s rejection of 
inwardness, her discounting the inner life’s connection with outer existence and plurality,476 
and her representation of the beautiful soul is but another inversion that follows the 
separation of morality and politics, based on the distinction she makes between what is 
private and what is public. Arendt succumbs to the temptation to cultivate a beautiful soul 
most clearly when she separates love from the city and when she separates the individual 
judging conscience from the political labor of mutual recognition. 477   Judgment so 
conceived cannot acknowledge its identity with the action it so harshly judges. It 
hypocritically slides back into the nobility of the judging self, revealing the kind of ethical 
posture we see in the diremption of the acting and judging conscience Hegel depicted. This 
diremption calls forth the hard-hearted hypocrite:  
Love “and” the state cannot be thought apart or together.... While the beautiful soul 
withdraws herself from the world by repulsing it and retreating from it, the hard 
heart remains in the world but survives by retreating from and repulsing the other 
in judgment–judgment of hypocrisy–the self-conscious disparity between declaring 
universal duty yet living particular inner being, which is itself hypocritical in 
appealing to its own law and also failing to act–making duty a mere matter of words. 
This judgment, exalted into a culture, would eliminate barbarism–of evil, of 
hypocrisy, of “banality” of evil. It affirms the “infinity of opinions” so that “going 
astray with Plato” is taken to mean opting for the charm of Plato’s person in 
preference to whatever truth is chanced upon by his opponents. This interpretation 
reduces the difficulty of truth to opinion, universal and person–This judging and 
talking is, therefore, what is true and invincible, while it overpowers everything; it 
is solely with this alone that one has truly to do with in this actual world. If absolute 
freedom removes the antithesis between universal and individual will so that the 
world may be destroyed, absolute judgment–judgment made omnipotent–would 
result in universal hypocrisy: for there is no truth, no universal, to be acknowledged, 
but only the dissolving play of opinions from which knowledge and truth and the 
risk of staking oneself for the sake of something transcendent and uncertain are 
banished. Absolute judgment would become absolute perversion as dynamic but 
suppressed knowledge must masquerade as opinion, and so appears as universal 
deception of itself and others. Can this be the sociality of the saints?478 
 
475 Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess.  
476 Yeatman, “Individuality and Politics: Thinking with and Beyond Hannah Arendt.” 
477 Rose, The Broken Middle, 237-38. Rose points out that some of Arendt’s early writing (for instance On 
Totalitarianism) did a better job of exploring love and law simultaneously, without setting them in opposition 
to each other and dirempting them. 
478 Ibid., 237.  
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This is a temptation Arendt succumbs to whenever she demotes caritas and elevates absolute 
judgment, rather than thinking through the contradictions between the individual will and 
the universal, or the contradictions between fascism and representation, as Rose put it in 
another essay. 479  Had Arendt in representing the beautiful soul’s judging conscience 
exposed rather than disowned our mutual implication in cultural and political practices that 
threaten to undo us, then the Hard Heart of the Judging Conscience could have broken 
open in mutual recognition, as Hegel showed. Breaking the dialectic would have required 
a strong moral motivation, the amor dei that animated Augustine and the communion of 
saints, a stronger one than Arendt was prepared to entertain.  
Rose’s identification of the beautiful soul is so interesting because it indicates why this 
happens again and again in this secular age. It dramatizes the real struggles involved in 
setting aside ordinary goods to act for the good of all (even in posing the question, “What 
ought I to do?”) and it shows why fascism, the assertion of enraged particularity, continues 
to re-emerge in the mundane and ordinary.480 At the end of the day, what Rose contributes 
to all projects of re-working conscience is this analysis: “Politics does not happen when you 
act on behalf of your own damaged good, but when you act, without guarantees, for the 
good of all–this is to take the risk of the universal interest.”481 
Conclusion 
When Eichmann testified in his own defense that he had always followed his conscience, 
the traditional understanding of conscience become untenable for Hannah Arendt. This 
chapter examined her attempt to overcome the problem of conscience by building upon a 
Socratic ethic and reconceptualizing conscience as an inner principle, connected to 
thinking and judging. Nevertheless, re-working conscience in this fashion left her tangled 
up in almost as many conceptual knots as the traditional understanding had. Arendt’s 
efforts to re-conceptualize conscience are premised on a distinction she made between what 
is private and what is public, between what is moral and what is political. Conscience, 
goodness, and love were relegated to the private realm, whereas respect, friendship and 
judgment were fitted to the political realm.  
 
479 Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation, 41-62. 
480 Ibid., 54. That should read “the representation of Fascism and the fascism of representation,” to be true 
to Rose’s meaning.  
481 Ibid., 62. 
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In maintaining those separations, Arendt robbed conscience of a shared world where it 
could have been shaped by goods held in common, and where mutual recognition might 
have been possible. In creating those separations, she also reduced conscience to a 
judgment, an offshoot of the thinking process, without a shared world where the moral 
terrain is apprehended through certain dispositions and habits. The problem of conscience 
is that it is both formal and normative; however, Arendt’s efforts maintained only the formal 
procedure of conscience as encapsulated in the question “what must I do to be able to live 
with myself?” If this formal procedure of conscience is to be normative then it also needs 
social existence and public practices with which it can communicate and instantiate its 
claim to be about the good. When conscience is placed in the private sphere separated from 
those historical, social and cultural practices, it falls apart and the consciousness of the 
beautiful soul re-emerges. Gillian Rose shows us how easily this happens in secular 





























This thesis has argued that the problem of conscience is that its formalism always has the 
potential to undermine its purported morality. The beautiful soul stands as a salutary 
warning that if we want to ensure the formal procedure of conscience is in fact normative, 
conscience needs to be considered in light of the social existence and public practices that 
it can use to communicate and instantiate its claim to be about the good. The morality of 
conscience is undermined whenever conscience is placed in the private sphere separated 
from those historical, social and cultural practices. It is also undermined when conscience 
is treated as a single-weighty decision instead of being assessed in terms the virtues, habits 
and dispositions that have shaped what decisions come before conscience. In both 
circumstances, conscience falls apart and the consciousness of the beautiful soul re-emerges.  
Gillian Rose shows us how easily this occurs in secular modernity. 
 
Taylor’s analysis of life in the immanent frame allowed us to see why we continue to fall 
back on the discourse of conscience, despite risking the fate of the beautiful soul. Life in the 
immanent frame is characterized by malaise (contestability, cross-pressures, fragilization, 
optionality), which indicate that modern culture is for all its secularity restless at the barriers 
of the human sphere and that we need a political ethic with a firmer basis than altruism can 
provide.  Taylor argues that we are all–traditional religious, spiritual, atheist alike–liberals, 
in that we all elect to spin the immanent frame in a particular way, whether we view it as 
open to the transcendent or as closed. As both open and closed views of the modern moral 
order’s immanent frame require a leap of faith, Taylor issued an invitation to try to inhabit 
an open stance. A number of scholars have taken up that challenge and  work is underway 
to develop a political ethic with a firmer basis than altruism provides. There is much interest 
in exploring how agape can frame the conditions of living in pluralistic liberal 
democracies.482 
 
482 Recent to  contributions to this conversation in political theology include: Luke Bretherton, Christ and 
the Common Life: Political Theology and the Case for Democracy (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
2019); Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship; Timothy 
P. Jackson, Political Agape: Christian Love and Liberal Democracy (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 
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If we take an open stance to sources that transcend the self, then conscience begins to 
acquire certain distinctive features. This chapter focuses on what those features are, and it 
does so in service to those who are restless at the barriers of the human sphere. First, it 
considers conscience as a learned discourse about moral decision-making, which is a form 
of human agency and is capable of formation and deformation. It then looks at conscience 
as dependent upon self-knowledge and realism about the world. Finally, it delineates what 
authority conscience can be said to have and clarifies how decisions of conscience differ 
from other moral decisions.  By drawing upon the theological perspective of Rowan 
Williams and others, these features of conscience are thrown into sharp relief. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to see what sort of starting place these theological features offer 
for re-conceptualizing conscience. A new starting place is needed because in much of the 
popular literature, conscience is still taken as self-explanatory or as having common sense 
meaning, even by scholars who acknowledge conscience to be beset with problems 
(linguistic and otherwise); therefore, conscience has not been thoroughly interrogated as a 
theological concept. Drawing out the distinctive features of conscience in this chapter is 
therefore a necessary and important prolegomenon to re-conceptualizing conscience in 
theological terms.   
 
Conscience is a discourse about decision-making 
 
At one time or another, we have all been told to “search your conscience” or “consult your 
conscience” or “follow your conscience.” Expressions such as these can be misleading in 
that they contain the suggestion that conscience is some sort of repository of right answers 
to questions about what I ought to do or that it is a catalogue of rules for behavior that can 
be consulted when I am unsure about how to judge or carry out an action. Conscience is 
neither a repository of ready-made solutions to any moral dilemma that might arise nor a 
catalogue of moral responsibilities. In fact, what conscience denotes is not a thing at all but 
rather a mode, specifically a mode of judgment. By depicting conscience as a mode of 
judgment, I am trying to present it not as a human faculty but as a useful fiction that can 
 
2015); O. O'Donovan, Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community: The 
2001 Stob Lectures (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2002). 
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help to describe how we go about reaching moral decisions.483 I have tried to make this 
point in the first chapter by indicating that conscience is formal. To put it another way, 
conscience is a learned discourse.  
 
Although conscience is a discourse about certain kinds of moral decisions, it is often 
perceived as a feeling or intuition that defies reason, this perception is strengthened where 
moral inarticulacy is prevalent. In response, scholars have worked to identify the various 
roles moral reasoning plays in decisions of conscience, from the time in which a person 
becomes aware of a dilemma up until its resolution, with the aim of showing that the work 
of reason is not limited to the final judgment.484 Reason may contribute to every phase of 
the decision making process: in defining the nature of the problem, in gathering the relevant 
information, in determining which factors are irrelevant, in proposing possible solutions, in 
assessing their worth in the situation at hand and in relation to the larger context, in seeking 
the advice of other thoughtful people, evaluating our own reasoning in light of the Scripture 
and tradition, in offering reasons for our decision when questioned about it. In practice that 
means being willing to discuss the goods that motivate us and the reasons that might justify 
us, especially with those who disagree, for the sake of deepening our own understanding 
and of sharing what we have come to believe to be truth with others in humility.  
 
There is a further observation that I wish to make about conscience as a mode of decision-
making specifically pertaining to the role of moral reasoning in decisions of conscience. This 
is that moral reasoning is embodied, learned and tradition bound. Moral reasoning has not 
always been viewed in this way but there is consensus among many ethicists that reason is 
inextricably bound up in our personal histories, social contexts, cultural narratives and 
systems of signification. Our reasoning is inevitably shaped and tutored by our emotions,485 
intuitions and imaginations, by social conventions, by cultural sensibilities, by the presence 
or absence of religious convictions, by fears and desires that are both conscious and 
 
483 Here I concur with David McCarthy. David Matzko McCarthy, “Veritatis Splendor: Conscience and 
Following Christ,” Studies in Christian Ethics 8, no. 2 (1995).  
484 Callahan, In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making, 115-42. Hogan, Confronting the Truth: 
Conscience in the Catholic Tradition, 135-40; Curran, Conscience, 3-24.  
485 Among the numerous studies of the role of emotion in guiding reason, William Wainwright’s stands out. 
He argues that reason functions properly only when informed by a rightly disposed heart, that is, when it is 
influenced by the appropriate emotions, feelings, and intuitions. William J. Wainwright, Reason and the Heart: 
A Prologomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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unconscious.486  Decisions of conscience are not abstracted, disembodied, dispassionate 
judgments of reason, but deliberations that engage the whole of me–my dispositions, 
feelings, desires, character, intuitions–and not just my intellect, as Linda Hogan argues.487 
It follows that moral reasoning is mediated through language, culture, history and context.  
In the Christian tradition, moral decision-making is not simply viewed in an ethical 
framework of reflection on what I ought to do. It is also viewed in a theological framework 
of reflection on what God would wish for me to do or what God is inviting me to do. Within 
that framework, conscientious decisions are identified not only with reason and but also 
with the operation of the Holy Spirit, who is said to inspire, instruct and guide these 
decisions in the process of helping one to discern God’s will in the matter.  The divine will 
that is discerned in the process of reaching a decision of conscience is variously described 
as “God’s voice” or “God’s truth” or “God’s abode within us.” These metaphors 
underwrite the Christian conviction that there is moral and that humans have the task of 
discerning it and living in accordance with it in order to faithfully resolve moral problems 
as they arise. Discerning what I ought to do, by God’s grace, is then not just a matter of 
knowing aright the contours of the moral order but also a matter of connecting to its source 
and thereby perceiving new ways of being. 
By identifying conscience as a discourse about moral decision-making I mean to delineate 
the role of decision-making in talk of conscience and to demarcate the place of conscience-
talk in ethics. We saw in chapter one that conscience is formal; therefore, it can assume any 
meaning, and as a master sign it tends to aggregate meanings to itself unless firmly framed 
within a linguistic, conceptual and social context.  We also saw in chapter five that when 
the formal procedure of conscience is treated apart from social existence and the public 
practices through which it could have communicated and instantiated its claim to be about 
the good, it falls apart and the consciousness of the beautiful soul re-emerges. To avoid 
 
486 Gregory Jones sums up much of the recent thinking about moral reasoning in his account of the moral life, 
while arguing that theological claims make a difference for how the activity of moral judgment is construed, 
and that those theological claims need to be explicitly Trinitarian if they are to adequately describe how moral 
life is transformed through discipleship. L. Gregory Jones, Transformed Judgment (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
Press, 1990).  
487 Hogan, Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition, 7, 136. This means debates about whether 
conscience is best understood in intellectual terms or intuitional or emotional terms miss the point. For a 
summary of the chicken and egg debate about whether moral reasons or moral emotions come first, see 
Keane’s recent book. He examines whether emotions provide the motives and commitments that mere 
principles might be unable to generate or whether principles provide the emotions with objects that one can 
endorse by explaining why it makes ethical sense to have those emotions: Webb Keane, Ethical Life: Its Natural 
and Social Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 58-59. 
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treating conscience as a master-sign and to avoid the fate of the beautiful soul, we must 
recognize that conscience is not ethical unless it is contextualized by social and institutional 
existence. Moreover, we must recognize that ethics is not reducible to isolated decisions, 
given the role that social and institutional life plays in shaping decision-making. In other 
words, there is more to conscience than the claim to have arrived at an ethical decision and 
there is more to ethics than talk of conscience, even though claims of conscience have 
special status.  
Conscience is a form of human agency  
Hearing the so-called “voice of conscience” is sometimes experienced as uncanny, 
mysterious, and other-worldly. It is likened to the discovery of the presence of another will 
inside our own.488 Oftentimes talk of conscience evokes a supposed agency in us that is 
prompting us to perform good acts, judging us on our past performance, and sanctioning 
what we ought to do and be in the future. For that reason, conscience might be spoken of 
as a tutor, a guide, a companion, or a pedagogue.  One of conscience’s distinctive features 
it that it is experienced as another form of moral agency working alongside us, speaking 
through us of our deepest convictions and impelling us to act on them. While conscience 
can appear as if it were a separate moral agent, from a theological perspective there is no 
other agency but that of us and of God. Conscience is however a discourse about our 
decision-making through which we may become aware of God’s will to the extent that our 
decisions of conscience are made in light of the judgments that God has made in Christ and 
in the process of our endeavoring to recognize, discern, reason about, and conform to those 
judgments.  
The kind of human agency presupposed by decisions of conscience should not be conceived 
of as independent of God’s agency, in competition with it or to be conflated with it.489 It is 
 
488 I am referring to the tendency to treat conscience as an oracular source of moral truth, experienced as a 
sort of voice that comes to me and influencing my moral judgment one way or the other by its deliveries. As 
William Perkins said, “conscience is a little God sitting in the middle of men’s hearts.. Cited in Ojakangas, 
The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethical Experience, 7. While the “voice of conscience” might 
suggest the voice of a little God (or indeed that of a big God a small space), it is none of these things. As Robert 
Speamann quips, “conscience does not influence moral judgment at all; it is moral judgment.” Italics his. 
Spaemann, Persons: The Difference between 'Someone' and 'Something', 168.  
489 This is not to deny the phenomenological experience of an agency within. Only to insist that when conscience 
is spoken of as the voice of God within me, the double personal agency–God’s and mine–does not imagine 
divine and human agencies in competition such that one is displacing the other or that they are rivals in any 
way. God is not one agent among others. God may act through my actions, but God’s action and my action 
are not comparable and take place on different planes altogether. For more on this Christological mistake 
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important to underline that point when hearing the voice of conscience is sometimes likened 
to experiencing God immanent within us or to an unmediated experience of the Holy 
Spirit. 490  That language is unfortunate, because conscience is human. It is a human 
capacity for a human judgment, even if it is my hope that through prayer I may be guided 
and inspired by God in making such judgments.491 Nevertheless, when I hear the voice of 
conscience telling me the way that I should walk in, it is my voice I hear. As James Hanigan 
has observed, “judgments of conscience may well be couched in language such as ‘God told 
me to do X,’ or ‘God has called me to do X,’ or ‘the Church has taught me I should do X,’ 
or ‘it is the Christian thing to do,’ or ‘it is only common sense,’ or ‘my parents would want 
me to do X and would be hurt if I did not,’ or ‘the teacher, the pastor, the boss told me to 
do X,’ or ‘society urges us to do X,’ or ‘everybody thinks X is the thing to do,’ or ‘our 
survival requires that we do X.’” And yet, the judgment of conscience is my own judgment 
on my conduct for which I must take personal responsibility, even when I evoke other 
authorities or offer other rationales or describe my decision in terms that seem to shift the 
blame or evade responsibility.492  
 
Conscience can be formed and can fail 
 
In the Christian tradition, confidence in a decision of conscience is not grounded in any 
supposed infallibility about its judgments.493 Following our conscience is no guarantee that 
we will have done what is right in every instance. Decisions of conscience are necessarily 
partial and one-sided because of our circumstances are necessarily shaped and limited by 
our language we speak, by the traditions out of which we come, the communities which 
nurture us, and by our experiences.  Such decisions are no more (or less) reliable than any 
other judgments we make and are equally prone to self-deception, self-delusion, mixed-
 
concerning godhead and manhood in Christ’s one person and the repercussions for human action, see 
Tanner’s exposition. Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (London: T&T 
Clark, 2001), 2-5; 90-91. 
490 It is all too easy to identify conscience with the Holy Spirit, as the Catholic ethicist James Hanigan cautions, 
while calling for a more nuanced relationship between conscience and the Holy Spirit. James P. Hanigan, 
“Conscience and the Holy Spirit,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 51 (1996): 227-46. 
491 Billy and Keating, Conscience and Prayer: The Spirit of Catholic Moral Theology. 
492 Hanigan, “Conscience and the Holy Spirit,” 237. 
493 As discussed in Chapter 1, our natural dispositional grasp of the first principles of practical reasoning, 
termed synderesis, which has been closely associated with conscience in the Thomistic tradition, was understood 
to be infallible. Nevertheless, the application of that innate sense of the good to particular moral decisions, 
termed conscientia, was not considered infallible. Kant is thought to have ascribed infallibility to conscience; 
Kazim’s monograph clarifies in what sense this is true of Kant: Emre Kazim, Kant on Conscience: A Unified 
Approach to Moral Self-Consciousness (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 58-108. 
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motives, prejudice, error, illusion, failure and sin. 494  Confidence in the decisions of 
conscience stems from an understanding of who I am that enables me to know what action 
will be an appropriate response to the truth about myself and the world around me.  
There are plenty of good reasons for modesty in one’s affirmations about the truth, 
perceived by conscience, and humility about one’s grasp of it. Our insights into our own 
motivations and into what is of importance and of value are often limited by the shape of 
our experience and distorted by our imperfections of character. As a result, our judgments 
and evaluations are frequently partial, clouded and uncertain. There is then a responsibility 
to form conscience.495 Theologically speaking, making decisions of conscience accurately is 
not simply a matter of increasing what we know, that is, having more information on which 
to base the judgments we make. It is a matter of increasing our capacity to do good, that is, 
by growing in virtue and by growing in holiness. The ability to make decisions of conscience 
accurately can be strengthened by certain practices, namely through our interactions with 
others, especially those with whom we can argue and dialogue. 496  They are also 
strengthened in fellowship with a community of faith whose common life includes hearing 
scripture, receiving the sacraments, praising God and partaking in the means of grace.497 
Similarly, the ability to formulate and act on decisions of conscience can also be misguided 
and distorted by certain practices, take for instance, those activities that tend to distract us 
and effectively diminish our freedom to do what we have determined to do.498  
 
The role of self-knowledge 
Whom shall I marry? Shall I marry at all? Which charity shall I support this 
Christmas? Shall I resign from this political party, which is now committed to things 
I do not believe in—but is still better than the other parties in some ways? Should I 
 
494 For an influential analysis of self-deception and its role in moral decision making, see Herbert Fingarette, 
Self-Deception (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).  
495 There are some notable theological accounts of conscience that strongly reject the idea that conscience 
can be formed. These accounts do not conceive of conscience as a judgment that can be strengthened and 
formed because they do not conceive of conscience as a judgment in the first place. Instead conscience is 
reduced to routine feelings of guilt and shame. While feelings of guilt and shame may be part and parcel of 
the actual experience of conscience, especially the phenomenology of having a guilty conscience, here I want 
to avoid reducing the concept of conscience to its noncognitive dimensions. 
496 For an Augustinian account of the role of dialogue, see Charles T. Mathewes, “Pluralism, Otherness, and 
the Augustinian Tradition,” Modern Theology 14, no. 1 (1998). 
497 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” in Conscience, ed. C.E. 
Curran (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2004). 
498 Rowan Williams has drawn attention to freedom from distraction as one of the marks of mature Christian 
decision-making. Rowan D. Williams, “Making Moral Decisions,” in Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, 
ed. Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 297. 
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become a vegetarian? Should I break the law and join an anti-government protest? 
Should I refuse to pay my taxes when I know they are partly used to buy weapons 
of mass destruction?499 
 
Decisions of conscience are conditioned by the agent’s beliefs about him or herself. As 
Rowan Williams reminds us, decisions such as these are shaped by the sort of person I am, 
by what issues concern me, by how I imagine what is “right” for me or truthful to what I 
know about myself and who I am becoming.500 When I ask, “What ought I to do?” in 
quandaries, such as the ones Williams’ describes, the answer has to do with who I 
understand myself to be, what I understand the meaning and truth of my life to be, and 
what that then to requires of me at this particular juncture. Impersonal solutions cannot 
help me decide what it is that I must do to respond appropriately to these kinds of dilemmas, 
because the right course of action is not something that can be determined in some sort of 
vacuum, irrespective of the unique set of relations, responsibilities, and roles in which I find 
myself. Thus, it can help to think of conscience as “reasoning from the first-person 
perspective.”501 
 
Knowing what I must do therefore requires a certain degree of self-discovery and self-
awareness. For that reason, conscience has long been associated with moral self-
examination, the process of going over the events of a previous period in order to call to 
mind what you did or failed to do.502 This moral examination is a personal undertaking, 
 
499 Questions that Archbishop Rowan Williams put to participants of the Lambeth Conference in the plenary 
session held on July 22, 1998. His address was republished here: Ibid., 300. 
500 Ibid., 295-96. 
501 The phrase “reasoning from a first person perspective” is Moyar’s. Moyar, Hegel's Conscience, 14. 
502 Examining one’s conscience in order to bring to mind one’s sins of thought, word, deed, desire and 
omission is a feature of penitential modes of confession. Over the years, manuals were compiled to aid 
confessors in determining the specific nature of the sin being confessed and what would therefore be a fitting 
penalty given that person’s particular struggle. The tradition of examining one’s conscience has therefore 
grown up alongside a long tradition of problem solving, designed to aid a doubtful conscience. That tradition 
of problem solving, known as casuistry, attempts to solve the issue of what to do in a new situation by an 
appeal to the congruencies with other cases. In casuistry, one turns not to moral principles for guidance in 
novel circumstances but rather to specific cases that might provide analogies, serve as paradigms, or suggest 
general maxims. For a historical treatment of casuistry in the medieval and early modern periods, see: Albert 
R. Jonsen and Stephen E. Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988). Their work forms part of a reassessment of casuistry’s ability to generate resources for 
making practical judgments about real life issues and to settle cases of conscience. A sampling of recent 
theological attempts to repristinate casuistry includes: Stanley Hauerwas, “Casuistry as a Narrative Art,” 
Interpretation 37, no. 4 (1983); James F. Keenan, “The Return of Casuistry,” Theological Studies 57, no. 1 (1996); 
Richard B. Miller, Casuistry and Modern Ethics: A Poetics of Practical Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996); Christopher Steck, "Saintly Voyeurism: A Methodological Necessity for the Christian Ethicist?” 
in New Wine, New Wineskins: A Next Generation Reflects on Key Issues in Catholic Moral Theology, ed. William C. 
Mattison (Lanham: Sheed & Ward, 2005).  
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perhaps best understood as a self-critical endeavor that calls into question “the project of 
being me,” as Williams puts it. At times that endeavor has involved examining myself 
against norms such as the Ten Commandments or precepts of the church, which describe 
the minimum moral requirements of the faithful in the Roman Catholic tradition. And at 
other times, it has involved examining myself against the Christian identity I am trying to 
realize, that is, who I am in unity with Christ and who am becoming more like through the 
power of the Holy Spirit.503 However it is construed, the task of self-examination is to orient 
myself in moral space by figuring out how I stand in relation to the issues facing my 
community, how I stand in relation to where I want to be, and how I stand in relation to 
my calling or vocation. 
In the Christian spiritual tradition, moral self-examination is meant to provide knowledge 
about who I am. The self that I discover through self-examination is not a hidden core of 
authentic agency uncorrupted by any engagement in society, uncompromised by language 
or history. That notion of a “true self” or “inner self” has more to do with romantic 
mythology.504 Theologically speaking, the self-knowledge sought in self-examination is not 
about finding an ‘inner self’ but about finding God. As Rowan Williams puts it, “The self 
that I am, the self that I have been made to be, is the self engaged by God in love and now 
in process of re-creation through the community of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit. 
It is no use trying to answer the question about who I really am independently of this. There 
is no secret, detached, individual ego apart from these realities in which I am gracefully 
entangled.”505 Williams’ assertion that there is no self apart from the realities in which I am 
entangled is meant to counter and correct the assumption that the inward turn of moral 
self-examination necessarily amounts to lonely introspection, a self-absorptive disregard for 
 
503 This involves my making decisions with an eschatological framework, that is, in the context of the call of 
my perfected self, that is, who I am in Christ. Karl Barth’s brief discussion of conscience portrayed conscience 
as a call or summons and strongly reasserted the eschatological dimension to decisions of conscience. Karl 
Barth and Dietrich Braun, Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 475-97. Extrapolating from Barth, John 
Webster defines conscience as “the presence to me in reflection of the moral effect of my new identity 
established in Christ through the Holy Spirit.” John Webster, “God and Conscience,” in The Doctrine of God 
and Theological Ethics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), 161.  
504 Charles Taylor has painstakingly mapped the development of the modern inward turn and its implications 
for our quest for the good. See Taylor, Sources of the Self. The inward turn and the search for the inner self are 
themes that have also been taken up albeit in a less sustained way by Peter Gay as part of his analysis of 
cultural trends. See Peter Gay, The Naked Heart: Bourgeois Experience Victoria to Freud (London: Harper Collins, 
1996). For a recent analysis of modern reflexivity, of both Kantian and German romantic views of human 
nature, and of the development of anthropology, see Chad Wellmon, Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology 
and the Embodiment of Freedom (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). 
505 Williams, “Making Moral Decisions,” 300. 
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the social world or narcissism. We do not need to cultivate beautiful souls to learn who we 
are and what we must do. 
Alisdair MacIntyre makes this point well when he describes how knowledge of oneself and 
of one’s moral judgments is acquired. He insists that self-knowledge comes from the 
observations of others or from having made oneself into an observer, and explain that “what 
is there to be observed, whether by others or by that apart of oneself which has become an 
observing other, is characteristically and generally not an individual self in isolation, but an 
individual involved in some specific and particularized network of social relationships, 
whose modes of participation in those relationships express his or her moral 
commitments.”506 Therefore, the kind of self-knowledge that sheds light on one’s moral 
commitments comes from participating in networks of social relationships, not from solitary 
introspection.  
 
The role of beliefs about the world  
 
Gaining knowledge of myself, my moral options and my moral goals is not then something 
that happens in a vacuum. When I ask, “What ought I to do?,” I am trying to reach a 
decision about how to respond at a particular juncture, in relation to particular people, in 
the context of particular circumstances, and in light of the moral options set before me. For 
that reason, deciding such matters is never simply about invoking a common-sense category 
or a general norm that will put an act in its context. Instead such decisions are marked by 
reflexivity.  I have tried to show in the brief treatment of reflexive self-awareness above that 
when I ask, “What ought I to do?,” I am making a judgment about myself, requiring a 
certain self-knowledge. Yet that is not merely a judgment about the demands of my own 
integrity and identity. It is also a judgment about a meaning and value of action I believe I 
am obligated to take now. For both my beliefs about how things are with myself and my 
beliefs about how things are with the world at large help to bring my moral options into 
focus.  
 
In his study of conscience, C.S. Lewis draws on the trope of conscience as an inner lawgiver, 
a source of moral legislation written on the tablet of the heart, to underscore the importance 
 
506 MacIntyre, “Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Social Practice: What Holds Them Apart?,” 108. 
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of my beliefs about the world around me. Lewis writes: 
  
 No lawgiver, inner or outer, gives laws in a vacuum; he always has real or supposed 
facts in mind, an idea of what is, which influences his rulings about what ought to 
be. Thus, the outer lawgiver ceases to make new statues against witchcraft when he 
ceases to believe in it and does not make vaccination compulsory till he thinks it will 
prevent smallpox. It is the same with the inner lawgiver. If you believe in the 
Christian God, synteresis [conscience] will lay upon you many duties towards him, 
and if you disbelieve, it will not. If you believe in transubstantiation it will tell you 
to risk Tyburn by attending Mass, and if you believe the Mass to be idolatry it will 
tell you to risk Smithfield by abstaining from it.507  
 
When Lewis says that the dictates of conscience are conditioned by a person’s beliefs about 
God, the world and his duties, he is underlining the point that conscience is formal.508 As 
conscience is formal, a person might describe his decision to attend mass as obeying his 
conscience, if he held certain beliefs, but he might equally describe his decision to abstain 
from mass as obeying his conscience, if he held other beliefs, because conscience has no 
content to call its own.  The importance of Lewis’ point about the formalism of conscience 
is that what I think my conscience dictates I should do very much depends upon what I 
believe to be true about the world around me. My idea of “what is” has a bearing on “what 
ought to be” and therefore on “what I must do then.”  
 
While the dictates of conscience are conditioned by my beliefs about myself and about the 
world around me, they should not be reduced to what is specified by my state of mind or 
constructed by consciousness or generated simply out of what I will or desire to be the case. 
The role that self-awareness plays is not that of sovereign self-governance. Some moral 
realism is needed here in discussions of “what is” as Rowan Williams has gone to great 
lengths to show when he writes of the importance of a “realism which shows us ourselves 
as neither wholly finished or wholly free, as having a body and a presence to nature and to 
society.”509 That the agent making a decision of conscience is “neither wholly finished or 
wholly free” is not often or adequately acknowledged in discussions of conscience, which 
continue to posit an autonomous agent freely constructing his world. 
 
507 Lewis, Studies in Words, 201. 
508 This is a point that Hegel was also keen to make when he drew a distinction between formal conscience, 
which is our certainty about our moral duty, and true or actual conscience, which is our disposition to the 
good. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 164. §137. 
509 Rowan D. Williams, “‘Religious Realism’: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt,” in Wrestling with 
Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, ed. Mike Higton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 248. 
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The authority of conscience  
 
Decisions of conscience are experienced as uncompromising.510 There is simply no arguing 
with conscience once the judgment has been made; it is an irrevocable decision. And once 
a decision of conscience is made there is a moral imperative to follow through with the 
decision by acting upon it even if that means putting oneself on the line. Why do claims of 
conscience exert an imperative force that obligates the agent to act in accordance with 
them? From whence does the authority of conscience derive?  
 
The perceived authority of conscience has been bolstered in two main ways over the years. 
Firstly, claims of conscience have been treated as authoritative by virtue of being divinely 
inspired. Here conscience is interpreted as the voice of God, drawing on the uncanny way 
the voice of conscience is sometimes experienced as the presence of another will inside our 
own impelling us to act. I have tried to counter the assumption by arguing that conscience 
is not a form of divine agency within us but rather a discourse about moral decision-making, 
albeit one in which we may become aware of God’s will. Secondly, claims of conscience 
have been treated as authoritative by virtue of their perceived infallibility. Here conscience 
is interpreted as an immanent source of truth with which we are in touch. As such any 
judgment that draws on it is always bound to be right. I have tried to counter this 
assumption by arguing that conscience is formal and not a storehouse or repository of truths 
from which to draw on in reaching a decision. Moreover, the verdicts of conscience are the 
end result of deliberation. They are no more or less reliable than any other moral judgments 
 
510 Decisions of conscience are not just binding on the agent. There is a sense in which such decisions attempt 
to impose themselves on others and to oblige them as well. That is because decisions of conscience are not 
mere statements about personal inclination, though there is a tendency to conflate claims of conscience (for 
example, the claim that “I believe that fighting in this war is wrong.”) with assertions of a personal preference 
or will (“I prefer to avoid military service.”). Robert Vischer has worked to disambiguate these kinds of claims 
by pointing out that claims of conscience not only assert something about the speaker’s feeling but also assert 
something about what the speaker perceives to be the truth. In that claims of conscience involve a truth claim, 
they presume a normative background. The truth claim indicates that it is not merely a question of what a 
person happens to think is good or right for himself, but what he thinks is in fact good and right irrespective 
of his own preferences. In that decisions or conscience make truth claims and convey the normative 
implications of those claims, they petition others to recognize that same truth and defer to it. Vischer, Conscience 
and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between Person and State, 73-97. Karen S. Feldman has undertaken an 
investigation of how the metaphors and figures used to describe how a verdict of conscience is taken as binding 
upon oneself also work, at a textual level, as petitions and persuasions that attempt to exert a binding force 
upon the reader.  The rhetoric that she foregrounds include depictions of conscience by way of “figures of 
activities, such as seeing, hearing, telling, judging, biting, strangling, gnawing, punishing, and torturing; spatial 
and architectural figures, as of the heart, a courtroom, an inner hell, and a church building; and 
heterogeneous images of conscience as spark, worm, natural light, inscription, and feeling.” Feldman, Binding 
Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger. 
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we may make for they are equally prone to self-deception, mixed-motives, prejudice, error, 
failure and sin.  
 
Those who wish to relativize the authority of conscience tend to locate the source of 
conscience in either the individual preference or, alternatively, in social conditioning. In 
the first instance, the voice of conscience is my subjective inclination getting voiced. Thus, 
my claim of conscience amounts to whatever I feel to be the case and heeding conscience 
is indicative of following my personal inclinations. Conscience therefore becomes a matter 
of personal preference. This is the path of the beautiful soul. In the second instance, the 
voice of conscience is merely a public opinion or an internalized parental authority getting 
voiced. Thus, my claim of conscience amounts to whatever might give me comfort by 
incurring a good conscience or warding off a bad conscience, where heeding the authority 
of conscience is indicative of my longing for social approbation or a dread of social 
censure.511 Conscience therefore becomes a matter of social conditioning. This is the path 
Freud took.512 
 
A theological approach to conscience does need not to attribute the claims of conscience to 
a source in God or in the apprehension of truth immanent within us. Nor does it need to 
reduce claims of conscience to subjective inclinations or repressive social forces. Those 
factors certainly color decisions of conscience, but they do not tell the whole story. Instead 
the “voice of conscience” can be seen as something we have constructed for ourselves from 
 
511 On this view, conscience originates in the relation of child to parent and that it can be linked to the function 
of the Freudian superego. The superego embodies the values that have been internalized in childhood by 
parental authority figures and societal conventions and shaped our sense of right and wrong in the pre-moral 
phase of personal development. As part of the functioning of the superego, the promptings of conscience 
command us to act in accordance with the norms that were internalized in childhood not only for the sake of 
gaining acceptance and approval, but also under the threat of being penalized by feelings of guilt and self-
reproach were we to challenge the moral standards we have internalized. While the Freudian superego seems 
to approximate the inwardness, imperativity, and authority of conscience, it is a non-rational self-accusing, 
repressive force in the life of a person that makes unconscious demands on him or her by way of internalized 
authoritative persons, thereby blocking his or her moral independence and maturity. It is therefore hard to 
see how conscience as superego could have a positive function in propelling us to act ethically when it is in 
fact an anti-ethical agency, bombarding us with impossible demands and punishing us for our failure to meet 
those demands by provoking excessive feelings of guilt and anxiety. That has not stopped some from trying 
to make a case for the Freudian super-ego having a positive influence on moral agency. See D.C. Langston, 
Conscience and Other Virtues, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008); Guyton B. Hammond, 
Conscience and Its Recovery: From the Frankfurt School to Feminism, Studies in Religion and Culture (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1993).  
512 The crucial differences between the conscience and the superego have been enumerated in recent years. 
Richard Gula has reconstructed the differences between conscience and superego first charted by John Glaser.  
Richard M. Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1989), 123-




a variety of sources, taking into account our personal experience and self-knowledge, our 
apprehension of the truth of the world around us, religious teaching, social teaching, our 
feelings and intuitions.  
 
If conscience is formal does its moral authority come from? To put it another way, why 
grant claims of conscience an objective entitlement that demands the recognition of others? 
Contemporary discussions on the authority of conscience tend to bracket the issue of the 
conscience’s source, whether working out of a secular or theological tradition. That is 
because in contemporary discussions, claims of conscience are granted authority, respect 
and protection, not on the basis of the source of those claims but on the basis of the role 
those claims are believed to play shoring up moral integrity and autonomy. 
On this understanding, what my conscience tells me to do is known through an internal 
hunt for feelings of certainty by which I infer that a certain course of action is right. Making 
a decision of conscience is identified with that inner sense of certainty and amounts to a 
wholehearted identification with the bedrock convictions that are experienced as 
constitutive of my identity. So, it goes to reason that acting out of a sense of certainty and 
in accord with strongly held convictions contributes to my moral autonomy, in that it allows 
me to develop and claim a moral worldview as my own. When I act freely according to 
what I hold with certitude to be the morally right thing to do in my circumstances, my 
action expresses autonomy in that it stems from my own commitments. It also goes to 
reason that acting out of a sense of certainty and in accord with what I judge to be my 
obligations and values contributes to my moral integrity, for when I act freely out of a strong 
sense of who I am and what I believe, my actions are consonant with my moral convictions 
and core commitments. Such convictions and commitments give meaning and direction to 
my life and having them respected is a condition for my self-respect. So, denying a person 
the freedom to act according to his conscience effectively undermines that person’s moral 
autonomy and personal integrity, thereby threatening that person’s very sense of moral 
identity.513  
 
513 A number of studies have undertaken to show how the concept of conscience has provided the ontological 
basis for individualism and the origins of individual rights. These genealogies of modern morals examine 
conscience as an integral part of moral subjectivism, that is, the exercise of personal willing and agency, while 
tracing the role conscience has played in the liberal tradition of political theory. For a recent potted history of 
conscience’s career in the development of liberal society, see Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual (London: 
Penguin Books, 2006). For a different narration of the relation that has unfolded between concepts of 
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When a person is not free to act on a decision of conscience, there is a sense of self-betrayal 
that generates regret, guilt and a feeling of no longer living at peace with oneself. In 
reflecting on the testimonies of conscientious objectors, the ethicist James Childress notes 
how this fear of self-betrayal plays out in cases in which appeals to conscience are made. 
This fear of self-disintegration is heard in testimonies where it is expressed in terms such as 
“‘I could not live with myself’; ‘A man has to answer to himself first’; ‘I must protect my 
sense of self.’ Or, ‘I could answer it, but if I did, I would hate myself in the morning.’ Or, ‘I 
could not look myself in the mirror.’”514 Claims such as these witness to the way in which 
the coherence of personal identity depends upon having the freedom to the act in 
accordance with the dictates of conscience. 
While there is no means of testing a person’s sincerity regarding what his conscience is said 
to dictate, there have been efforts to establish whether the deliveries of conscience are in 
fact conscientious. For examples, tribunals for individuals claiming conscientious objector 
status to war-time service are tasked with determining whether a person who claims to have 
a conscientious objection is telling the truth about what he claims his conscience requires 
him to do. In making a determination about whether the law should defer to a person’s 
claim of objector status and grant exemption from compulsory military service, such a 
tribunal is not expected to take into account the validity or otherwise of the objector’s 
position in opposing war. For what matters is not the validity of the moral claims on which 
his decision of conscience is based but that it is the decision of his conscience. Nevertheless, 
claims of conscience to oppose war service on the basis of moral, political, economic or 
philosophical convictions have not been granted the same authority (and hence legal 
accommodation) as claims of conscience made on the basis of religious convictions, defined 
by membership in a recognized pacifist denomination or by specifically religious training 
 
conscience and liberal democratic notions of liberty, equality, and identity, see Edward G. Andrew, Conscience 
and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern Subjectivity (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2001). Michael Sandel helpfully problematizes readings of the relationship between individual 
conscience and liberal political traditions that are overly cosy. He argues that the version of liberalism implicit 
in US constitutional law depreciates the claims of conscience and of religion, because it fails to respect the 
values and ends that individuals have not have not chosen, such as the duties derived from sources other than 
themselves. Michael J. Sandel, “Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?,” in Articles of Faith, Articles of 
Peace: The Religious Liberty Clauses and the American Public Philosophy, ed. James D. Hunter and Os Guinness 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990). 
514 Childress draws on the testimonies offered by the playwright Arthur Miller, who refused to name other 
writers suspected of being Communists before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, by 
Governor Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas who commuted the sentences of fifteen prisoners on death row, 
and by Captain Michael Heck who refused to continue to obey orders to fly more bombing missions in 
Vietnam. James F. Childress, “Appeals to Conscience,” Ethics 89, no. 4 (1979): 316-17.  
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and belief.515 That is not because religious views were treated as intrinsically valid but 
because they were treated as more central to a person’s life, more constitutive of a person’s 
identity and thus more obligating than views that were formed from political, philosophical 
or moral considerations.  
The difficulty that arises here is that the authority of conscience derives simply from the 
fact that a person possesses a sense of certainty about the claims that his conscience makes 
on him. It does not say anything about what those claims are, apart from how central those 
claims are to his sense of identity. Moreover, it is not the validity of the claim that needs to 
be verified but whether the individual treats that claim as morally obligating. Therefore, 
there is no imperative to provide an account of the goods that motivate our moral 
commitments and no need to explain how one’s conscientious action might align with our 
moral commitments. What determines whether a claim of conscience is morally obligating 
for someone is the intensity of belief in that course of action and the centrality of that belief 
to an individual’s life. So, claims of conscience are assessed as having authority and worthy 
of respect, solely based on their importance in expressing a person’s moral integrity and 
autonomy, and, by extension, on their centrality to a person’s moral identity.516 
  
A number of difficulties arise in accommodating the claims of conscience based on felt 
commitments viewed as central to a person’s life. I have space to mention just one problem 
presented in this understanding of the authority of conscience that stems from the formalism 
of conscience: in theory a person could claim that any action might violate his conscience 
and threaten him with a loss of identity and integrity, as there is no clear ostensive meaning 
offered as to its basis. If respect for conscience is reduced to the intensity or centrality of an 
individual’s conviction about a particular notion of what is right or wrong that must be 
 
515 In 1957, Daniel Seeger claimed conscientious objector status, declaring to the draft board that he was 
opposed to participating in war on the basis not of religious beliefs but on beliefs that he had come to base on 
reading the writings of Mahatma Gandhi, John Dewey and Henry David Thoreau. The federal district court 
denied Seeger’s claim and convicted him for refusing to submit to induction, a conviction that the court of 
appeals affirmed but that the US Supreme Court later reversed in order to make equal space for religious and 
nonreligious moral convictions. For a more extended discussion of cases defining the nature of conscience 
with respect to exemption from compulsory military service and for a treatment of the Seeger v. United States 
case in particular, see Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between Person and State, 15-47. 
Vischer is concerned with how to resolve disputes involving conscience in US court decisions without resorting 
to claims of an individual’s rights. He wants to see a better legal framework developed for respecting 
conscience.  
516 Elizabeth Sepper asserts that, “an individual’s moral integrity offers the most compelling moral basis for 
respecting her conscience. In a liberal pluralistic society, the objective truth or falsity of an individual’s moral 
commitments cannot form the justification for determining when to accommodate conscience.” Elizabeth 
Sepper, “Taking Conscience Seriously,” Virginia Law Review 98 (2012): 1529.  
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heeded for fear of loss of identity or integrity, claims of conscience become indistinguishable 
from fiats of will.517 Without a fuller explanation, a Muslim teacher’s decision to wear a 
scarf at work can be equated with her colleague’s choice to wear a baseball hat.  
 
What is more, locating the authority of conscience in the certainty with which the decision 
is made and in the centrality of that decision to a person’s sense of self, collapses discussions 
of conscience into assertions of will, effectively robbing such discussions of their moral 
dimension, as we saw in Hegel’s morality tale when the beautiful soul tried to present 
individual will as a justified norm. From a theological perspective, making decisions of 
conscience can be seen to contribute to personal integrity and moral autonomy, but liberty 
of conscience need not treated only as a means to those ends. The moral convictions at the 
heart of claims of conscience are in fact perceptions of realities that have sources outside 
the self.  
 
If we accept strong moral motivations, which have sources outside the self, there is no longer 
any need to shore up the authority of conscience. To put it plainly, decisions of conscience 
do not possess any authority or imperative of their own.  Any authority a claim of 
conscience has derives from the realities that it assents to. As Herbert McCabe puts it, “it 
is not the strength and sincerity of my conviction that the use of nuclear weapons must 
always be evil, but rather the grounds for this conviction, that make it morally right for me 
to refuse cooperation with any such use.”518 That is because the overriding authority of 
conscience, experienced as pure necessity, is a response to realities that have a source that 
is external to the self and society, though those realities are discerned in and through them.  
 
The point of the absolute authority of conscience is that once we have discovered the truth 
of a doubt-filled situation, or think we have, we can do nothing else with integrity except to 
assent to it. The imperative to follow my conscience does not stem solely out of concern to 
express a conviction within me but out of an acknowledgement of the truth of the reality 
 
517 My point here is that the most common ways of defending the normative significance of conscience actually 
undermine its normativity. That includes the argument that conscience must be respected to avoid the 
psychological distress that compelling a person to violate conscience will cause. It also includes as the 
argument that decisions of conscience made by others should be respected on the grounds that we would 
want our decisions of conscience to be respected, and other contractualist accounts of conscience, which 
reduce the reasons for a decision of conscience to individual importance or preference.  
518 McCabe, “Aquinas and Good Sense.”  
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around me, which grounds my conviction.519 Obedience to that truth compels me such that 
I am put in a position where there simply is no choice about doing what conscience dictates 
must be done if I am to be faithful to the truth I acknowledge. Either conscience has the 
final word, or I must act against my better judgment and deny something in myself about 
what my integrity, wholeness, and growth as this particular person requires or forbids here 
and now, but also, and perhaps more importantly, deny something about the reality I have 
apprehended. Here I want to affirm the power of that reality to motivate our moral actions 
and also the necessity to give some account of it.  As conscience is formal, the truth it is 
acknowledging needs to be stated. It is not self-explanatory. 
 
Where decisions of conscience differ from other moral decisions 
The picture of conscience that I have been building up here to counter moral inarticulacy 
views the concept as a discourse about moral decision making. It is a discourse that asks not 
only “What must I do?” but also often tries to discern “What is God calling me to do?” The 
key features of conscience I have proposed here are these: conscience is human, fallible, 
subject to formation and deformation, shaped by our beliefs about ourselves, shaped by 
beliefs about the world around us, and experienced as uncompromising because it responds 
to the good. Such a proposal raises several questions. For instance, in speaking of conscience 
in this way am I simply speaking of practical reason or of self-conscious agency? What does 
calling this highly personal mode of decision-making “conscience” actually add? To see 
how decisions of conscience differ from other kinds of moral decisions, it is important to 
note when matters of conscience arise. Conscience is only said to be pricked, troubled, 
examined and then invoked in specific situations; conscience has to do with “a particular 
moment in our moral self-presentation when we hit a bump in the road,” as Rowan 
Williams put it. 
Historically, these circumstances have been sparked by political, social or ecclesial conflicts 
that have created crises of authority. As C.A. Pierce noted, “It is clear that conscience only 
 
519 The Christian tradition has not been consistent in affirming that it is reality itself that ultimately motivates 
action and there are long standing disagreements over the status of the authority of conscience, which have 
intensified after Vatican II. What I am asserting is that the authority of a decision of conscience derives from 
the realities that such a decision assent to, and that that decision of conscience does not possesses any authority 
or imperative of its own. In his genealogy of conscience, John Lamont attributes to Suarez the view that 
conscience possesses an authority of its own, a view that later came to dominate the counter-Reformation 
tradition. Lamont, “Conscience, Freedom, Rights: Idols of the Enlightenment,” The Thomist,  vol. 73, no. 2, 
April 2009, 180-81. 
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came into its own in the Greek world after the collapse of the city-state. The close 
integration of politics with ethics, with the former predominant, was no longer possible: 
there was no sufficiently close authority, external to the individual, effectively to direct 
conduct. Consequently, as a pis aller, men fell back on the internal chastisement of 
conscience as the only authority.”520 In periods in which traditional authority structures are 
eroding under the pressures of societal change, appeals are made not to traditional norms 
but to emerging ones.521 And in such contexts claims of conscience come to the fore and 
get voiced where other justifications for actions or ways of living stop. 
Appeals to conscience are not only commonplace during crises of authority when we can 
no longer argue our position in universally valid terms. Conscience also becomes salient 
when we perceive different spheres of normativity coming into conflict in the course of our 
deliberations. In these instances, I may appeal to conscience not because I demand to be 
made an exception but because my actions seem governed by more than one norm both of 
which are decisive for me. These situations arise by virtue of relating to multiple 
communities and institutions. I may have specific obligations with my family, with my 
church, with my place of work, with the civic and professional organizations with which I 
am involved, with my community and with my country. 522  Such communities and 
institutions provide the context whereby objective morality takes shape in our lives and 
provide the practices with which the dictates of conscience are discerned, articulated and 
lived out. The communities and institutions to which we belong also compete in structuring 
our lives and may lay claims to our loyalties in conflicting ways when we are trying to 
discern what we ought to do. Multiple moral mandates produce conflicting obligations. 
This is especially characteristic of societies which partition social life into different spheres 
each with their own normative expectations, such that what is deemed right in the home is 
one thing, in the corporate sphere another, and in the political arena something else 
again.523  
 
520 Claude A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1955), 76. 
521 See, for example, Christopher Hill’s depiction of the crisis of authority in seventeenth-century England. 
Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (London: Penguin 
Group, 1991). 
522 David McCarthy is particularly interested in faithful decision making according to conscience in pluralistic 
contexts that are not delimited by the bounds of the institutional church. See McCarthy, “Veritatis Splendor: 
Conscience and Following Christ.” 
523  Alisdair MacIntyre has examined the effects of this compartmentalisation of society on academic 
philosophical enquiry and on contemporary politics over a number of years. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, “What 
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When a person appeals to his or her conscience saying, “My conscience tells me to do X,” 
it can indicate that that person finds himself in circumstances that force him to decide 
between alternate moral visions, where choosing to act according to what is prescribed by 
one normative framework will mean falling short of or departing from moral standards 
prescribed by another. In such circumstances, I must decide among the various conflicting 
values at stake. I may be committed to following a course of action in accord with 
convictions shaped in one moral sphere, while recognizing that doing so will preclude me 
from following convictions in another sphere. Conscience is typically invoked in such 
situations of conflict or perplexity where it appears that I must choose between 
incommensurables and violate some of my standards or interests. Conscience is then the 
name given to the judgment made in those instances where what I believe is required of me 
clashes with other moral laws. In those instances, appeals to conscience are made in the 
course of explaining an action that a person believes he must take, whether to justify it to 
himself or to others, and in the process of giving an account of one’s conduct and trying to 
dispel suspicions about his motives in abrogating a moral law.524  
While issues of conscience can ignite disagreement between people, it should now be clear 
that they can also generate cognitive conflict within a person.  James Childress and David 
McCarthy in their separate ways have drawn attention to the fact that conflict between 
moral principles often experienced as a conflict within oneself.525 Nevertheless, it is still 
common to belittle an agent’s claim of conscience as a demand to be made an exception to 
a rule, rather than appreciating that the agent’s actions are governed under the 
circumstances by more than one norm or obligation.526 Having to decide between my 
moral convictions and commitments can threaten my sense of moral coherence, not merely 
by throwing my behavior into question but by demanding a radical reassessment of my 
moral beliefs and standards. Have a really understood what is essential to my identity? Have 
a truly determined what is important and what is the worthiest cause to serve? In this way, 
my predicament can call into question the very means available to me for making 
evaluations, challenging the formulas and categories that seemed most fundamental to me. 
 
Has Not Happened in Moral Philosophy,” The Yale Journal of Criticism, no. 5 (1992). “Politics, Philosophy, and 
the Common Good,” in The Macintyre Reader, ed. Kelvin Knight (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 
524 This is not to reduce a claim of conscience to an excuse mechanism but merely to emphasize that it has an 
explanatory role. 
525  McCarthy, “Veritatis Splendor: Conscience and Following Christ,” 48; Childress, “Appeals to 
Conscience,” 321-2. 
526 As does Karl Rahner in his efforts to counter overly-subjective views of conscience. Rahner, Nature and 
Grace: And Other Essays, 84-111. 
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In that decisions of conscience can force me to re-evaluate how I have been formulating 
what is most important to me they can provoke crises of moral identity and agency. That 
provocation can cause us to stick stubbornly to certain favorite terms and try to settle all 
issues about actions in these terms, refusing any radical questioning. Alternatively, the 
question about whether we have got our most inchoate evaluations right, can provoke us 
to struggle with those terms that come most readily to hand. That struggle can generate a 
gestalt shift in our view of the situation, so that out of the confusion and uncertainty we find 
new, more adequate terms in which to see our predicament, which we could not properly 




If we take an open stance to strong moral motivations, then conscience acquires certain 
distinctive features. First of all, conscience can be treated as a learned discourse. It is an 
aspect of human agency that is liable to error and failure but also malleable to processes of 
formation (as well as deformation). Conscience, understood as a kind of discourse about 
moral decision-making, is conditioned by my beliefs about myself and it therefore requires 
a certain degree of self-awareness. This means coming to know myself in and through a 
community of persons rather than simply in solitary introspection. Conscience is also 
conditioned by my beliefs about how things are with the world at large. A degree of realism 
is therefore required to avoid reducing our understanding of how things are in ourselves 
and in the world to what can be generated merely by what we will or desire to be the case.  
 
Claims of conscience exert an imperative force that obligates the agent to act in accordance 
with them. From a theological perspective, the authority of conscience does not need to be 
established on the basis of infallibility or by equating the voice of conscience with the voice 
of God. Nor is the authority of conscience relativized by efforts to attribute claims of 
conscience to naturalistic sources, as if they were merely reflection of subjective inclinations 
or social conditioning. Instead, the “voice of conscience” can be understood as something 
we have constructed for ourselves from a variety of sources, taking into account our 
personal experience and self-knowledge, our apprehension of the truth of the world around 
us, religious teaching, social teaching, our feelings and intuitions. Rather than conferring 
decisions of conscience with any imperative of their own (either by virtue of their source or 
by virtue of their role in building up moral autonomy and integrity) this the authority of a 
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claim of conscience can be understood to derive from the reality to which it assents. That 
reality has a source that is external to the self and society, though it is discerned in and 
through them. Lastly, this chapter distinguished decisions of conscience from other forms 
of decision making, by considering when matters of conscience arise. Developing these 
features of conscience offers a promising starting place for the development of a new 






This thesis began with twentieth-century attempts to manage the problem of conscience 
and to make sense of the ambiguities that have plagued conscience over the course of its 
history (chapter I.)  I assessed efforts to situate conscience in its semantic context, showing 
why they fail to tell the whole story. I also evaluated other approaches that extend beyond 
the semantics of conscience but do not extend far enough. I argued that all these strategies 
obscure two aspects of conscience which need to be reasserted in re-working conscience: 
the formalism of conscience and the normativity of conscience. Moreover, these strategies 
deflect attention from the fact that the formalism of conscience undermines its purported 
normativity. I also showed that efforts to rework conscience that fail to appreciate that 
conscience can mean anything, in the absence of a rich account of its particular social, 
political, metaphysical and linguistic context, create situations in which conscience ends up 
doing everything. 
 
One of my contentions in this thesis is that claims of conscience in modern culture are 
largely a front, a way of hiding from ourselves and others our inability to articulate what 
really motivates us. I examined why claims of conscience are so often treated as if they were 
actual (as in ‘conscience made me do it’) rather than formal, in light of Charles Taylor’s 
critique of modern moral theories (chapter II). Turning to Taylor’s discussions of moral 
inarticulacy allowed me to situate conscience within the unresolved debates of modernity. 
I unspooled Taylor’s thesis about secularization (that neither religion nor its alternatives 
can be seen to provide all of society with normative foundations) and his thesis about the 
“malaise of immanence” (that comes from not having moral sources capable of creating a 
sufficiently firm identification with the common good to allow us to live up to our own 
moral commitments), and showed why it is difficult to provide reasons that would make 
plain the moral motivations behind claims of conscience. I also examined Taylor’s proposal 
that giving transcendent love credence as a strong moral motivation would help overcome 
moral inarticulacy and concluded that drawing upon sources outside the self would might 
correct our over reliance on conscience-talk.  
The illustrative figure of the beautiful soul portrays what following individual conscience 
looks like under the conditions Taylor described (which was established in chapter III).  The 
beautiful soul of the “Confessions” found in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, depicts one response 
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to having weak moral sources, which is to turn away from the needs of the world and the 
demands of universal justice and benevolence, and to focus on smaller goals. Overwhelmed 
by those demands, the beautiful soul decides to construct a life for herself that is internally 
consistent, beautifully harmonized and free from the taint of compromise. She imagines 
that it will be purifying and that it will give her peace within. She identifies the life she wants 
to lead with the life of conscience. To live in that way, Goethe’s beautiful soul will be steered 
only by the inclinations that stem from the law of her heart, something she tries to achieve 
by systematically extricating herself from social roles and responsibilities, external 
influences and physical constraints. In so doing, the figure of the beautiful soul shows what 
it looks like to try to generate ethical ideals and moral practices with nothing but one’s own 
mind and will. My re-narration of Goethe’s beautiful soul also allowed us to see why 
cultivating a beautiful soul might be a perennial modern temptation. 
While trying to live according to conscience may seem like a perfectly reasonable response 
when overwhelmed by the needs of the world and the universal demand for justice and 
benevolence, it is a risky strategy. In my narration of the fate of the beautiful soul in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, it is shown to be both futile and counter-productive (as chapter IV 
established).  Cultivating a beautiful soul is futile because there is no way of living in the 
world and doing no harm. And when we realize we are still complicit, despite our best 
efforts to extricate ourselves, we are liable to give up.  Cultivating a beautiful soul is also 
counter-productive, because it does not do any good to aim for our own purity or integrity. 
When we make that our aim, we become solipsistic and narcissistic; we become focused on 
our own personal project rather than aiming to make the bigger, more systemic changes 
needed. Focusing on what I can do in my own sphere for the sake of my conscience 
forecloses social practices and forms of solidarity, whereas many of the wrongs that need to 
be righted in the world can only be adequately addressed by collective, coalitional 
responses. Hegel’s verdict is that we cannot escape the moral crises of our age by retreating 
from them but that we can confess the ways in which we are implicated in them. That 
means acknowledging the difficulties concerning our place in society, recognizing the need 
to work through complex situations with others and participating in institutional life. 
 
Familiarity with Hegel’s cautionary tale would have helped Arendt anticipate some of the 
pitfalls she ran into while trying to re-work conscience (chapter V). I laid out Arendt’s 
attempt to address the problem of conscience after Eichmann’s trial and showed how she 
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reworked Socratic conscience into an inner principle, connected to thinking and judging. 
In construing conscience as an offshoot of the thinking process, Arendt reinforced the view 
of conscience as a solidary moral decision. As a result, she failed to see the role that the 
dispositions, habits and virtues one does (or does not) have plays in the way one apprehends 
the moral terrain.  
 
The problem of conscience is that it is both formal and normative, but Arendt’s efforts to 
rework conscience maintained the formal procedure of conscience as encapsulated in the 
question “What must I do to be able to live with myself?” at the cost of maintaining the 
normative dimension. I argued that if conscience is to be normative, then it also needs social 
existence and public practices with which it can communicate and instantiate its claim to 
be about the good.  Formalism requires some way of mediating a principled moral 
standpoint with actual historical and social practices.  So, formalism of conscience 
necessitates a political ethic that can consider the creation of institutions, the formation of 
practices, and the sustaining of civic values and virtues–such as love–strong enough to 
inspire, motivate and sustain the modern moral order’s universalist-egalitarian 
commitments.  That is simply not possible in Arendt’s scheme, which is designed to keep 
love out of politics. By enforcing a separation between what is private and what is public, 
and between what is moral and what is political, Arendt robbed conscience of a place in 
public life where it could have been shaped by goods held in common and mutual 
recognition might have been possible.  When conscience is placed in a private sphere 
separated from actual historical, social and cultural practices, it falls apart and the 
consciousness of the beautiful soul re-emerges. This is why Gillian Rose criticized Arendt 
for succumbing to the temptation of the beautiful soul and representing, 
phenomenologically, Germany during the transition from Social Democracy to totalitarian 
rule.   
 
Elaborating on Rose’s insights, I conclude that if we are going to continue to appeal to 
conscience in moral matters without being diverted by the project of cultivating beautiful 
souls, then we need to be emphatic that (1) ethics is about more than decision-making and 
that (2) ethics is inseparable from politics. As to the first point, ethics is more fundamentally 
about habits than about decisions.  It is not that moral decisions are unimportant–indeed 
the chapter IV outlined why it is best to view conscience as a discourse about moral 
decision-making–but that our decisions are not all important.  After all, it is the habits you 
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practice that determine what choices you think you have to decide from.  As to the second 
point, getting the relation between ethics and politics right requires theorizing from another 
standpoint. Until that happens, conscience and all its problems will continue to call 
attention to the inadequate relationship between ethics and politics.   
 
If we align conscience with a more substantive account of the good and take an open stance 
towards the idea of self-giving Christian love, as Taylor proposes, then conscience acquires 
certain distinctive features (chapter VI).  First of all, conscience can be treated as a learned 
discourse, and as form of human agency. It is therefore liable to error and failure but also 
malleable to processes of formation. Conscience, understood as a discourse about moral 
decision-making, is conditioned by my beliefs about myself and it therefore requires a 
certain degree of reflexive self-awareness. Reflexive self-awareness entails coming to know 
myself in and through a community of persons rather than in solitary introspection. 
Conscience is also conditioned by my beliefs about how things are with the world at large. 
A degree of realism is therefore required to avoid reducing our understanding of how things 
are in ourselves and in the world to what can be generated merely by what we will or desire 
to be the case.  
 
From a theological perspective, the authority of conscience does not need to be established 
on the basis of infallibility or by equating the voice of conscience with the voice of God. 
Nor is the authority of conscience relativized by efforts to attribute claims of conscience to 
naturalistic sources, as if they were merely reflective of subjective inclinations or social 
conditioning. Instead, the “voice of conscience” can be understood as something we have 
constructed for ourselves from a variety of sources, taking into account our personal 
experience and self-knowledge, our apprehension of the truth of the world around us, 
religious teaching, social teaching, our feelings and intuitions. Rather than treating 
conscience as having its own authority, the imperative nature of conscience can be 
understood as deriving from the reality to which it assents. That reality has a source that is 
external to the self and society, though it is discerned in and through them. Developing 
these features of conscience gives us a real shot at affirming both the formalism and 
normativity of conscience, as well as an alternative to cultivating our self-images as beautiful 




As we saw, Charles Pierce observed that people tend to fall back on the authority of 
conscience during the breakdown of the nation-state, when politics is no longer integrated 
with ethics and there is no longer any sufficiently close authority, external to the individual, 
that can direct conduct effectively. The divisions that characterize the political landscape 
in the wake of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump 
in the United States have been correlated with the breakdown of the nation-state, the rise 
of populism and the distrust of authority and of truth.527  These are the very circumstances 
in which men and women increasingly fall back on conscience as the only source of moral 
authority, so it is more important than ever to understand the dangers of becoming a 
beautiful soul.   
 
The individual searching for a way through the challenges of this age does have an 
alternative to cultivating a beautiful soul. On a theoretical level, the way to avoid becoming 
a beautiful soul is to maintain the formalism and normatively of conscience. On a practical 
level, the way to avoid becoming a beautiful soul is to be wary of making claims of 
conscience in public discourse, especially in the current climate where many maintain that 
they have the right to spread false assertions and alternative facts as true if they truly believe 
they are right. Given that the language of conscience is not likely to go out of currency, the 
challenge for the time being will be to use claims of conscience economically in public 
discourse, and to act, as Rose put it, not on behalf of our own “damaged good” but to take 

















527 For a recent critical analysis of those political debates in light of Gillian Rose’s reflections, see Anna 
Rowlands, “Beginning in the Middle: The Third City and the Politics of Membership,” in Misrecognitions: 





Abbey, Ruth. “Theorizing Secularity 3.” In Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on 
Religion and Theology in the Work of Charles Taylor, edited by Carlos D. Colorado and 
Justin D. Klassen, 98-124. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014. 
Andrew, Edward G. Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and 
Modern Subjectivity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. 
Aquinas, Thomas. Questiones Disputatae De Veritate. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952. 
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future. Edited by Jerome Kohn. London: Penguin, 2006. 
———. “Civil Disobedience.” In Crises of the Republic, 49-102. San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1972. 
———. “Collective Responsibility.” In Responsibility and Judgment, edited by John Kohn, 
147-58. New York: Schocken, 2003. 
———. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press, 1965. 
———. The Human Condition: Second Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. 
———. The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think. Vol. 1, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1981. 
———. Love and Saint Augustine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
———. Men in Dark Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970. 
———. The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Penguin Books Limited, 2017. 
———. “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship.” Edited by Jerome Kohn, 17-48. 
Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken, 2003. 
———. “Philosophy and Politics.” Social Research: An International Quarterly 71, no. 3 (Fall 
2004): 427-54. 
———. “Political Experiences in the Twentieth Century. Lecture Notes. The New 
School for Social Research. Series: Subject File, 1949-1975.”  The Hannah Arendt 
Papers (1968). https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/arendtthtml/series.html  
———. The Promise of Politics. New York: Schocken Books, 2005. 
———. Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess. Translated by Richard Winston and Clare 
Winston. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
———. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books, 2003. 
———. “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy.” In Responsibility and Judgment, edited by 
John Kohn, 49-146: Schocken, 2003. 
———. “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture.” Social Research 38, no. 3 (1971): 
417-46. 
Arendt, Hannah, Gerschom Scholem, Marie Louise Knott, and Anthony David. The 
Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2017. 
Barth, Karl, and Dietrich Braun. Ethics. New York: Seabury Press, 1981. 
Baugh, Bruce. French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism. London: Routledge, 2003. 
Baylor, Michael G. Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther. 
Leiden: Brill, 1977. 
Beck, Julie. “The Folly of ‘Purity Politics’: An Interview with Alexis Shotwell.”  The 
Atlantic (2017). Published electronically Jan 20.  
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/01/purity-politics/513704/ 
Beddow, Michael. The Fiction of Humanity: Studies in the Bildungsroman from Wieland to Thomas 
Mann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
  
179 
Beiner, Ronald. “Love and Worldliness: Hannah Arendt’s Reading of Saint Augustine.” 
Chap. 12 In Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, edited by L. May and J. Kohn, 269-
84. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997. 
Benhabib, Seyla. “Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem.” Chap. 3 In Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt, edited by D. Villa, 65-85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006. 
———. “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought.” Political 
Theory 16, no. 1 (1988): 29-51. 
———. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
Bernstein, Richard J. “Arendt on Thinking.” Chap. 14 In Cambridge Companion to Hannah 
Arendt, edited by D. Villa, 277-92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
———. “Did Hannah Arendt Change Her Mind?” Chap. 6 In Hannah Arendt: Twenty 
Years Later, edited by Larry May and Jerome Kohn, 127- 46. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1997. 
Billy, Dennis J., and James Keating. Conscience and Prayer: The Spirit of Catholic Moral 
Theology. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2001. 
Boyle, Nicholas. Goethe: The Poet and the Age. Vol. 2, Revolution and Renunciation, 1790-1803. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Brandom, Robert. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. 
Breidenthal, Thomas. “Jesus Is My Neighbor: Arendt, Augustine, and the Politics of 
Incarnation.” Modern Theology 14, no. 4 (October 2002): 489-503. 
Bretherton, Luke. Christ and the Common Life: Political Theology and the Case for Democracy. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 2019. 
Brownlee, Timothy. “Conscience and Religion in Hegel’s Later Political Philosophy.” The 
Owl of Minerva 43, no. 1-2 (2011-12): 41-72. 
Buckler, Steve. “Ethics and the Vocation of Politics.” In Action and Appearance: Ethics and the 
Politics of Writing in Hannah Arendt, edited by A. Yeatman, C. Barbour, P. Hansen 
and M. Zolkos, 117-33. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. 
Buechler, Ralph W. “Germany, Austria, Switzerland: 17th-and 18th-Century 
Auto/Biography.” In Encyclopedia of Life Writing: Autobiographical and Biographical 
Forms, edited by Margaretta Jolly. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Callahan, Sidney C. In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making. San 
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991. 
Canovan, Margaret. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Universitty Press, 1992. 
Childress, James F. “Appeals to Conscience.” Ethics 89, no. 4 (1979): 315-35. 
Chrysostom, John. On Wealth and Poverty. Translated by Catharine P. Roth. Yonkers: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984. 
Church, Catholic. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium Et Spes. 
Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1965. 
Clairvaux, Bernard. Bernard of Clairvaux: Sermons on the Song of Songs. Translated by Irene 
Edmonds. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1980. 
Coles, Stanley Hauerwas and Romand. “‘Long Live the Weeds and the Wilderness Yet’: 
Reflections on A Secular Age.” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (July 2010): 349-62. 
Colorado, Carlos D. “Transcendent Sources and the Dispossession of the Self.” Chap. 3 
In Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion and Theology in the Work of 
Charles Taylor, edited by Carlos D. Colorado and Justin D. Klassen, 73-97. Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014. 
  
180 
Conn, Walter E. Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence. Birmingham: Religious 
Education Press, 1981. 
Curran, Charles E. Conscience. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2004. 
Curran, Jane Veronica. Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship: A Reader's Commentary. 
Rochester: Camden House, 2002. 
D'Arcy, Eric. Conscience and Its Right to Freedom. London: Sheed and Ward, 1961. 
D’entreves, Maurizio Passerin. "Arendt’s Theory of Judgment." Chap. 12 In Cambridge 
Companion to Hannah Arendt, 245-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006. 
De Nys, Martin J. “Conscience and Ethical Life.” The Owl of Minerva 43, no. 1-2 (2011): 
139-47. 
de Vries, Hent. “The Deep Conditions of Secularity.” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (July 
2010): 382-403. 
Deiulio, Laura. “The Voice of the Schöne Seele.” In Challenging Separate Spheres: Female Bildung 
in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Germany, edited by M.E. Goozé, 93-108 Bern: 
Peter Lang, 2007. 
Delhaye, Philippe, and Charles Underhill Quinn. The Christian Conscience. New York: 
Desclee, 1968. 
Ellison, David R. Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Literature: From the Sublime to the 
Uncanny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Women and War. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 
Feldman, Karen S. Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006. 
Field-Bibb, Jacqueline. Women Towards Priesthood: Ministerial Politics and Feminist Praxis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Fingarette, Herbert. Self-Deception. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 
Gay, Peter. The Naked Heart: Bourgeois Experience Victoria to Freud. London: HarperCollins, 
1996. 
Gilby, Thomas. Summa Theologiae: Volume 18, Principles of Morality: 1a2ae. 18-21. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Glaser, John W. “Conscience and Super-Ego: A Key Distinction.” Theological Studies 32 
(1971): 30-47. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Eric A. Blackall, and Victor Lange. Wilhelm Meister's 
Apprenticeship. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Gram, Moltke S. “Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel’s Critique of ‘The Moral World-
View.’” In The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays, edited by 
Jon Stewart, 307-33. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. 
Greene, Robert A. “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis.” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 52, no. 4 (1991): 617-44. 
Gregory, Eric. Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
Griffin, Leslie C. “The Catholic Bishops vs. The Contraceptive Mandate.” Religions 6 
(2015): 1411-32. 
Guignon, Charles. On Being Authentic. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2004. 
Gula, Richard M. Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1989. 
Haas, John M. Crisis of Conscience. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996. 
Hammond, Guyton B. Conscience and Its Recovery: From the Frankfurt School to Feminism. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993. 
  
181 
Hanigan, James P. “Conscience and the Holy Spirit.” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological 
Society of America 51 (1996): 227-46. 
Hansen, Phillip. “Individual Responsibility and Political Authority Hannah Arendt at the 
Intersection of Moral and Political Philosophy.” In Action and Appearance: Ethics and 
the Politics of Writing in Hannah Arendt, edited by Anna Yeatman, Charles Barbour, 
Phillip Hansen and Magdalena Zolkos, 134-49. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2011. 
Harris, Henry S. Hegel: Phenomenology and System. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1995. 
———. Hegel's Ladder. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. 
Hauerwas, Stanley. “Casuistry as a Narrative Art.” Interpretation 37, no. 4 (1983): 377-88. 
———. The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Translated by H.B. 
Nisbet. Edited by A.W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
———. Phenomenology of Spirit Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1977. 
———. “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate.” In Early Theological Writings, edited by 
T.M. Knox and R. Kroner, 182-301. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1971. 
Herdt, Jennifer A. “The Authentic Individual in the Network of Agape.” Chap. 7 In 
Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion and Theology in the Work of Charles 
Taylor, edited by Carlos Colorado and Justin Klassen, 191-216. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2014. 
———. “Between Imago Dei and the Bildungsroman:  Ethical Formation for Our World.” 
New Haven: Yale Divinity School, 2009. 
———. Forming Humanity: Redeeming the German Bildung Tradition. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, forthcoming, 2019. 
Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. 
London: Penguin Group, 1991. 
Hill, Thomas E. “Four Conceptions of Conscience.” In Integrity and Conscience, edited by 
Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams, 13-52. New York: New York University Press 
1998. 
Hirsch, Mirianne. “Spiritual Bildung: The Beautiful Soul as Paradigm.” In The Voyage In:  
Fictions of Female Development, edited by Mirianne Hirsch Elizabeth Abel, Elizabeth 
Langland, 23-48. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983. 
Hogan, Linda. Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition. New York: Paulist 
Press, 2000. 
Holsclaw, Geoffrey. Transcending Subjects: Augustine, Hegel and Theology. Challenges in 
Contemporary Theology. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2016. 
Howard, Jason J. “Translating Convictions into a Clear Conscience.” The Owl of Minerva 
43, no. 1-2 (2011): 107-23. 
Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit Translated by 
S.Cherniak and J. Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. 
Inwood, Michael. Phenomenology of Spirit: Translated with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 2018. 
Jackson, Timothy P. Political Agape: Christian Love and Liberal Democracy. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015. 
  
182 
Jacobitti, Suzanne D. “Thinking About the Self.” Chap. 9 In Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years 
Later, edited by Larry May and Jerome Kohn, 199-220. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1996. 
Jager, Erice. The Book of the Heart. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 
Janz, Paul D. “Transcendence, ‘Spin’, and the Jamesian Open Space.” Chap. 2 In 
Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age, edited by Justin D. Klassen and Carlos D. 
Colorado, 39-70. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014. 
Jones, L. Gregory. Transformed Judgment. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1990. 
Jonsen, Albert R., and Stephen E. Toulmin. The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral 
Reasoning. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
Kampowski, Stephan. Arendt, Augustine, and the New Beginning: The Action Theory and Moral 
Thought of Hannah Arendt in Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008. 
Kant, Immanuel. Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kateb, George. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil. Lanham: Rowman & Allanheld, 
1987. 
Kazim, Emre. Kant on Conscience: A Unified Approach to Moral Self-Consciousness. Leiden: Brill, 
2017. 
Keane, Webb. Ethical Life: Its Natural and Social Histories. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2015. 
Keenan, James F. “The Return of Casuistry.” Theological Studies 57, no. 1 (1996): 123-39. 
Kerr, Fergus. “How Much Can a Philosopher Do?” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (July 2010): 
321-36. 
Kiess, John. Hannah Arendt and Theology. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016.  
Klassen, Justin D. “The Affirmation of Existential Life in Charles Taylor’s a Secular 
Age.” Chap. 1 In Aspiring to Fullness in a Secular Age: Essays on Religion and Theology in 
the Work of Charles Taylor, edited by Carlos D. Colorado and Justin D. Klassen, 13-
38. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014. 
Konersmann, Ralf. “Seele, Schöne.’ In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edited by 
Joachim Ritter u. Karlfried Gründer, 89-92. Basel 1995. 
Kries, Douglas. “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome’s Ezekiel 
Commentary.’ Traditio 57 (2002): 67-83. 
Krimstein, Ken. The Three Escapes of Hannah Arendt: A Tyranny of Truth. New York: 
Bloomsbury USA, 2018. 
Kymlicka, Will. “The Ethics of Inarticulacy.” Inquiry 34, no. 2 (June 1991): 155-82. 
La Caze, Marguerite. “The Miraculous Power of Forgiveness and the Promise.” Chap. 11 
In Action and Appearance: Ethics and the Politics of Writing in Hannah Arendt, edited by 
Anna Yeatman, Charles Barbour, Philip Hansen and Magdalena Zolkos, 150-65. 
London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2001. 
Lacan, Jacques. The Language of the Self. Translated by Anthony Wilden. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1968. 
Lamont, John R. “Conscience, Freedom, Rights: Idols of the Enlightenment.” The Thomist 
73, no. 2 (2009): 169-239. 
Langston, Douglas C. Conscience and Other Virtues. University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2008. 
Lauer, Quentin. A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1993. 
Lehmann, Paul Louis. Ethics in a Christian Context. London: SCM Press, 1963. 
Lewis, C.S. Studies in Words. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
  
183 
Librett, Jeffrey S. “Rhapsodic Dispositions: Engenderments of the Ground in the 
Discourse of the ‘Beautiful Soul’ (Shaftesbury, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger).” Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 1989. 
Liu, Lydia H. “Shadows of Universalism: The Untold Story of Human Rights around 
1948.” Critical Inquiry 40, no. 4 (2014): 385–417. 
Lloyd, Vincent. “On the Use of Gillian Rose.” Heythrop Journal 48, no. 5 (Sept 2007): 697-
706. 
Lonzi, Carla. “Let’s Spit on Hegel.” Translated by Veronica Newman. In Feminist 
Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel, edited by Patricia J. Mills. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. “Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Social Practice: What 
Holds Them Apart?” In The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, 104-22. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
———. “Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good.” In The Macintyre Reader, edited by 
Kelvin Knight, 235–66. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. 
———. “The Recovery of Moral Agency?” In The Best Christian Writing 2000, edited by 
John Wilson, 110-36. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000. 
———. “What Has Not Happened in Moral Philosophy.” The Yale Journal of Criticism, no. 
5 (1992): 193-9. 
Maclure, Jocelyn, and Charles Taylor. Secularism and Freedom of Conscience Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011. 
Mahony, Deirdre L. Hannah Arendt’s Ethics. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018. 
Mathewes, Charles T. “Pluralism, Otherness, and the Augustinian Tradition.” Modern 
Theology 14, no. 1 (1998): 83-112. 
McCabe, Herbert. “Aquinas and Good Sense.” New Blackfriars 67, no. 798 (1986): 419-31. 
McCarthy, David Matzko. “Veritatis Splendor: Conscience and Following Christ.” Studies 
in Christian Ethics 8, no. 2 (October 1995): 36-53. 
McGinn, Colin. Ethics, Evil, and Fiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Melina, Livio. “Moral Conscience and Communio: Toward a Response to the Challenge of 
Ethical Pluralism.” Communio 20, no. Winter (1992): 673-86. 
Miller, Donald E. The Wing-Footed Wanderer: Conscience and Transcendence. Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1977. 
Miller, Richard B. Casuistry and Modern Ethics: A Poetics of Practical Reasoning. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Milne, Drew. “The Beautiful Soul: From Hegel to Beckett.” Diacritics 32, no. 1 (2002): 63-
82. 
Moretti, Franco, and Albert Sbragia. The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European 
Culture. London: Verso, 2000. 
Mount, Eric. Conscience and Responsibility. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969. 
Moyar, Dean. Hegel's Conscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge, 1970. 
Neaum, Rachel S. “A Response to the Use of ‘Minority’ in Sir Philip Mawer's Review.” 
In Women and the Church 2017. 
Neiman, Susan. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015. 
Neuhouser, Frederick. Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000. 
Norrie, Alan. Law and the Beautiful Soul. London: The Glass House Press, 2005. 
Norris, Richard A. The Song of Songs: Interpreted by Early Christian and Medieval Commentators. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003. 
  
184 
Norton, Robert Edward. The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995. 
O’Connell, Timothy E. “An Understanding of Conscience.” Chap. 2 In Conscience: 
Readings in Moral Theology edited by Charles E. Curran, 25-38. New York: Paulist 
Press, 2004. 
O’Donovan, O. Common Objects of Love: Moral Reflection and the Shaping of Community: The 
2001 Stob Lectures. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2002. 
Ojakangas, Mika. The Voice of Conscience: A Political Genealogy of Western Ethical Experience. 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013. 
Pierce, Claude A. Conscience in the New Testament. London: SCM Press, 1955. 
Pinckaers, Servais. “Conscience and the Christian Tradition.” In The Pinckaers Reader: 
Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, 321-34. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2005. 
———. “Conscience and the Virtue of Prudence.” In The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing 
Thomistic Moral Theology, edited by John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus, 342-55. 
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005. 
Pinkard, Terry. German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
———. “Hegel's Phenomenology and Logic: An Overview.” Chap. 8 In The Cambridge 
Companion to German Idealism, edited by K. Ameriks, 161-79. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
———. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. 
———. “Norms, Facts and Forms of Life in the Phenomenology.” (2009). 
https://terrypinkard.weebly.com/articles-for-downloading.html. 
———. “Virtues, Morality, and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices.” European Journal of 
Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 217-38. 
———. “What Is a ‘Shape of Spirit’?” Chap. 7 In Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical 
Guide, edited by Dean Moyar and Michael Quante, 112-29. Cambrige: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Plotinus. Enneads. Translated by A. H. Armstrong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1969. 
Potts, Timothy C. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002. 
Press, Eyal. Beautiful Souls: The Courage and Conscience of Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012. 
Rahner, Karl. Nature and Grace: And Other Essays. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963. 
Redfield, Marc. Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the Bildungsroman. Ithaca, N.Y. ; 
London: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
Rogers, Richard A. “From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and 
Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation.” Communication Theory 16, no. 4 
(2006): 474-503. 
Rose, Gillian. The Broken Middle. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
———. Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. 
———. Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 




Rowlands, Anna. “Beginning in the Middle: The Third City and the Politics of 
Membership.” Chap. 1 In Misrecognitions: Gillian Rose and the Task of Political Theology, 
edited by Joshua B. Davis, 29-46. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2018. 
Russon, John E. Reading Hegel's Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2004. 
Sandel, Michael J. “Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?” Chap. 5 In Articles of 
Faith, Articles of Peace: The Religious Liberty Clauses and the American Public Philosophy, 
edited by James D. Hunter and Os Guinness, 74-92. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1990. 
Sax, Benjamin C. “Active Individuality and the Language of Confession: The Figure of 
the Beautiful Soul in the Lehrjahre and the Phänomenologie.” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 21, no. 4 (1983): 437-66. 
Schneewind, Jerome B. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Sepper, Elizabeth. “Taking Conscience Seriously.” Virginia Law Review 98 (September 21 
2012): 1501-73. 
Shaftesbury, Lord. Shaftesbury: Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000.  
Shapiro, Ian, and Robert Adams. Integrity and Conscience: Nomos XL. New York: New York 
University Press, 1998. 
Shaw, Germain Grisez and Russell. “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth.” In 
Conscience, edited by C.E. Curran, 39-50. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 2004. 
Shotwell, Alexis. Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2016. 
Siedentop, Larry. Inventing the Individual. London: Penguin Books, 2006. 
Siep, Ludwig. “The ‘Aufhebung’ of Morality in Ethical Life.” In Hegel's Philosophy of Action, 
edited by L.S. Stepelevich, D. Lamb, Hegel Society of America and Hegel Society 
of Great Britain, 137-55. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983. 
Sjoberg, Laura. “Women Fighters and the ‘Beautiful Soul’ Narrative.” International Review 
of the Red Cross 92, no. 877 (March 2010). 
Smith, Christian. Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Smith, James K. A. How (Not) to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor. Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014. 
Smith, Robert J. Conscience and Catholicism: The Nature and Function of Conscience in 
Contemporary Roman Catholic Moral Theology. Lanham: University Press of America, 
1998. 
Spaemann, Robert. Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something.’ Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
Speight, Allen. Hegel, Literature, and the Problem of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
Staten, John C. Conscience and the Reality of God. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988. 
Steck, Christopher. “Re-Embedding Moral Agency.” Journal of Religious Ethics 41, no. 2 
(2013): 332-53. 
———. “Saintly Voyeurism: A Methodological Necessity for the Christian Ethicist?” In 
New Wine, New Wineskins: A Next Generation Reflects on Key Issues in Catholic Moral 
Theology, edited by William C. Mattison, 25-44. London: Sheed & Ward, 2005. 
Stephenson, Roger. “Review of Robert E. Norton, Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in 
the Eighteenth Century.” Modern Language Review (2001): 806-09. 
  
186 
Stringfellow, William. Conscience and Obedience. Wipf & Stock I, 2004. 
Strohm, Paul. Conscience: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Suttor, Timothy. Summa Theologiae Man: Ia. 75-83. Vol. 11: Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
Swales, Martin. The German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978. 
Tanner, Kathryn. Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology. London: T&T 
Clark, 2001. 
Taylor, Charles. A Catholic Modernity? Edited by James L. Heft. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
———. “Challenging Issues About the Secular Age.” Modern Theology 26, no. 3 (July 
2010): 404-16. 
———. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
———. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge Universityt Press, 1975. 
———. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 
———. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. 
———. Sources of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Verene, Donald P. Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1985. 
Vetlesen, Arne Johan. “Hannah Arendt on Conscience and Evil.” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 27, no. 5 (2001): 1-33. 
Villa, Dana. “Introduction.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, edited by Dana 
Villa, 1-21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
———. Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Vischer, Robert K. Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between Person and 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Wainwright, William J. Reason and the Heart: A Prologomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
Walzer, Michael. “Conscientious Objection.” In Obligations: Essys on Disobedience, War, and 
Citizenship, 120-45. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
Wand, Bernard. “The Content and Function of Conscience.” The Journal of Philosophy 58, 
no. 24 (1961): 765-72. 
Webster, John. “God and Conscience.” In The Doctrine of God and Theological Ethics, 147-65. 
London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006. 
Wellmon, Chad. Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Freedom. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 
Westphal, Kenneth R. The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Hoboken: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2009. 
Williams, Robert R. Hegel's Ethics of Recognition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998. 
Williams, Rowan D. “Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of 
Gillian Rose.” Modern Theology 11, no. 1 (January 1995): 3-22. 
———. “Making Moral Decisions.” In Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, edited by 
Robin Gill, 3-15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
———. On Augustine. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016. 
———. “‘Religious Realism’: On Not Quite Agreeing with Don Cupitt.” In Wrestling with 
Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, edited by Mike Higton, 228-54 Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007. 
  
187 
———. “‘The Sadness of the King’: Gillian Rose, Hegel, and the Pathos of Reason.” 
Telos no. 173, Winter (2015): 21-36. 
Winters, Francis X. “The Banality of Virtue: Reflections on Hannah Arendt’s 
Reinterpretation of Political Ethics.” In Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and 
Thought of Hannah Arendt, edited by James W. Bernauer, 187-218. Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987. 
Wokalek, Marie. Die Schöne Seele: Eine Denkfigur: Zur Semantik Von Gewissen Und Geschmack Bei 
Rousseau, Wieland, Schiller, Goethe. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011. 
Women, Archbishops’ Commission on the Ministry of. The Ministry of Women: Report of the 
Archbishops’ Commission. London: Press and Publications Board of the Church 
Assembly, 1935. 
Yeatman, Anna. “Individuality and Politics: Thinking with and Beyond Hannah Arendt.” 
Chap. 6 In Action and Appearance, edited by Anna Yeatman, Charles Barbour, Philip 
Hansen and Magdalena Zolkos, 69-86. London: Bloomsbury, 2011. 
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004. 
 
